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This thesis addresses the question of whether corporate risk management adds value to a 
firm by examining the linkage between the cost of equity capital and property insurance 
in China. Over the last decade or so, several studies have examined the direct impact of 
risk management (derivatives or insurance use) on firm value. Utilizing an agency 
theory framework, the present study adds to the extant literature by investigating the 
corporate risk management-value relation from a more focused and novel perspective 
using a panel data set of 395 publicly listed Chinese companies (PLCs) for the period 
2003-2007. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and modified price earnings 
growth (MPEG) models are employed to estimate the cost of equity. The results of the 
study suggest that Chinese PLCs purchasing property insurance tend to have lower costs 
of equity. Also a non-linear U-shape relation between the cost of equity and the extent 
of property insurance use is found. Given the inflection point occurs above the 90th 
percentile of the sample of firms, property insurance appears to be beneficial to most 
Chinese PLCs. The present study also shows that property insurance reduces the cost of 
equity by mitigating agency problems such as the managerial risk aversion incentive. 
Indeed, this is the first study that finds evidence that agency theory-based arguments 
appear to be appropriate in explaining the relation between property insurance use and 
the cost of equity. The empirical results are further robust to within-firm and cross-firm 
variations and unlikely to be driven by endogeneity problem. Therefore, the present 
study contributes new and important insights on the role of insurance - a pure risk 
hedging (indemnity) contract - in contributing to improvements in the market value of 
firms. This aspect of the research is particularly important in major emerging markets, 
such as China, that are attracting increasing attention from domestic and foreign 
investors but still suffer from severe market imperfections (e.g., information 
asymmetry) and  an undeveloped financial and legal infrastructure compared with 
Western countries. Therefore, it is concluded that the results of this study could have 
potentially important commercial and/or public policy implications for corporate 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AEG Model             Abnormal Earnings Growth Model 
AMEX                        American Stock Exchange 
APT                         Arbitrage Pricing Theory  
ASBE                         Accounting Standards for Business Entities  
BSAM                         Bureau of State Assets Management  
CAPM                         Capital Asset Pricing Model  
CBRC                         China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CIE                         Chinese Industrial Enterprises  
CIRC                         China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
CSRC                         China Securities Regulatory Commission 
DDM                         Gordon Dividend growth model 
EPS                         Earnings per Share  
FDI                         Foreign Direct Investment  
FF3F                         Fama-French Three-Factor 
FM Regression           Fama-MacBeth Regression 
Forex                         Foreign Exchange  
GAAP                         Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GDP                         Gross Domestic Product  
HKSE                         Hong Kong Stock Exchange  
HSBC                         Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
IAS                         International Accounting Standards  
IMF                         International Monetary Fund  
IPO                         Initial Public Offering  
LLC                         Limited Liability Company  
MOF                         Ministry of Finance  
MPEG                         Model Modified Price Earnings Growth Model 
NASDAQ                    National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation            
                                     System                                
NBSC                          National Bureau of statistics of China 
NPV                          Net Present Value                 
NYSE                          New York Stock Exchange 
PBOC                          People’s Bank of China  
xii 
 
PEG Model             Price Earnings Growth Model 
PICC                         People’s Insurance Company of China 
PLCs                         Publicly Listed Companies     
QFII                         Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
RIV Model             Residual Income Valuation Model 
R-L Model             Rubinstein-Leland Model 
ROE                         Return on Equity  
SGX                         Singapore Exchange  
SHFE                          Shanghai Future Exchange 
SHSE                         Shanghai Stock Exchange 
SOEs                         State-Owned Enterprises  
SZSE                         Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
TCE Theory             Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
UK                         United Kingdom 
US                               United States  
WACC              Weighted Average Cost of Capital      
WMW Test             Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test 










CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Whether a firm is rewarded by engaging in the risk management is an important but 
nevertheless open question in the finance literature. Under the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) framework, risk management decisions do not impact on the market value of a 
firm as shareholders can costlessly diversify their risks across a balanced portfolio of 
investments. However, there is ample evidence to suggest that due to market 
imperfections - for example, financial distress/bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz, 1985), 
taxes (Stulz, 1996; Leland, 1998), and agency problems (Bessembinder, 1991; Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993) risk management can be a value enhancing activity. 
Instead of examining the impact of property insurance an overall proxy of firm value-
Tobin’s Q - as recent research (e.g. Zou, 2010) has done, this thesis investigates 
specifically how property insurance affects firm value directly through the cost of 
equity. 1  The present study thus offers a more focused, novel and ‘cleaner’ test of 
financial benefits of commercial insurance buying decisions then has hitherto been the 
case.  
 
It is widely acknowledged in the finance literature that the cost of equity capital is 
fundamental to corporate strategic decisions as it impacts on firms’ profitability, market 
share and ultimately, their traded market value (Easley and O’Hara, 2004, p. 1553; 
Cummins and Phillips, 2005, p. 442). What factors that influence the cost of equity 
capital of firms are therefore important considerations for investors, financial analysts 
and other stakeholders with an interest in the market pricing (valuation) of corporate 
assets. A key consideration influencing the pricing of a firm’s assets is the availability 
of public and private information regarding the exposure of those assets (and their 
ability to generate cash flows) to future risks (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). One 
                                                 
1 Botosan (2006, p. 31) defines the estimated (implied/imputed) equity cost of capital (r) as “. . . the 
minimum rate of return equity investors require for providing capital to the firm.” In other words, the cost 
of equity is an opportunity cost concept. The cost of equity can also be applied as the risk-adjusted 
discount rate to expected future cash flows in order to determine the market value of a firm (Lee, Walker 
and Christensen, 2006, p. 12). Put another way, the cost of equity can be viewed as the internal rate of 




financial contracting technique that is commonly used by companies to mitigate asset-
risk is property insurance (Mayers and Smith, 1981, 1982, 1987; Ashby and Diacon, 
1996; Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008) 2 . Cassidy, Constand and Corbett (1990) 
demonstrate empirically that firms’ traded value increases after planned rises in risk 
management(including insurance) spending were announced to shareholders of United 
States (US)-based publicly listed companies (PLCs). Sprecher and Pertl (1983) provide 
further US evidence that severe loss events reduce value for shareholders implying that 
the corporate purchase of property insurance is likely to be a positive net present value 
(NPV) project (see also Ashby and Diacon, 1996). Minton and Schrand (1999) also 
report that firms with greater cash flow volatility (such as that arising from catastrophe) 
tend to face high costs of raising external capital and so invest less in positive NPV 
projects. Therefore, hedging (insurance) can increase value for firms by reducing cash 
flow risk. In addition, Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) 
demonstrate that managers of firms are more likely to use risk management techniques 
(such as insurance), and use them to a greater extent, when they face tight financial 
constraints and/or they have greater growth opportunities. Therefore, information on the 
amount of property insurance purchased by a firm could influence its cost of equity 
capital, and therefore, its traded value, particularly in asymmetric markets such as China 
(Zou, 2010). 
 
It is well known that in private credit negotiations assets-based (property) insurance 
helps to reduce agency costs for capital suppliers thereby reducing borrowers’ market 
cost of capital (Zou and Adams, 2008a, 2009). Grace and Rebello (1993) also point out 
that the managerial purchase of property insurance can provide a positive signal to 
financial markets as to the quality of productive assets and their potential to generate 
future cash flows. Hau (2006) further reports that property insurance provides additional 
liquidity to firms that have to replace lost and/or impaired assets arising from 
catastrophes in order to restore productivity and fulfil their contractual obligations to 
customers. Hau (2006) adds that an uninsured property loss could increase a firm’s cost 
of capital leading to a downgrade in its credit rating, enhanced business disruption, and 
reduction in free cash flows. Another argument advanced by such scholars as Doherty 
                                                 
2 Insurance is a risk management (indemnification) technique that helps to alleviate business risks (e.g., 
the adverse effects of environmental uncertainty on a firm’s current and prospective earnings ability) and 
financial risks (e.g., the bankruptcy risk faced by capital providers in investing in/lending to users of 
funds) (Doherty, 2000). 
3 
 
and Smith (1993) and Doherty (2000) is that property insurance not only reduces cash 
flow volatility in companies but helps managers to ‘filter out’ the effects of 
unanticipated shock events (e.g., catastrophes) on traded share prices by reducing 
bankruptcy risk (so-called extreme ‘left-tail outcomes’). Doherty and Lamm-Tennant 
(2009) further point out that by reducing the “noise” effect of unanticipated insurable 
losses and increasing the signalling power (i.e., information content) of corporate 
earnings, insurance provides investors with a potentially clearer picture of a firm’s 
underlying ability to generate future cash flows and thus its economic value.  
 
1.2 Rationale for the Research Project 
The subject investigated in the present study is potentially important as the cost of 
equity is a major determinant of a company’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
that is used as the discount rate in determining the NPV of investment projects3 and 
evaluating capital budgeting decisions (Heinkel, Krau and Zenchner, 2001; Lee et al., 
2006). What is more, Sharfman and Fernando (2008, p. 570) argue that the link between 
risk management (such as insurance) and the cost of equity capital are fundamental 
strategic issues from the stand point of the firm and capital markets. This is because 
changes in (actual and perceived) levels of a firm’s riskiness decreases its cost-base and 
so potentially increases its ability to make greater profits from given levels of revenue 
generated. 
 
Furthermore, the linkage between risk management (insurance) and the cost of equity is 
particularly important in an emerging market such as China where the funding of 
corporate investment opportunities can be obfuscated by severe information asymmetry 
problems (Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000) and poorly developed legal and financial 
systems (Ge and Qiu, 2007), and where business activities can be disrupted as a result 
of environmental perils such as earthquakes and floods (Li and Peng, 2008). Zou and 
Adams (2008a) and Zou and Adams (2009) investigate the relation between property 
                                                 
3 Lee et al. (2006) report that the WACC is the total cost of financing the operations of the firm and can 
be expressed as: WACC = Ket (1-(Dt÷Vt) + Kdt(1-τc)(Dt÷Vt) where Ket is the cost of equity, Kdt is the 
cost of debt; Dt is the value of debt; Vt is the total value of the firm calculated as the sum of the value of 
equity and debt; and τc is the marginal rate of corporation tax. The cost of debt of listed companies is 
usually calculated as the sum of the cost of bank loans and cost of corporate bonds issued. However, the 
costs of bank loans of Chinese PLCs are not publicly available. As a result, an accurate esimate of the 
WACC for Chinese PLCs is not able to be computed in the current study.  
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insurance, debt capacity (leverage) and the cost of debt among PLCs in China. They 
find that property insurance mitigates information asymmetry problems, reduces the 
costs of financial distress and bankruptcy, and helps to expand corporate borrowing 
capacity as well as reducing the cost of debt. Their observation is consistent with the 
findings from Graham and Rogers’ (2002) research on hedging activities in the US 
corporate sector 4 . Moreover, in the first direct test of the link between property 
insurance and firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) Zou (2010) finds that assets 
(property) insurance is generally beneficial to shareholders though over-insurance can 
be value reducing5.  
  
Stulz (1996, p. 24) further postulates that besides increasing corporate debt capacity, 
hedging (e.g., via insurance) could, by reducing downside financial distress/bankruptcy 
risks, reduce the cost of equity, and thus encourage investors to increase their equity 
stakes in well-hedged (insured) firms. This is additional to the possibility that ex-post 
financing mechanisms, like property insurance, could help to release companies’ 
holdings of equity capital and so reduce its cost of usage (Shimpi, 2002)6. In other 
words, purchasing insurance can be viewed as a strategic choice alternative to using 
equity (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, p. 273). Hedging through the use of insurance 
could also benefit shareholders as it reduces unobservable uncertainty and thus enables 
investors to optimize their portfolio choices and maximize their private wealth 
objectives (De Marzo and Duffie, 1995). Furthermore, Poshakwale and Courtis (2005, p. 
433) report that for international banks, disclosing risk management information in the 
annual report and accounts was the most significant factor in reducing the cost of equity. 
Indeed, in a survey of the importance of corporate risk management among financial 
                                                 
4 Warner (1977) and Yamori (1999) show that bankruptcy costs are typically low compared with the 
potential costs of financial distress, suggesting that bankruptcy risk per se may be less important in 
motivating the corporate decision to buy property insurance than theory suggests.  
 
5 Tobin’s Q (defined as the ratio of the market value of equity and debt to the book value of total assets)  
could be an imprecise proxy for firm value as it could reflect firm size and industry effects as well as 
considerations such as market share (Zou, 2010). As noted in section 1.1 of this chapter, the current study 
is thus potentially a more robust test of the link between property insurance and firm valuation compared 
with Zou (2010). 
 
6 The reasoning here is that the financial savings realized from releasing equity are greater than the cost of 
the premiums that firms’ are charged in the insurance market. In these circumstances, risk transfer via 
insurance can be more economical and efficient than risk retention with capital coverage and so likely to 




analysts in the United Kingdom (UK), Ashby and Diacon (1998, p.39) found that 
reducing the cost of equity capital was viewed as an important attribute of purchasing 
corporate insurance. All this implies that property insurance could be a major 
determinant in reducing the cost of equity capital in the nascent Chinese corporate 
sector.  
 
Prior studies have not directly examined the effect of property insurance on the 
expected cost of equity capital for industrial companies operating in China or indeed, 
any other jurisdiction7. This study therefore seeks to fill this gap in the literature by 
using a unique 2003-2007 panel dataset to examine the relation between property 
insurance purchase and the cost of equity in Chinese PLCs.8 More specifically, the two 
main research questions that will be investigated in this study are as follows: 
 
Research Question 1: Does property insurance affect firms’ cost of equity capital? 
Research Question 2: If it does, then to what extent does property insurance impact on    
                                   firms’ cost of equity capital? 
 
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
This study examines empirically the relation between property insurance and the cost of 
equity among PLCs in China. To achieve this aim, the project has five distinct 
objectives: 
 
1. To examine the institutional environment within which Chinese PLCs operate. 
In particular, the unique setting of China’s financial markets and the salient 
features of Chinese PLCs are examined. 
 
                                                 
7 Zou and Adams (2008a) point out that the paucity of prior empirical tests is due to the off-balance sheet 
nature of corporate insurance information and the associated lack of public disclosure. Some prior US 
studies (e.g., Cummins and Harrington, 1985; Davidson, Cross and Thornton, 1992) have examined 
whether insurance affects the equity cost of capital. However, these studies have inherent limitations 
(e.g., the use of aggregate data; small samples). By using firm-specific data the present study enables a 
more precise and rigorous test of the insurance-cost of capital relation to be carried out. 
 
8  The insurance premium data are obtained from database of Chinese industrial enterprises (CIE) 
compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). The CIE data only provides insurance 
premium data from 2003 to 2007, because insurance premium data have not been routinely collected by 
the NBSC since 2008.  
6 
 
2. To select an appropriate theoretical framework from a review of the academic 
literature. 
 
3. To develop hypotheses (drawn from agency theory) and test those hypotheses 
empirically by means of univariate and multivariate (panel data) statistical 
analysis. 
 
4. To explain and evaluate the empirical results. 
 
5. To make conclusions, and consider the implications for policymaking and future 
research. 
 
1.4 Contribution of the Research 
The study should contribute to the existing insurance and finance literature, and 
generate regulatory/practical implications in at least four important: 
 
1. Empirical evidence on the relation between the cost of equity capital and 
property insurance is important because prior research (e.g., Doherty, 2000; 
Graham and Rogers, 2002; Swiss Re, 2005; O’Brien, 2006) suggests that 
corporate financing and risk management decisions are inextricably bound. For 
example, the contingent capital attributes of insurance can reduce the level of 
retained equity and so maximize reported returns on equity. More importantly, 
the monitoring function provided by insurers helps to minimize the risk of asset 
depletion and moral hazard (carelessness) by agent-managers. (e.g. see 
Diamond, 1984) In other words, insurance mitigates the agency costs of equity. 
However, prior research has not tested (e.g., due to limited availability of public 
data) the relation between the cost of equity capital and property insurance, and 
so this study contributes new and important insights on the interplay between 
the cost of capital and risk management that might be useful for insurance 
suppliers, brokers, managers, industry regulators, investors, and others. For 
example, lowering the cost of equity could be a key motivating factor for the 




2. This study provides new information on the relation between the cost of equity 
capital and risk management by utilizing a unique corporate insurance database. 
Unlike the use of financial derivatives’ data, which have characterized most 
previous risk management studies (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; 
Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell, 2007; Géczy, et al., 1997, 2007; Gay, Lin and 
Smith, 2011), insurance being a pure hedge (indemnity) contract cannot be used 
for speculation (Zou, 2010)9. Additionally, basis risk (where the hedge does not 
completely cover the risk exposure) can be a concern for users of derivatives 
and this could help explain both intra-industry and inter-industry variations in 
the use of derivative instruments (Haushalter, 2000, p. 147). Aunon-Nerin and 
Ehling (2008, pp. 298-299) go further in that they argue that corporate risk 
managers often do not have the expertise to accurately determine whether or not 
risk exposures should be hedged, and if so, the extent to which such risks should 
be hedged. Therefore, managers could be inhibited in their ability to apply 
financial derivative instruments effectively in dealing with strategic risks. The 
inability of decision-makers in firms to effectively manage risk exposures also 
means that it can be difficult in practice to ascertain whether firms use 
derivatives to hedge, speculate, or indeed, engage in a combination of these 
activities. For these reasons, the present study provides a potentially cleaner test 
of the research hypotheses than would be the case using financial derivatives 
data.  
 
3. The linkage between risk management (insurance) and the cost of equity is 
particularly important in an emerging market, such as China, where the funding 
of corporate investment opportunities can be obfuscated by severe information 
asymmetry problems and poorly developed legal and financial systems. 
Therefore, the study of Chinese market provides a good opportunity for testing 
and refining financial economics-based theories on the relation between cost of 
equity and risk management. The methodology and results of this study could 
thus act as a useful framework and benchmark for future insurance-based 
                                                 
9 Zou, Adams and Buckle (2003) also report that derivatives markets are relatively undeveloped in China 
compared with Western developed countries such as the UK and US. 
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research in both China and other Asian countries, particularly those with a 
similar economic structure and political history to China. 
 
 
4. China’s rapidly expanding financial markets and the increasing number of 
Chinese companies seeking overseas listing status has offered international 
investors increased prospects for risk diversification (Zou and Adams, 2006). 
However, Lee and Rui (2000) observe that a key inhibitor to the efficient 
operation of financial markets in China is the lack of knowledge held by 
investors (particularly those from overseas) as to the future growth opportunities 
of companies with different ownership and control structures (e.g., State versus 
private shareholdings)10. Therefore, this study should provide intuitive insights 
as to whether investors in China price securities differently for firms purchasing 
property insurance compared with firms that do not insure or do not insure to 
any significant degree. Moreover, the research project could be of potential 
relevance to managers, policymakers, investors, and others with an economic 
interest in China. For example, by enabling the managers of PLCs to better 
understand the effects of insurance purchases on business operations. This could 
also help them improve their risk management practices in the future.  
 
1.5 Research Methods 
To achieve the stated aim and objectives of the project, a combination of literature-
based and empirical research methods will be employed as follows: 
 
1. A search and analysis of the relevant literature leading to the selection of an 
appropriate theoretical framework to guide empirical analysis. 
 
2. A statistical analysis of panel data for the period 2003-2007 using data from 
published sources mainly the CIE database complied by the NBSC (see also 
footnote 8). The panel dataset is supplemented by Datastream, the CSMAR 
                                                 
10  Credit ratings in emergent markets (such as China) are far less common than they are in more 
developed economies such as the UK and US (Ferri, Liu and Majnoni, 2001). This feature compounds the 
information asymmetry problems for investors (particular those from overseas) and underscores the 
importance of insurance in providing enhanced surety for capital suppliers. 
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Securities Research Database (developed by Shenzhen GTA Ltd. and Hong 
Kong Polytechnic University) and WIND Financial Information System 
(developed by Shanghai Wind Ltd.). The data used in this study are analyzed 
using descriptive, univariate, and multivariate statistics. Robustness tests, 
including a two-stage instrument variable approach, are also conducted to 
control for endogeneity. 
 
3. Recent costs of equity metrics reported in the literature are evaluated for 
choosing the estimation of the cost of equity for this study. The classical capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) is first utilized to estimate the cost of equity. An 
alternative market-based accounting valuation model - the modified price 
growth in earnings (MPEG) proposed by Easton (2004) - is also employed for 
the purpose of empirical comparison.  
 
1.6 Assumptions 
 The study is predicated on nine main assumptions as follows: 
1. Managers of Chinese PLCs have discretion to make investment and financing 
decisions (including insurance) independently of State officials. This 
assumption is considered to be justified as considerable progress has been 
made in terms of the degree of autonomy assigned to company managers since 
China embarked on its program of market reforms in 1978 (e.g., see Tam, 
2000; Zou et al., 2003). 
2. The concepts of ‘value’ and ‘risk’ whilst independent of each other under the 
CAPM are nonetheless inter-related under imperfect market conditions, such 
as information asymmetry, agency costs and bankruptcy costs. Therefore, it is 
maintained assumption of this thesis that property insurance can add value to 
shareholders by mitigating operating cash flow risks associate with market 
imperfection.  
3. The corporate purchase of property insurance in China is increasingly 
becoming necessary to satisfy lenders (banks) thereby potentially making 
leverage endogenous to the insurance decision (Zou and Adams, 2008a; Zou, 
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2010)11. However, as Chinese PLCs are expected to have some bargaining 
power with lenders in the increasingly competitive domestic lending market, 
the level of insurance taken out to indemnify lenders against losses arising 
from bankruptcy will to some degree be negotiable. As such, it is assumed that 
the overall amount of property insurance taken by the board of Chinese PLCs 
purchased will still largely be a discretionary strategic decision. 
4. Restrictions in the supply of (property) insurance to companies do not severely 
constrain (distort) the insurance decisions of managers. In view of the rapidly 
developing insurance market in China and the increasing variety of insurance 
products and coverage levels on offer (Zou et al., 2003; Zou and Adams, 2006) 
this assumption is deemed to be reasonable. 
5. As in Zou et al. (2003) and Zou and Adams (2006; 2008a) the aggregate level 
of annual premiums incurred by Chinese PLCs is adjudged to reflect the 
endogenously derived managerial demand (risk appetite) for indemnity assets 
coverage rather than the market pricing of risks underwritten in the insurance 
market. That is, it is assumed that total premiums paid each year reflect the 
expected probability and quantum of risks to be covered rather than period-
specific (cyclical) movements in prices. This assumption is not only consistent 
with much of the academic insurance literature but deemed to be reasonable as 
annual amounts of premium are expected to be positively correlated with 
levels of indemnity coverage (Zou et al., 2003)12.  
6. The financial data to be analyzed derive largely from independently audited 
public databases. Therefore, the data to be used in this study are assumed to be 
reliable. 
                                                 
11  As noted in section 1.5 above, potential endogeneity issues will be controlled and tested for 
econometrically using two-stage instrument variable approach. 
 
12 It is acknowledged that the use of premiums (whilst the only measure available in the current study) is 
an imprecise (‘noisy’) indicator of the extent of asset risk protection. This is because premiums can be 
affected by (unobservable) factors such as the level of deductible retained by the firm and the 
actual/perceived risk profile of the individual assets insured – a feature that can vary across firms/time 
and industrial sector (Zou, 2010, p. 971). Additionally, insurance being an indemnity contract only covers 
for actual financial loss rather than the current cost of replacement/book (or market) value of the impaired 
asset. This helps to explain the apparently low percentage spend on property insurance at the 90th 
percentile noted in panel B of Table 7.1 (see Chapter 7, p. 101). 
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7. Zou and Xiao (2006, pp. 240-241) note that corporate equity issues are tightly 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) with approvals only granted if regulatory prescribed 
profit and investment targets are likely to be met.13 Investors are nevertheless 
likely to evaluate companies’ risk profiles and impute such assessments into 
the prices that they are willing to pay for the traded shares. As a result, it is 
assumed that regulatory constraints on the issue of equity in China should not 
impact on investors’ pricing decisions and the role of insurance in possibly 
affecting those decisions. 
8. Chinese companies’ law currently permits insolvent PLCs to declare 
bankruptcy (although for social welfare reasons this is rare in practice). 
However, financially weak Chinese PLCs are still likely to suffer the costs of 
financial distress in ways similar to their counterparts in the West (Zou and 
Adams, 2008a). Therefore, it is assumed that the probability of bankruptcy and 
the expected costs of insolvency and financial distress are motives for the 
corporate purchase of property insurance in China. 
9. The insurance data obtained from the CIE/NBSC database are given only at 
the level of the parent and not for the entire consolidated group. Therefore, the 
assumption is made that risk-bearing at the parent level is commensurate with 
that of the group. In other words, it is assumed that the cost of equity at the 
parent and group level is equivalent, or at least similar.  
 
1.7 Scope of the Project 
The scope of the project is defined as follows: 
 
1. The study focuses only on those companies quoted on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and excludes those 
(n = 80 or so) Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(HKSE) and issue A shares. The HKSE has been operating for much longer 
                                                 
13 For example, profitability has to exceed return on equity targets of 9-10% per annum. See Zou and 
Xiao (2006, p. 241) for more details of equity issuing requirements relating to Chinese PLCs.  
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than the mainland bourses and its companies are more closely attuned with 
Western accounting, risk management, and stock exchange listing practices 
(Abdel-khalik, Wong and Wu, 1999). Therefore, HKSE quoted companies are 
excluded to avoid potentially confounding effects. 
 
2. The study focuses on property insurance as it is first, the most significant line 
of insurance in the Chinese corporate sector (comprising at least 90 percent of 
the value of total annual corporate premiums – e.g., see the People’s Bank of 
China, 1998, p 123-128; p. 637-638); and second, (tangible) assets-based 
protection is likely to have the most substantive impact on corporate financing 
policy and market expectations regarding the surety of future earnings 
potential (Zou and Adams, 2008a). The insurance of intangible assets (e.g., 
goodwill) and land are also outside the ambit of the study. The former are not 
generally insurable in China, whereas land is State-owned and not subject to 
private damages claims (e.g., arising from pollution) (Zou et al., 2003). 
 
3. The time span of the study covers the five years 2003 – 2007. The main reason 
for the time period from 2003 to 2007 is due to the data availability of the 
CIE/NBSC database providing corporate insurance premiums data. 
 
1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 1. Overview of the Study: This chapter covers the rational for the choice of this 
research topic, the aim and objectives of the study, the contribution to knowledge, and a 
description of research methods employed. It also addresses the underlying assumptions 
and the scope of this study. Finally, an outline of thesis is provided.  
 
Chapter 2. Institutional Background: This chapter provides background information 
about the institutional environment in which both Chinese PLCs and the domestic 
insurance market operate. In addition, the institutional merits of Chinese market as a 
research environment are examined in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Literature Review: This chapter of the research project identifies and 
reviews (critiques) the literature relating to the corporate demand for insurance. From 
this review agency theory is selected as the most appropriate conceptual framework 
within which to guide and direct the empirical analysis.  
 
Chapter 4. Hypotheses Development: This part of the thesis derives and specifies test 
hypotheses drawn from the agency theory framework outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
Chapter 5. Cost of Equity Capital Metrics: This chapter reviews (critiques) the cost of 
equity metrics used in prior studies. From this review appropriate metrics are identified 
to facilitate empirical tests of the selected hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 6. Research Design: This chapter describes the research methods used, 
including a description of the data, definition of the variables, and specification of 
models used to analyze the data. 
 
Chapter 7. Empirical Results:  This chapter analyzes the results and evaluates them in 
relation to the test hypotheses and the existing literature.  
 
Chapter 8. Summary and Conclusions: This chapter draws conclusions from the 
empirical analysis, considers the limitations of the study and outlines the implications of 
the study’s findings for future academic research, and strategic commercial and/or 












CHAPTER 2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides background information on the institutional environment within 
which Chinese PLCs operate and sets out the commercial context of insurance in China. 
More specifically, the chapter outlines the nature of the financial and insurance markets 
in China and summarizes the key regulatory and legislative frameworks and governance 
systems within which these financial systems operate. The reasons why China is 
considered to be an important environment within which to examine the corporate 
insurance-finance interface are also examined in this section of the thesis.  
 
2.2 Economic Background 
With a geographical area of approximately 3.7 million square miles (9.6 million square 
kilometres) China is territorially the fourth largest country in the world after Russia, 
Canada, and the US, and  currently the world’s most populous country with a 
population of roughly 1.3 billion people (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2009, 
2011). In 1978, China’s ruling Communist Party embarked on a program of major 
market reforms that sought to deregulate State control over major sectors of the 
economy in an effort to initiate economic growth and foster international trade and 
investment. These macroeconomic policy goals have largely been achieved as over the 
last 30 years or so the Chinese economy has consistently achieved annual average rates 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 7% to 8% per annum exceeding 10% per 
annum since 2003 (see Table 2.1). Table 2.1 shows that China’s GDP has increased 
from RMB13,582 billion (US$1,641 billion) in 2003 to RMB47,288 billion (roughly 
US$7,319 billion) in 2011 at current rates of exchange. This makes China the world’s 
second largest economy after the US (IMF, 2011). With a current account surplus in 
2011 of approximately US$202 billion, China’s rapid growth has been primarily driven 
by manufacturing exports to mature markets of North America, Japan and Europe (see 
Table 2.1). This export-led domestic economic growth, together with continuing State 
management of the economy, has enabled China to avoid the worst excesses of high 
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unemployment (particularly in urban areas) that have characterized many other 
transitional economies (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009).  
 
In contrast to many contemporary developing economies, China has also experienced 
relatively modest price inflation (of less than 6% per annum) over the last five years or 
so (see Table 2.1) and this relative price stability has helped to stimulate high rates of 
domestic capital investment and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2009). Indeed, since the liberalization of trade, relaxation of company 
ownership restrictions, and greater business freedom induced by China’s entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (in November, 2001) inward FDI in China has grown 
rapidly to about US$75 billion as at the end of 2007. This currently makes China the 
largest recipient of overseas investment in the world ahead of the US (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2009). Since 1978, the Chinese government has also attempted to 
minimize job losses arising from privatization and industrial restructuring, and thereby, 
reduce the risk of extreme social disorder (Zou and Adams, 2006). As noted earlier 
(chapter 1, section 1.6), this has meant that Chinese companies are rarely liquidated and 
national unemployment rates have averaged around 4% per annum over the last decade 
– a rate that has again been much lower than for most other emerging economies over 
the same period. Since the mid-1990s legal reforms and in particular, the introduction of 
new property rights legislation-such as China’s  Companies Law (1993,2005) which 
amongst other things, established companies as separate legal entities that could own 
assets-has helped considerably to consolidate and expand economic growth and 












       Table 2.1: China - Key Economic Indicators, 2003-2011 
Economic Indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP 
RMB¥(billion) 13,582 15,988 18,056 21,631 26,581 31,405 34,090 40,151 47,288 
US$(billion) 1,641 1,932 2,257 2,719 3,494 4,522 4,991 5,931 7,319 




US$(billion) 43 69 132 232 353 421 243 238 202 




US$(billion) 403 610 819 1,066 1,528 1,946 2,399 2,847 3,181 
Annual Inflation  (Consumer Price) 1.2% 3.9% 1.8% 1.5% 4.8% 5.9% -0.7% 3.3% 5.4% 
Annual Interest Rates 
Lending 
  
5.3% 5.6% 5.6% 6.1% 7.5% 5.3% 5.3% 5.8% 6.6% 
Deposit 2.0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.5% 4.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.8% 2.8% 
Unemployment Rate % (Urban) 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.1 
(Sources: People’s Bank of China (2007-2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008-2012; IMF, 2009-2011). This table shows the key economic indicators of 







2.3 China’s Financial and Insurance Markets 
China’s financial systems, particularly its equity markets, are playing an increasingly 
important role in matching the demand for, and supply of, corporate investment funds, 
fostering entrepreneurial initiatives and promoting domestic economic growth and 
development (Zou and Adams, 2008a). China’s insurance industry, alongside the 
banking sector, is also playing an important role in the country’s current economic 
progress by mitigating the financial effects of severe unanticipated losses (such as those 
arising from catastrophic storms, earthquakes, fires and floods), alleviating business 
uncertainties, and facilitating economic and infrastructural development through 
institutional investment (Zou, et al, 2003). In this section, the main institutional 
developments in China’s financial and insurance markets are outlined. 
 
2.3.1 Stock Market 
 
Table 2.2 indicates that in 2007 there were just over 1,500 companies quoted on 
mainland China’s two main stock exchanges – Shanghai (SHSE) (established in 1990) 
and Shenzhen (SZSE) (established in 1991) – with a total market capitalization of 
approximately RMB32,714 billion (US$4,673 billion). This makes China the most 
important emerging stock market in the world and one that is likely to continue growing 
as a result of the economic restructuring of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the 
expansion of the corporate privatization process and growth in the participation rate 
amongst private investors (with currently 139 million investor accounts – see Table 2.2) 


































RMB ¥ US $ RMB ¥ US $ RMB ¥ US $ SSE SZE SSE SZE 
2003 1,285 600 4,246 606.6 1,254 179.1 4,526.1 646.6 250.8 261.2 36.5 36.2 6,953.1 
2004 
1,373 671 3,705 529.4 1,123 167 4,233.4 604.8 288.7 288.3 24.2 24.6 7218.7 
2005 1,378 715 3,243 463.3 1,063 151.9 3,166.3 452.3 274.4 320.6 16.3 16.4 7,336.1 
2006 1,421 1,266 8,940 1,277.2 2,501 357.2 9,046.9 1,292.4 555.7 671.3 33.4 33.6 7,854 
2007 1,530 1,695 32,714 4,673.4 9,306 1,329.5 46,055.6 6,579.4 936.4 1,062.1 59.2 72.1 13,887 
(Source: CSRC (www.circ.gov.cn), Shanghai Stock Exchange ( www.sse.com.cn), Shenzhen Stock Exchange (www. szse.cn), People’s Bank of China, 2008). These tables 








A key feature of many of China’s privatized SOEs is that the government retains 
significant ownership stake with voting rights scattered amongst various public sector 
organizations (Zou, Wong, Shum, Xiong and Yan, 2008). Indeed, State ownership 
represents about one-third of the total number of shares in issue in China and is present 
in about 90 percent of PLCs – a proportion of State control that is much greater than for 
domestic corporations operating in former command economies such as those in Eastern 
Europe (Xu and Wang, 1999).  Therefore, as a major equity claimholder in many 
Chinese PLCs, the State is likely to be a potentially significant loser in the event of a 
major uninsured loss to productive assets. As a result, it is likely to be in the economic 
interests of the State as well as private shareholders for Chinese PLCs to purchase 
property insurance. Another distinctive feature of Chinese PLCs is that ownership tends 
to be concentrated in a single dominant institutional shareholder (usually these are 
government agencies or legal entities) that does not trade its equity stake unless it is 
transferred to a counterparty via private negotiations (subject to government approval) 
(Chen, Firth and Xu, 2009). This means that although all shareholders have equal voting 
rights, majority shareholders tend to play a more dominant role in board decisions and 
matters of corporate governance than their counterparts in Western countries (Chen et 
al., 2009).  
 
Figure 2.1 shows that A-shares issued by Chinese PLCs are classified into State-held 
shares, domestic institutional shares (legal-person shares), staff shares and tradable A-
shares, with each kind of shareholding accounting for about one-third of total shares 
issued. In addition, all shares carry the same voting and cash flow rights (Xu and Wang, 
1999). State shares are normally held by government agencies (e.g., the Bureau of State 
Assets Management (BASM)). Legal-person shares are those owned by SOEs, 
collectively owned enterprises, township and village enterprises, domestic private 
companies or foreign investors. However, State-held shares and legal-person shares are 
not publicly tradable (see Table 2.3), and they can only be transferred via private 
negotiations which are also subject to approval from the MOF and the CSRC (Zou and 
Adams, 2008b). As a result, there is a potential conflict of interest between non-tradable 
shareholders and tradable shareholders. This is because non-tradable shareholders’ 
interests are not directly affected by changes in market stock prices given the non-
tradability of their shares. More importantly, the concentrated shareholdings can give 
non-tradable shareholders the opportunity to dominate company decisions and benefit 
20 
 
themselves at the expense of minority interests (e.g., Zou et al., 2008). The potential 
controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts could thus impact on the cost of 
equity.  
 
Apart from tradable A-shares (mainly comprising private domestic investors), B-shares 
(traded by foreign investors and since 2001, also by domestic investors), H-shares 
(shares traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE)), S-shares (shares traded on 
the Singapore Exchange (SGX)) and N-shares (shares traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ Stock Exchange (NASDAQ), or American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX)) can be transacted on China’s bourses (see Table 2.3). The relative 
volume and value of the different types of shares traded in China between 2003 and 
2007 (the year of focus in this study) are illustrated in Table 2.4. In November 2002, 
China introduced the system of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in an 
attempt to provide another channel for foreign investors to invest in A-shares and so 
take advantage of local investment growth opportunities (Zou and Adams, 2008b). 
Since 2003 the CSRC (established 1998/99) has also actively sought to encourage 
institutional investors in China – for example, in February 2005 commercial banks were 
approved to establish fund management companies, while a month later insurance funds 
entered the stock market (People’s Bank of China, 2007). The CSRC supervises and 
regulates China’s securities markets as well as formulating policies, laws and 
regulations regarding the operation of the domestic financial markets. While both A-
shares and B-shares are traded on the SHSE and SZSE (and have equal voting and 
dividend rights), A-share and B-share markets are different in some key regards. For 
example, B-shares often trade at a discount to A-shares and are reported to have price 
lower volatility (Poon, Firth and Fung, 1998). Table 2.4 indicates that in 2007, the total 
value of shares issued by companies quoted on the SZSE and SHSE was approximately 
RMB868 billion (US$124 billion). Table 2.4 also shows that of the total number of 
shares issued by Chinese PLCs roughly two-thirds involved A-share issues reflecting a 
recent growth in trades conducted by private investors. Moreover, Table 2.4 indicates 
that share rights issues have become more prevalent in recent years comprising 
approximately 3% of the total value of equity capital raised in 2007. This observation 





Table 2.3: Features of Different Types of Shares in Chinese PLCs 
Share types Shareholders Tradability 
State shares Various government 
departments or their delegated 
bodies (i.e., Bureau of State 
Assets Management (BSAM) 
and State assets investing 
companies) 
Not publicly tradable, but may be 
transferred to domestic 
institutions upon the approval of 
the MOF and the CSRC (Article 







Corporate investors such as 
SOEs, non-State-owned 
companies, financial institutions 
(other than commercial banks) 
Not publicly tradable, but may be 
sold to other domestic 
institutions by negotiation 




Mainly private individuals (and 
some domestic institutions and 
securities investment funds, 
foreign investors through QFII) 
Publicly tradable at the SHSE 
and the SZSE 
Staff shares2 Company employees and 
managers 
Initially prohibited from trading 
for one year after allocation, and 
thereafter, may become tradable 
A-shares upon approval from the 
CSRC.  
B-shares Exclusively foreign investors 
(typically financial institutions) 
until 2001, from 20th Feb,2001 
onwards, private individuals are 
allowed to trade B-shares on the 
secondary market 
Publicly tradable at the SHSE 




Exclusively foreign investors Publicly traded in Hong Kong 
(H-shares), New York (N-





Foreign investors (these are 
institutional shares procured as 
founder shares or private 
placement shares) 
Not publicly tradable (founder 
shares are not allowed to transfer 
within one year subsequent to the 
incorporation of the company      
(Article 143 of the China’s 
Companies Law (2005)) 
(Source: Zou (2002), China Securities Regulatory Commission www.circ.gov.cn, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange www.sse.com.cn, Shenzhen Stock Exchange www. szse.cn). This table describes the main 
features of each category of shares that are issued by Chinese PLCs. 
 
Notes:  
1. Commercial banks in China are not allowed to hold company shares directly (China’s 
Commercial Bank Law (2003) Article 43). 
 
2. The senior management of a company must declare the shares of the company they hold and any 
changes in them; each year during their term of office they cannot transfer more than 25% of the 
total of the shares of the company they hold; and they cannot transfer any of the shares of the 
company they hold within one year after the date the shares of the company are listed and 
traded. (China’s Company Law (2005) Article 142). 
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Table 2.4: The Chinese Stock Market – Type of Share Issues, 2003-2007 




In which Raised Capital 
In which 
A Shares Rights Issued H, N Shares B shares 
A 
Shares 
H, N Shares 
B 
Shares 
RMB ¥ US $ RMB ¥ US $ RMB ¥ US $ RMB ¥ US $ RMB ¥ 
US 
$ 
2003  281.4  83.64  196.79 1.0  1,357.8  194.0  819.6  117.2  74.79  10.7  534.7  76.4 3.54 0.5 
2004 227.9 54.9 171.5 1.5 1,510.9 215.8 835.7 119.4 104.5 14.9 648.1 92.6 27.2 3.9 
2005 
567.1 13.8 553.3 -  1,882.5 268.9 338.1 48.3 2.6 0.4 1,544.4 220.6 - - 
2006 1,287.8 351.1 936.7 -  5,594.3 799.2 2,463.7 352 4.3 0.6 3,130.6 447.2 - - 
2007 637.2 413.3 224 -  8,680.2 1,240 7,723 1,103.3 227.7 32.5 957.2 136.7 - 
- 
 








Figure 2.2 gives the industrial sector mix of companies quoted on the Chinese stock 
exchange in 2007. Figure 2.3 reveals differences in market capitalization by industrial 
sector between 2003 and 2007.  In 2003, most Chinese PLCs (about 44% of total market 
capitalization) operated in the manufacturing sector. However, by 2007 the proportion 
of companies operating in manufacturing fell to 21% of total market capitalization, 
whereas financial services and mining companies have become more significant players 
on the domestic stock market with 33% and 26% of total market capitalization 
respectively. These figures therefore suggest that the Chinese economy has undergone 
major structural changes in recent years. 
 
















(Source: Derived from various literature sources, e.g., Xu and Wang,1999; Zou and Adams, 2006) This 
figure illustrates the major categories of shares that are issued by Chinese PLCs-namely, State shares, 
































Figure 2.2: Market Capitalization by Industrial Sector in 2007  
 
(Source: China Financial Market Development Report, 2007). This figure shows the difference of market 
capitalization in terms of industrial sector between 2003 and 2007 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Comparison of Market Capitalization (%) by 
Industrial Sector for 2003 and 2007 
 
(Source: People’s Bank of China, 2007). This figure shows the difference of market capitalization in 
























































China’s stock market is widely recognized to be opaque by Western standards, and that 
both active and prospective investors often face acute information asymmetry problems 
as to the future risk and return on invested assets (Xu and Wang, 1999). Therefore, 
insurance can be important for protecting the economic interests of investors and 
improving the efficiency of China’s capital markets as a source of investment finance 
by signalling surety to prospective investors as to the security and quality of their 
investment. To the extent that assets (property) insurance can further help to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders such as lenders from business 
risks like bankruptcy, the adequacy of insurance coverage is also an issue of some 
importance to the national regulatory authority-the CSRC. Equity finance is expected to 
grow in importance in China as PLCs are often keen to raise equity rather than debt in 
order to reduce leverage and relieve the tight monitoring and restrictive credit controls 
that are often imposed by the banks (Zou and Xiao, 2006). Therefore, the effect of 
corporate insurance on the equity is likely to be an increasingly important issue for 
financial analysts and participants in the Chinese stock market. 
 
2.3.2 Corporate Bond Market 
 
In contrast to more advanced economies, such as the UK and the US, China does not 
currently have a well-developed corporate bond market (People’s Bank of China, 2007). 
The first corporate bonds were issued in China in 1989 and first traded on the SHSE and 
SZSE from the mid-1990s. A decade or so later corporate bond issues in China only 
amounted to about RMB102 billion (US$13 billion) or less than 0.5% of GDP (Hasan et 
al., 2009). The over-the-counter (OTC) corporate bond market in China is even more 
limited comprising about RMB 4 billion (US$ 0.5 billion) of transactions in 2007(Scott 
and Ho, 2004). Consequently, there is considerable scope for the Chinese corporate 
bond market to grow in future in line with national economic development. In contrast, 
the government bond market (Central Bank and Treasury securities) has witnessed rapid 
growth in recent years, particularly in short maturity bonds (of a duration of less than a 
year) with the total value of transactions amounting to approximately RMB8 trillion 




Scott and Ho (2004) suggest that there are four main reasons for China’s undeveloped 
corporate bond market. First, in China the corporate bond market has been inherently 
more risky than commercial banking (e.g., due to acute information asymmetries) – a 
feature that has manifested itself in several issuer defaults, particularly amongst SOEs. 
Second, the main issuers of corporate bonds have been Chinese SOEs that have not 
been financially or legally constrained by corporate liquidation rules. This situation has 
created an enhanced borrower-related moral hazard problem in the market. Third, the 
Chinese authorities have viewed it more politically expedient to favor development of 
the domestic equity markets and so avoid the potential risk of forced corporate 
takeovers by major creditors in the event default (and the possible impact that this might 
have on job losses). In these circumstances, State control of the Chinese corporate bond 
market resides with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). PBOC rules prescribe that, 
amongst other things, all corporate bond issues have to be guaranteed, interest rates 
must be capped at 40% over the prevailing bank lending rate, and that approved bond 
issuances can only be made when the issuer is AAA credit rated. Fourth, corporate 
incentives to issue bonds have been blunted by a 20% interest tax. 
 
2.3.3 Banking Sector 
 
Given the limitations of China’s corporate bond market, it is not surprising that debt 
finance in the listed company sector is predominately driven by a bank credit, with non-
listed firms placing greater reliance on less formal financing channels, such as trade 
credits, and increasingly, leasing (Ge and Qiu, 2007). The Chinese Central Bank – the 
PBOC – was founded in 1948 and it performed both central and commercial banking 
functions up to the market reforms of the late 1970s. Major changes in the Chinese 
commercial banking sector began in the early to mid-1990s with the separation of 
policy banks from commercial banks following the passing of the Commercial Bank 
Law (1995) and the encouragement of private sector investment (including direct 
investment by foreign-owned banks such as Citigroup and HSBC) in the economy via 
the Central Bank Law (1995). Since the mid-1990s the China’s banking sector has gone 
through a process of privatization with four of the largest former State-owned banks 
now listed entities albeit with the government retaining a majority shareholding. This 
reform process was further accelerated by China’s entry into the WTO with selected 
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foreign banks (e.g., Citigroup) now licensed to provide commercial banking services to 
the Chinese corporate sector from 2007 subject to them meeting the minimum 
capitalization requirement of US10 billion and a capital adequacy ratio of not less than 
8% (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009). Developments in China’s legal and financial 
infrastructure, such as the introduction of commercial property rights, ownership 
privatization, and improved prudential controls over banks’ solvency through the 
monitoring activities of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) have 
further helped to improve systems of financial intermediation, treasury business, and 
retail banking as well as spawning investment banking activities in areas such as private 
equity and syndicate loan management. Nevertheless, Berger et al. (2009) report that 
there is scope for improved operational efficiency in the Chinese banking market – for 
example, in reducing the incidence of non-performing loans and minimizing risks to 
collateral underpinning loans granted (e.g., through property insurance). Like other 
regulatory agencies in China the CBRC is accountable to the PBOC, which as the 
Central Bank has ultimate responsibility for monetary policy and the regulation of 
financial markets and financial institutions. 
 
2.3.4 Insurance Market 
 
The real annualized aggregate value of private sector-sourced premiums per capita (i.e., 
insurance penetration) in China is low (i.e., 1% for non-life insurance and 3% for life 
insurance) compared with more developed economies such as the UK and US where the 
average total penetration rate for insurance in the economy is about 8% to 10% (Swiss 
Re, 2004)14 . However, since the initiation of the market reform program in 1978, 
China’s insurance market has been growing rapidly in line with its national economic 
development and the greater autonomy afforded to managers to make business 
decisions, including commercial insurance purchases (Zou, 2003). With 110 insurance 
providers operating in China in 2007/8 (including 43 foreign-invested joint-ventures) 
the supply of life and non-life insurance has grown over the last decade to meet the 
growth in the demand for commercial insurance.  
                                                 
14 Insurance penetration is sometimes viewed in the insurance literature as reflecting domestic consumer 
demand. However, in equilibrium insurance penetration could equally reflect the supply (sales) of 
insurance in an economy. Therefore, insurance penetration can be viewed as a manifestation of both the 












Total assets (billion) 
RMB ¥ US $ RMB ¥ US $ 
2003 388.0 55.4 21% 912.2 130.3 
2004 431.8 61.7 25% 1185.4 169.3 
2005 492.7 70.4 25% 1522.6 217.5 
2006 564.1 80.6 27% 1973.1 281.9 
2007 703.6 100.5 28% 2900.4 414.3 
 (Source: People’s Bank of China, 2009). This table provides the premium income and total asset of 
insurance market in China from 2003 to 2008. 
 
Table 2.5 reveals that as at the end of 2007, property-liability insurance premiums in 
China amounted to approximately RMB197 billion (US$23 billion) (with life insurance 
premiums totalling about RMB506 billion (US$77 billion). Even allowing for price 
changes, the current aggregate value of annual premiums written of nearly US$100 
billion in 2007 represents exponential growth over the previous two decades when in 
1978 total premiums written by the State monopoly – the People’s Insurance Company 
of China (PICC) – amounted to just US$200 million (Thomas, 2002).  
 
Zou and Adams (2006) report that over 85% of their 1997-99 sample of Chinese PLCs 
purchased property insurance – a proportion that is now likely to be close to 100% as 
the supply of insurance and awareness risk management awareness of managers has 
increased in line with the development of the Chinese financial markets. However, at 
the time that this study was carried out (2003-2007), only about 1% of the value of 
productive assets-in-place was indemnified by insurance, suggesting a substantial 
degree of under-insurance and scope for further future growth (Zou, 2010). Growth in 
the life, health and pensions segments of the Chinese insurance market has also been 
stimulated by rising real incomes and rates of saving as well as the closure of publicly 
funded healthcare and pension schemes in SOEs (Swiss Re, 2004). As a proportion of 
their respective markets, commercial property insurance business currently constitutes 
roughly 20% of annual premiums and group life insurance about 15% of annual 
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premiums. Corporate liability insurance is relatively under-developed in China 
accounting for only 7% of annual premiums (Zou et al., 2003). According to Zheng, Liu 
and Dickinson (2008), China’s non-life insurance sector is projected to grow at a rate of 
9% to 13% per annum over the next decade or so, assuming annual rates of growth in 
GDP of 6% to 9% per annum. This pace of expansion is estimated to be roughly twice 
that for the international non-life insurance industry as a whole over the same period. In 
the listed corporate sector almost all companies now insure their productive assets to 
some extent (Zou, 2010).  
 
Despite increased competition initiated by China’s entry into the WTO, the Chinese 
insurance market is still highly concentrated with approximately 75% annual premiums 
generated by three main national operators – the PICC, China Pingan, and China Pacific 
(Sun, 2003; Zou, 2003). The total assets of all Chinese insurance companies has grown 
from about RMB320 billion (US$41 billion) in 2000 to approximately RMB2,900 
billion (US$414 billion) in 2007 (see Table 2.5). Indeed, as noted earlier, insurance 
companies are now becoming increasingly important institutional investors in the 
Chinese economy (People’s Bank of China, 2007). However, the value of total assets of 
the Chinese insurance industry only currently comprise roughly 5% of the value of 
aggregate assets held by the banking sector (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2009). Since China’s accession to the WTO the Chinese market for property reinsurance 
has also opened up to international reinsurance companies with Lloyd’s of London 
establishing a China-based reinsurance company in 2007(Zheng et.al., 2008) 
 
The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) has been the insurance industry 
regulator since 1998 and it has, amongst other things, responsibility for licensing new 
(domestic and foreign) entrants to the insurance market, controlling the design of 
insurance contracts (e.g., policy terms and premium rates), monitoring company 
solvency, and scrutinizing sales practices, particularly where such practices infringe on 
the public interest (Zheng et al., 2008).  The CIRC inherited most of these duties from 
its predecessor – the PBOC (to whom it is accountable) - while its statutory authority to 
create laws, rules and insurance regulations stems from China’s Insurance Law (1995). 
This statute gives the CIRC considerable powers of prudential supervision and 
operational oversight of licensed insurers (which must maintain minimal capital of 
RMB 200 million (roughly US$25 million)) as well as considerable discretion to 
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interpret, expand, and enforce legal and regulatory requirements. For example, the 
CIRC may require an insurer of dubious financial condition to increase its reserves and 
maintain a solvency margin that is higher than the industry average and/or impose 
sanctions (e.g., fines, license suspensions and withdrawals) against insurers that do not 
comply with insurance regulations (Thomas, 2002).  
 
2.3.5 Other Financial Markets 
 
With total annual financial derivatives transactions valued at roughly RMB410 billion 
(US$51 billion) in 2007 hedging instruments are limited compared with more developed 
economies such as the UK and US. This means that Chinese corporations are likely to 
place more reliance on insurance rather than hedging instruments to manage their 
business risks (Zou and Adams, 2008b, 2009). However, trades on the Shanghai Futures 
Exchange (SHFE) have been growing in recent years, particularly in commodity 
futures, interest rate swaps and foreign exchange (forex) forwards, and as such, 
represents scope for future development (People’s Bank of China, 2007). Other market 
developments in association with the growth of China’s banking sector have largely 
been in commodities trades (notably gold, with an annual trading volume of roughly 
RMB69 billion (US$9 billion) in 2007) and the inter-bank foreign exchange market 
(People’s Bank of China, 2007).  
 
2.4 Regulatory Framework 
China adopts a sector-based regulation model for its financial markets with each sector 
operating are under separate supervision. Securities, banking, trusts and insurance 
sectors are supervised by the CSRC, the CBRC and the CIRC respectively.  
 
 
2.4.1 Regulation of the Chinese Stock Markets 
 
The securities market in China is supervised by the CSRC and companies are not 
allowed to cross-list between the SHSE and the SZSE. A firm can decide to be listed on 
either the SZSE or the SHSE, but not both stock exchanges. Before 2001, China 
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adopted a quota system by setting an annual limit on new share issues (Aharony et al., 
2000). Subject to a rigorous and lengthy approval process, many unlisted firms in China 
acquire a ‘shell company’ to gain access to the stock markets indirectly (Chi and Ma, 
2000). On the other hand, with the absence of an enforceable bankruptcy law and the 
government’s overacting concern with social stability, the authorities are often reluctant 
to delist or liquidate a poorly performing firm (Xu and Wang, 1999). From March, 2001 
onwards, a formal approval system was introduced whereby a firm that wishes to apply 
for an initial public offering (IPO) would have to be recommended by its sponsor to the 
CSRC. The CSRC then would review and make the final decision.  
 
2.4.2 Insurance Regulation 
 
China’s insurance market has been supervised by the CIRC since the end of 1998. The 
Insurance Law (1995) was adopted to build the basic principle of transacting 
commercial insurance and was amended in 2002. In essence, the 1995 law acts as the 
‘mother law’ for other insurance related rule-making (Thomas, 2002).  
 
Property insurance prices in China have long been more tightly controlled by the 
government compared with that of many developed insurance markets (e.g., UK, US) 
(Wang, 2000). The Nationwide Insurance Clauses and Premium Rates (2002), the 
Insurance Law (2002), the Provisional Ordinance on Insurance Administration (2003) 
and the Clauses, Premium Rates of Property Basic Risks Covers and Property 
Comprehensive Risks Covers (2003) are all important laws relating to property 
insurance pricing. Rates of insurance premium and basic contract terms for the majority 
of corporate insurance products are controlled by the CIRC under these regulations (Zou 
and Adams, 2006). Only a limited fluctuation in premium rates (up to a maximum 30 
percent) is allowed on intra-provincial business with the CIRC’s approval. In addition, 
the Clauses, Premium Rates of Property Basic Risks Covers and Property 
Comprehensive Risks Covers (2003) cover the classification of insurable hazards and 
ensure that the scaling of industrial risk basically aligns the risk-rating practices of 
insurance companies. Moreover, the Insurance Law (2002) forbids insurance companies 
to compete by lowering insurance premiums (Article 106). Chinese insurance 
companies are also constrained to transfer expected risks to the international reinsurance 
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market (e.g., they have to give preference to domestic insurer/reinsurers (Article 103)). 
During the period of analysis (2003-2007), the Insurance Law (2002) also required non-
life insurers operating in China to cede 20% of annual premiums with reinsurance 
companies. To sum up, the laws and regulations mentioned above were in effect over 
the five-year period (2003-2007) covered by the empirical element of this study. 
Additionally, property insurance prices in the Chinese market were fairly stable in those 
5 years therefore avoiding the effects of possible premium level distortions due to 
extraneous environmental (e.g., regulatory) effects.  
 
2.4.3 Corporate Regulation 
 
China’s corporate legal system was originally established in 1993 and has since been 
amended many times. The most recent one is the Companies Law (2005) which sets out 
general requirements on company incorporation. Specifically, the 2005 Law comprises 
matters such as corporate governance, the issue, listing and trading of shares, corporate 
accounting and reporting, dissolution and liquidation. The 2005 Law further divides 
companies into limited liability company (LLC) and companies limited by shares (joint-
stocks companies) company. The former are only allowed to have maximum 50 
shareholders and their equity capital cannot be divided into equal shares (Article 3). The 
latter can be incorporate through a combination of sponsor subscriptions and an IPO 
(Article 78), while the number of sponsors must more than two but less than two 
hundred (Article 79). Furthermore, sponsors must subscribe no less than 35 percent of 
the total shares in issue (Article 85). 
 
China’s security law system was established in 1998 with the most recent amendment 
being made in 2004. The Security Law (2004) sets forth the procedures for share 
issuance, share transactions, information disclosure requirements of PLCs, and the rules 
of corporate takeover. For example, the Security Law (2004) requires a company 
applying for listing status to report annual net profits for previous three years. 
Moreover, to align more closely with the Companies Law (2005), Chinese PLCs are 
required to publish regular financial reports at least twice a year (i.e, the interim and 
annual reports). The annual reports should include a profile of the firm, its audited 
annual financial statements (e.g., balance sheet, income and cash flow statement), 
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business review, senior management profile, and the number of outstanding shares and 
bonds. Chinese PLCs are also required to prepare occasional reports to public, which 
provides details of expected ‘material incidents’ that may significantly impact their 
share prices. Corporate takeovers can take two main forms: bidding purchase or a 
negotiation purchase. The former is conducted by buying shares through stock 
exchanges, while the latter involves in a negotiation with the shareholders of the 
acquired company.  
 
On the other hand, Accounting Standards for Business Entities (ASBE) and 13 industry-
specific accounting promulgations were adopted as business accounting rules in China. 
Local generally accepted accounting practice (Chinese GAAP) was introduced in 1993. 
(Lin and Chen, 1999). Apart from the ASBE, Chinese PLCs are also required to comply 
with the Accounting System for Joint-Stock Companies (2002) which is more 
conservative and closer in format to international accounting standards (IAS). More 
specifically, from 1997 onwards, corporate disclosure rules in China required PLCs to 
itemize major financial statement items in the notes to financial statements in annual 
reports and some companies voluntarily report insurance expenditure under “amortized 
expense items”. However, the rules were changed from 2007 onward, which creates 
incomparable time-series data, which can adversely confound the analysis of research 
data including that of the present study. This problem will, however, be dealt with in the 
process of data collection (see Chapter 6, section 6.2). 
 
2.5 Insurance and Corporate Governance 
In 2001/2 the CSRC introduced several new measures for improving the governance of 
Chinese PLCs including the use of independent board directors (comprising a third of 
board members with at least one independent director being a professionally qualified 
accountant), the establishment of nomination, remuneration and audit committees 
(consisting of a majority of independent directors), and the preparation of annual reports 
and accounts that confirm to international accounting standards (Yuan, Xiao, Milonas 
and Zou, 2009). Furthermore, Chinese PLCs operate a two-tier board structure namely a 
board of directors and a supervisory board (Yuan et al., 2009). However, Xiao, Dahya 
and Lin (2004) report that the supervisory board is largely symbolic and ineffectual so 
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that the governance system in Chinese PLCs essentially resembles the single-tier system 
of Anglo-American companies. In addition, the general lack of risk management 
expertise and limited risk management alternatives (e.g., with regard to undeveloped 
local derivatives markets) have increasingly encouraged managers to transfer downside 
business risks (such as severe catastrophe losses) into the commercial insurance market 
(Zou, 2003). Corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence and due 
diligence, can also enhance the ability of Chinese companies to access bank finance and 
so exert a significant influence on corporate performance (Firth, Lin, Liu and Wong, 
2009).  
 
As an integral part of corporate financing policy and strategy, insurance decisions are 
also inextricably bound with the decision-making process in Chinese PLCs (Zou and 
Adams, 2006, 2008a). A major benefit of property insurance is that it helps secure funds 
for loss recovery and so lowers the insured firm’s probability of financial distress and 
bankruptcy following a major accidental loss. As a result, the heavy costs associated 
with financial distress and bankruptcy (e.g., costs arising from the violation of debt 
covenants, the loss of business reputation, and the consequent loss of key customers and 
business suppliers due to business interruption) can be lowered (Zou and Adams, 
2008a). This attribute of corporate insurance may enable firms to reduce their cost of 
equity capital and maximize value for their shareholders (Shimpi, 2002). There is some 
empirical evidence supporting the benefits of corporate insurance in China. For 
example, Zou and Adams (2008a, 2009) find that in China where PLCs rely heavily on 
private debt (e.g., bank loans) because the issues of equity and bonds are tightly 
regulated, the purchases of property insurance increase debt capacity and marginally 
lower interest costs. Zou (2010) shows that more property insurance is associated with a 
higher traded value for most Chinese PLCs; however, excessive insurance purchases 
can reduce shareholder value. Zou’s (2010) analysis also suggests that a key way for 
property insurance to increase the market value of companies is that it helps secure debt 
financing and increase investment activity. Specifically, companies can suffer from 
agency costs (e.g., in the form of a higher borrowing costs) arising from the debtholder-
shareholder incentive conflicts and information asymmetry problems. The presence of 
appropriate insurance cover thus hedges against liquidity risk by reducing the likelihood 
of a cash flow shortfall (that may arise from a major accidental loss) forcing a company 




Furthermore, insurance purchases may enhance corporate value and promote good 
governance by mitigating some internal manager-owner incentive conflicts (Mayers and 
Smith, 1981, 1982, 1987). For example, managers may be reluctant to invest in 
positive-NPV loss control and safety projects (e.g., because they focus on short-term 
profit targets). Insurance may help facilitate such value-adding investment through the 
insurer’s prescription of loss prevention measures (at the time of insurance 
underwriting). With regard to property insurance, insurers additionally provide “free” 
and “quality-bonded” safety inspections and loss control advice for their corporate 
clients (Mayers and Smith, 1981, 1982, 1987). Such risk protection and advisory 
services can be valuable for Chinese companies that often lack risk management 
expertise. Therefore, insurance can be an effective internal control device and as such, it 
is expected to usefully supplement and complement other corporate governance 
mechanisms in Chinese PLCs (Adams, Chen and Zou, 2011). 
 
2.6 Attributes of the Chinese Environment 
China is a potentially good environment within which to investigate the link between 
corporate insurance and its benefits for shareholders, particularly in reducing the 
corporate costs of equity capital in at least three regards as follows. 
 
First, the unique institutional and organizational features of the Chinese corporate scene 
(e.g., the all-pervasive role of the State in corporate affairs and the limited ability of 
Chinese managers to diversify risks nationally and internationally) combine to make the 
insurance-cost of equity capital relation an obtuse but nonetheless potentially interesting 
issue to examine empirically.  
 
Second, the structure of corporate ownership has potentially important implications for 
corporate governance and understanding financial management decisions (including 
insurance). Corporate ownership structure reflects owners’ control rights and their 




Third, in China, property insurance is currently the dominant technique used by PLCs to 
manage business disruption risks arising from asset losses (Zou, 2003). Therefore, 
research results are less likely to be confounded by omitted variable bias (e.g., the effect 
of liability insurance on financing costs) than studies carried out in more developed 
markets such as the US and UK. Additionally, the availability of alternative risk 
management techniques such as financial derivative instruments are, as noted earlier, 
generally limited in China (Zou et al., 2003). Therefore, potentially cleaner empirical 
tests of the corporate insurance-cost of equity capital relation in China can be carried 
out than might be the case in more developed markets. 
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter introduces the key features of China’s financial and insurance markets and 
outlines the importance of corporate insurance in alleviating investment risk in the 
rapidly expanding Chinese economy and maximizing value for shareholders. China is 
undoubtedly a major international economy and its importance as an insurance and 
financial market is expected to become more important in the future. Advances have 
been made in terms of promoting the legislative and regulatory financial infrastructure 
in China and enhancing systems of corporate governance. However, the Chinese 
corporate environment is complex and investors, particularly those from overseas, face 
considerable information asymmetry problems in making efficient and effective capital 
allocation decisions. Property insurance is an important aspect of corporate strategy in 
China and empirical research into the insurance-cost of equity capital relation should 
usefully inform and influence the decision-making process for corporate investors. It is 
also considered that these attributes will enable a cleaner and more robust test of the 
research hypotheses to be carried out. The various theories that could help to explain the 








CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The academic literature contains numerous theories and hypotheses which purport to 
explain the corporate purchase of insurance. Collectively, these theories/hypotheses are 
commonly referred to as financial economics-based (positivist-deductive) theories of 
insurance. This chapter reviews the main theoretical frameworks that seek to explain 
corporate insurance (risk management) decisions.  
 
3.2 Theory of Insurance and Risk Management 
The major theoretical frameworks used to explain the corporate purchase of insurance 
are reviewed in this section of the thesis. A summary of their key features, strengths and 
weakness is provided in Table 3.1. 
 
3.2.1 Expected Utility Theory 
 
An early theoretical framework of the purchase of insurance is expected utility theory. 
Main (1982) reports that traditionally, optimal insurance decisions have been analyzed 
in terms of individual risk aversion and expected utility maximization. Essentially, 
expected utility theory postulates that risk-averse individuals purchase insurance to 
reduce risk, while risk neutral persons do not have incentives to insure (Arrow, 1971). 
What is more, the degree of risk aversion will be affected by microeconomic 
considerations such as the scale of an individual’s disposable wealth. However, as 
expected utility theory is focused at the private rather than corporate level it is largely 
inappropriate for examining how insurance decisions impact on the market value of 
firms, particularly those owned by shareholders with balanced portfolios of investments 
(Cho, 1988, p. 119). Furthermore, it is considered that expected utility theory has 
limited appeal as a framework for the present study because its underpinning 
assumptions do not have general application. For example, the notion that corporate 
owners are risk averse does not have strong empirical support. For instance, intuitively, 
corporate shareholders (particularly in widely-held corporations) are expected to be 
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profit-seeking risk-takers, or at least, risk-neutral holders of diversified portfolios 
(Cummins, 1976). Rather, as Stulz (1984) points out, it is managers who are likely to be 
risk-averse and thus engage in corporate hedging to satisfy their private welfare 
objectives (e.g., job security). Indeed, Davidson et al. (1992) provide evidence from the 
US corporate sector that risk aversion does not motivate shareholders to purchase 
corporate insurance. Garven (1987) also reports that with expected utility theory it is 
difficult to determine time and risk preferences among parties in insurance transactions 
making it very difficult, if not impossible, to derive a collective utility function for risk 
management decisions. Garvin (1987) adds that expected utility theory is predicated on 
the notion that risk management (insurance) decisions are focused at the level of the 
individual whereas firms comprise a nexus of contracts among different constituents 
such as shareholders, debtholders and managers. Expected utitlity theory is also not 
explicit as to the extent to which corporate managers will insure their assets in the face 
of environmental uncertainty and the economic trade-off against other financial strategy 
goals (e.g., the self-retention of risk).15 As a result, expected utility and the concept of 
risk aversion among owners of firms are now deemed by many scholars to be 
unsatisfactory explanations for the purchase of insurance (Grillet, 1992, p. 462). 
 
3.2.2 Portfolio Theory and the CAPM 
 
Another (efficient markets-based) theory of finance that has been used extensively for 
analysing corporate risk is portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). This framework 
encompasses the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Linter, 1965) 16  and is consistent with 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal work on corporate capital structure, which 
posits that in perfectly competitive markets (e.g., those without transaction costs and 
taxes) financing policy (including the insurance decision) does not affect the market 
                                                 
15 Froot et al. (1993, p. 1632) state that the transaction costs of hedging will, at least partially, determin 
the optimal hedging position of companies and explain why the managers of firms will not in reality 
hedge all business risks.  
 
16 The CAPM is commonly used to estimate the expected equity cost of capital (r) for a firmi (Botosan, 
1997, 2000, 2006) and a single period model that is also founded on notions of efficient markets, risk-less 
borrowing, zero transaction costs, and absent taxes (Main, 1982, p. 7). The CAPM has been widely 
criticized in the literature for not explaining expected security returns sufficiently accurately using short 
time series data on realized security returns (e.g., see Fama and French, 1992; Lee et al., 2006). See 
Chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) for a detailed evaluation of the CAPM as a cost of equity metric.  
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value of a firm (Jensen and Smith, 1985)17. In other words, in perfectly competitive and 
efficient markets with costless bankruptcy, the risk-adjusted NPV of the corporate 
insurance decision is zero (Cummins, 1976; MacMinn and Garven, 2000). Portfolio 
theory defines an efficient asset portfolio as one that provides both the maximum 
expected return for a given risk (variance) and minimum risk for a given expected return 
(Jensen and Smith, 1985, p. 5). This ‘mean-variance principle’ implies that decision-
makers can estimate the outcomes and probabilities of investment choices and so the 
more risk reduced through diversification the greater the total value of the portfolio 
(Doherty, 2000, p. 551). This reasoning suggests that risk management decisions (such 
as insurance) can be viewed as a portfolio optimization strategy such that the 
maximization of firm value becomes a trade-off between risk transfer (purchasing 
insurance) and risk retention (capital maintenance). However, a key limitation of 
portfolio theory is that variance is a crude measure for the cost of risk and that other 
financial factors (e.g., leverage) are likely to have a more direct impact on the cost of 
risk, level of capital retained, and market value of the firm (Doherty, 2000, p. 551). 
 
The CAPM has been widely used in asset-risk pricing and estimating the cost of equity 
capital (Jensen and Smith, 1985; Cassidy et al., 1990; Pagano, 2001). However, the 
basic insight of the CAPM is that the market value of a widely-held firm is affected 
only by non-diversifiable systematic (market-based) risks because firm-specific 
(idiosyncratic) risks (e.g., arising from fire damage) can be efficiently diversified by 
shareholders holding balanced portfolios of investments. Therefore, at equilibrium, only 
systematic risk (beta) is taken into account by the market in the pricing (valuation) of a 
firm’s shares (assets) (Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005). This implies that for well-
diversified shareholders the purchase of insurance is not a value maximizing activity 
and (e.g., because of transaction costs) the purchase of insurance could actually reduce 
firm value (Main, 1982, p. 7). In other words, portfolio theory (including the CAPM) 
and Modigiliani and Miller’s (1958) generalized ‘irrelevance theorem’ imply that the 
cost of capital and insurance are mutually independent. That is, under conditions of 
                                                 
17 In a later paper, Modiglian and Miller (1963) showed that where the assumtptions of perfect markets 
and information asymmetry are eased and interest expenses become tax deductible then the financing 
method (including by implication, insurance) can be value enhancing for shareholders. Therefore, a firm’s 
optimal capital structure (and hence optimal cost of capital position) will involve a trade-off between 
increased bankruptcy risk arising from increased indebtedness and the tax shield advantage of deducting 
debt costs against future taxes (Merton, 1987; Merton and Perold, 1993). As insurance helps to mitigate 
bankruptcy risk and is also tax deductible against earnings, it is also likely to be an important 
consideration in determining a firm’ optimal capital structure and cost of capital (Shimpi, 2002).  
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capital market equilibrium, insurance does not reduce the risk of investors’ returns and 
so cannot effectively lower the cost of capital and maximize the traded value of firms 
(Doherty and Tinic, 1981, p. 950). Prior US studies (e.g., Cummins and Harrington, 
1985; Davidson et al., 1992) have used the CAPM to examine the relation between 
systematic risk and insurable losses using aggregate property-liability insurance 
companies’ data and found that insurance does not statistically affect underwriting betas 
and hence the cost of equity.  
 
Main (1982, p.10) nonetheless reports that despite the implication that insurance does 
not add value for shareholders holding balanced portfolios of investments, corporate 
insurance purchases are common in practice, even amongst large and widely-held 
corporations (e.g., see also Yamori, 1999). This could reflect the economic benefits of 
transferring firm-specific risks to a third party insurer which has comparative 
advantages in risk-pooling and claims settlement, and can also provide its corporate 
clients real services in the form of loss prevention advice, legal support services and so 
on (Grillet, 1992). O’Brien (2006, p. 105) adds that business practitioners often consider 
that managing idiosyncratic risk (e.g., using property insurance) can add value for 
shareholders by reducing uncertainty over the variability of future cash flows and 
mitigating the cost of risks (e.g., agency and bankruptcy costs) which arise from market 
imperfections. 
 
3.2.3 Options Theory 
 
Options theory posits that corporate risk management strategies, such as the purchase of 
insurance, are contingent on the value of underlying assets whose value varies 
according to their price/risk (volatility), the risk-free rate of return, exercise price, and 
time to maturity (Rubinstein, 1976; Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, 1979). Therefore, in a 
highly levered firm with limited liability (i.e., a ‘default put option’) the value of equity 
could be viewed as a (call) option on firm value with an exercise price equal to the face 
value of debt. If asset values fall below the face value of outstanding debt (which might 
happen following an unexpectedly severe uninsured loss event which causes financial 
distress) then shareholders could be motivated to exercise their default put option and 
‘walk away’ from their investment in the firm. This can impose significant externality 
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costs on society as well as shifting the risks of financial distress and bankruptcy onto the 
firm’s fixed claimants (e.g., debtholders) (Grillet, 1992)18. Doherty (2000) contends that 
options theory can be applied to insurance transactions as contractually insurance claims 
are contingent upon the occurrence of insured events. Under the options framework, 
shareholders, for example, have incentives to maximize risks (i.e., their default put 
option value), while debtholders are motivated to minimize risks by requiring insurance 
to be taken out on collaterized assets thereby helping to reduce the cost of debt. 
However, Pagano (2001) suggests that hedging (insuring) assets could be viewed as a 
risk management cost to investors as it reduces the value of their default put option to 
abandon the firm in the event of financial distress. The main conceptual appeal of 
options theory is that it assumes that the value of underlying assets (e.g., shares) can be 
measured with a degree of certainty (as in efficient markets). However, Doherty (2000, 
p. 189) points out that options theory has its limitations for pricing insurance as the 
relative probability distributions that underpin insured losses and changes in share 
prices are likely to differ between firms. Therefore, options theory has limited 
application in the context of the present study as the underlying asset portfolios of many 
Chinese PLCs will be difficult to value accurately from the published information 
available. 
 
3.2.4 Strategic Competitive Theory 
 
Strategic competitive theory argues that the managers of risk neutral firms can be 
motivated to purchase insurance as a result of strategic product-market considerations. 
Indeed, prior research (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1982; Zou and Adams, 2006; Jia, 
Adams and Buckle, 2010) report that insurance decisions are strategically important to 
businesses. In this vein, Ashby and Diacon (1998) consider optimal insurance coverage 
in oligopoly (duopoly) firms under conditions of a Cournot-Nash game. They postulate 
that given market uncertainty, managers have incentives to maintain market equilibrium 
levels of insurance in order to protect and maintain their share of abnormal economic 
rents arising from the exercise of oligopoly power (i.e., high prices, fixed (low) outputs) 
following an unforeseen catastrophic loss event (e.g., a severe earthquake). Ashby and 
                                                 
18The upside of limited liability is that it eliminates the unrestricted dependence of firm credit on 
shareholders’ wealth and reduces the transaction and information costs for owners when considering 
potentially risky and uncertain business investments (Grillet, 1992, p. 463). 
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Diacon (1998) argue that with differential market levels of insurance coverage highly 
insured firms would benefit strategically at the expense of lowly insured firms 
following a major event loss thus breaking down the oligopoly. Seog (2006) takes a 
different view and contends that in competitive markets insurance can encourage 
corporate managers to act aggressively with their rivals (e.g., by increasing output 
and/or lowering prices) when the strategic benefits (e.g., in terms of new business 
acquisition) are greater than the cost of insurance. That is, reducing period cash flows 
might increase financial distress costs for the lowly insured firm while the highly 
insured firm could mitigate the effects of financial distress by insuring its (collaterized) 
assets. Seog’s (2006) reasoning therefore implies that insurance could enhance rather 
than mitigate managerial risk-taking via aggressive price reducing/output increasing 
behavior in highly competitive markets, and that managers in aggressive (fast-growing) 
firms will have incentives to purchase insurance since their operating and investment 
decisions increase the degree of future risk and uncertainty.  
 
Indjejikian (2007) further points out that cost of capital decisions can be strategic if (as 
argued in Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2007)) public information disclosures (on 
matters such as a firm’s risk profile) affect the cost of capital of other market 
participants. However, the main shortcomings with regard to strategic competitive 
theory relate to the difficulty in measuring the largely unobservable strategic financial 
impact of property insurance on market output, and ascertaining whether managers 
purchase insurance before or after they make their output decisions. The linkage 
between the strategic effect of insurance, the cost of insurance and the cost of equity 
capital are also not made explicit in the literature. These limitations thus reduce the 
conceptual and empirical appeal of strategic competitive theory in the context of the 
present study. 
 
3.2.5 Signalling Theory 
 
Signalling theory underpins much of the literature on the effect of accounting (financial) 
disclosures on the cost of capital (e.g., see Botosan, 1997, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002, 2005). Signalling theory explicitly recognizes that there are information 
asymmetries between managers (insiders) and prospective investors (outsiders) with the 
former possessing private information (e.g., regarding future investment opportunities) 
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that the latter does not have (Ross, 1977). Signalling theory posits that to mitigate 
information asymmetry problems and highlight a firm’s growth prospects, managers 
will be motivated to signal inside information (e.g., risk mitigation strategies) publicly 
but at the same time take care not to disclose potentially costly proprietary information 
(Talmor, 1981; Botosan, 2000). 
 
Grace and Rebello (1993) contend that insurance can be used by managers with private 
information on expected cash flows/insured losses to signal the ‘quality’ of the firm to 
financial markets, and so increase its future cash flow generating ability. Insurance 
decisions can therefore help to consolidate diverse information among investors and 
assure their perceptions about a firm’s market prospects. This reasoning is analogous to 
Easley and O’Hara’s (2004) proposition that improving the quality of information 
disclosure reduces the cost of capital by ‘levelling the playing field’ for investors. Main 
(1982) also suggests that management might use the extent of (productive assets-based) 
insurance coverage to signal their financial expertise and prudence to the market 
(thereby enhancing their human capital value in the managerial job market). This 
positive signalling effect could help firms to acquire and retain customers, and thus 
secure competitive advantages in the market (Seog, 2006). Pagano (2001) contends that 
publicly disclosing hedging activities (such as insurance) further enables managers to 
signal anticipated improvements in the distribution of firms’ cash flows (e.g., it could 
indicate that managers are confident about having sufficient liquidity to pay future 
insurance premiums). As a result, a firm’s ‘true’ risk profile (i.e., the degree of 
managerial confidence regarding future payoffs on assets) can be revealed to financial 
markets through the corporate purchase of property insurance.  
 
In nascent but highly uncertain developing markets, such as China, signalling theory 
might help to explain the disclosure of insurance details to the business community 
either formally (e.g., through published accounting statements) and/or informally (e.g., 
via private communication channels) so as to signal the underlying economic value of 
the firm to prospective investors. However, Brennan (1995, p. 13) reports that signalling 
theory has its limitations; for example, it does not explain why one mode of disclosure 
is likely to be chosen over another. Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005, pp. 678-680) and 
Botosan (2006, p. 37) also claim that modelling managerial disclosure signals can be 
difficult because of problems such as variable endogeneity and sample selection bias. 
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For example, managers may voluntarily disclose insurance purchases because their 
firms are inherently low risk entities with low costs of capital. Therefore, a theoretical 
framework, such as agency theory, that focuses on the volume of, rather than the public 
disclosure of, corporate insurance purchases could offer better insights into the link 
between insurance and the cost of capital.  
 
3.2.6 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Theory 
 
TCE theory predicts that risk management practices (such as insurance) are determined 
by institutional economic factors such as accepted market practices and norms of 
business behavior. Therefore, in emerging markets (such as China) managers are 
expected to use insurance as they become more familiar with the need manage corporate 
risks and institutional structures (e.g., financial and legal) develop to satisfy demand for 
insurance (hedging) techniques (Klimczak, 2008). Moreover, as with agency theory, 
TCE theory holds that firms are characterized by the twin problems of bounded 
rationality (incomplete and costly contracting) and managerial opportunism (self-
seeking behavior), and that cost-effective contractual commitment can be facilitated 
through the purchase of transaction-specific assets (Adams, 1997)19. By linking the 
certainty of contractual exchange with specific asset purchases, insurance help to 
promote the security of business transactions (Klimczak, 2008). However, in emerging 
markets such as China there are few historical and institutional determinants of the 
current state of risk management (insurance) practices compared with more developed 
economies such as the UK and US. In addition, there are few direct empirical tests of 
the predictions of new institutional economics theory in the risk management literature 
(e.g., see Klimczak, 2008). These constraints therefore limit the conceptual appeal of 
TCE theory as a framework for testing the insurance-cost of capital relation in the 
Chinese corporate sector. 
 
3.2.7 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory derives originally from the risk economics/insurance literature which 
describes the risk-sharing problems (e.g., adverse selection and moral hazard) arising 
                                                 
19 Adams (1997) reports that transaction-specific assets can be physical in nature (e.g., specialist 
machinery) and/or human-specific (e.g., the specialist insurance knowledge of actuaries). 
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when cooperating parties have different attitudes towards risk. It has been broadened in 
the finance literature to include agency problems occurring when cooperating parties 
have different goals and incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
Specifically, it focuses on the agency relationships within a corporation and is 
concerned with resolving problems that can occur in agency relationships. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) postulate that the key agency theory holds that the modern corporation 
can be viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts’, which exist to ensure that agents (managers) act 
in ways that maximize the economic interests of shareholders (principals) and other 
constituents (e.g., debtholders). However, this plurality of contracts that comprise the 
modern firm generates non-trivial monitoring and control costs that may be exacerbated 
by unexpectedly acute asset losses (Grillet, 1992, p. 466). In other words, agency 
problems arise when the goals or incentives between two parties are different, and it is 
difficult and/or expensive to verify that one party (agent) behaves in line with the 
interest of another party (principal). Another issue is the risk-sharing problem that arises 
when two parties have different attitudes towards risk. In a typical PLC, there are three 
main types of agency relationships: (1) manager and shareholders; (2) shareholders and 
debtholders; (3) controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. As noted 
previously, the agency problems arising from these three agency relationships are 
summarized in the Table 3.2.  
 
The basic assumptions of agency theory include imperfect markets (e.g., financial costs) 
and information asymmetries (e.g., adverse selection and moral hazard).  Agency theory 
holds that in the face of information asymmetries, and the costs arising from agency 
problems and other risks such as the probability of bankruptcy, market investors and 
debt providers will impute a higher price for the enhanced risk of unforeseen and acute 
asset losses thus increasing the firm’s cost of capital (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). 
However, by alleviating the costs of risk and reducing the need for costly contracting 
and monitoring by capital providers property insurance can play an important role in 
reducing a firm’s cost of capital (Shimpi, 2002; O’Brien, 2006). 
 
Agency theory-based arguments for the corporate purchase of insurance are reported 
extensively in the academic literature (e.g., see Mayers and Smith, 1981, 1982, 1987; 
MacMinn, 1987; Zou et al., 2003; Zou and Adams, 2006, 2008a; Jiang, Adams and Jia-
Upreti, 2012). Indeed, Garven (1987) suggests that agency theory is the most prevalent 
 46 
 
theoretical framework used in insurance research including studies conducted using 
Chinese corporate data (e.g., Zou et al., 2003; Zou and Adams, 2006,2008a; Jiang et al., 
2012), Mayers and Smith (1981, 1982, 1987) view insurance as an integral part of 
corporate financing policy and they contend that given imperfect market conditions, 
insurance enables managers of firms to mitigate agency problems (e.g., the 
underinvestment and asset substitution problems)20 and limit short-term risky behavior. 
Table 3.2 illustrates the main agency problems in firms and how (property) insurance 
can mitigate those problems, and in doing so, help reduce the equity costs of capital.  
 
Davidson et al. (1992) find that in the US corporate sector the primary motivation for 
the corporate purchase of insurance are the ‘me-first rules’ contained in debt covenants 
and that in return for insurance on collaterized assets, debtholders charge a lower cost of 
debt thereby increasing value for shareholders. Caillud, Dionne and Jullien (2000) also 
show that the cost of agency and other (e.g., bankruptcy) risks associated with external 
financing can induce risk-neutral investors to insure (hedge) against asset losses. This is 
because the managers of firms are likely to have better information than outside capital 
suppliers concerning the future timing and magnitude of accidental losses and so they 
are likely to require property insurance to be purchased to mitigate such risk exposures. 
In this regard, property insurance could also effectively substitute for other potentially 
costly contracting solutions to the information asymmetry problem such as regular 
                                                 
20 With regard to the underinvestment problem, Mayers and Smith (1987), MacMinn (1987), Garven and 
MacMinn (1993), and MacMinn and Garven (2000) demonstrate analytically that in highly levered states 
(with risky outstanding debt) an acute loss event could motivate shareholders not to replace (or fully 
reinstate) damaged/lost assets because the economic gains would accrue to debtholders rather than 
themselves. MacMinn and Garven (2000, p. 551) also report that the underinvestment incentive can arise 
by shareholders/managers limiting the size of restatement as well as rejecting the replacement compeletly. 
In such circumstances, shareholders would (under corporate limited liability rules) liquidate the company 
leaving debtholders with unrecoverable losses (i.e., the so-called ‘debt over-hang’ effect). However, 
insurance is a key contracting mechanism that can mitigate the underinvestment incentive by providing 
post-loss financing for the assets destroyed/impaired by an insured loss event. This analysis implies that 
more highly levered firms are more likely to insure (hedge) than firms that are less indebted (Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993, p. 269). Campbell and Kracow (1990) analyze the asset substitution (risk-
shifting) problem and they argue that risk management (such as insurance) can control the incentives of 
shareholders/managers to increase asset risk after financing terms have been agreed with debtholders. For 
example, risk-shifting can be controlled by the terms and conditions of insurance policies and the 
monitoring activities of insurance companies’ inspectors (Ashby and Diacon, 1998, p. 37). Therefore, 
loan covenants often specify that collaterized assets over which the lender has a claim should be insured 
(at the borrower’s expense) in order to minimize the risk that after a loan has been granted the borrower 
increases the risk associated with those assets by, for example, engaging in speculative ventures. 
Davidson et al. (1992) also make the insightful point that lenders would prefer insurance coverage under 
the ‘me-first’ rules of debt covenants rather than price the risk via higher interest charges because 




independent auditing. Froot et al. (1993) and Doherty (2000) argue that insurance 
(hedging) helps ensure investment goals and realized after an unexpectedly severe loss 
event and in doing so, mitigates agency costs arising from lax risk management and 
managerial inertia. That is, insurance resolves that so called ‘investment crowding-out’ 
problem (see Table 3.2 and Chapter 4, section 4.2)  These attributes of insurance further 
helps to maximize the long-term market value of the firm by exploiting more fully the 
‘quasi rents’ that can be realized by using organizational capital effectively (Grillet, 
1992, p. 467). MacMinn and Garven (2000) also report that because of market 
imperfections (e.g., bankruptcy costs) insurance can provide an optimal hedge for firms 
as it alters the payoff distribution for investors in a way that they cannot duplicate on 
their personal account. This view is consistent with the well-known Fisher separation 
theorem in finance (Fisher, 1930) and implies that in an economy with costly 
bankruptcy the market value of an (highly) insured firm is expected to be greater (cost 
of capital lower) than for an uninsured (lowly insured) firm, other things being equal. 
Additionally insurance can encourage managers to take risks and thus add value for 
shareholders. For example, insurance can assure managers that their economic interests 
(e.g., job security) are protected from downside risks of decisions taken. By providing 
surety to managers, insurance can optimize the effect of incentive compensation 
schemes and so better align the interests of managers with the objective of maximizing 
shareholder value. These qualities help reduce the equity cost of capital by mitigating 
problems associated with managerial entrenchment (e.g., see Jiang et al., 2012) (see also 
Table 3.2). 
 
Given the widespread use of agency theory in the finance and insurance literature, and 
the ability of insurance to influence the cost of capital, agency theory is considered to be 
the most apt theoretical framework for the present study. Agency theory is also 
appropriate as theoretical framework as insurance is a key contractual mechanism for 
mitigating the potential value-diluting effect of agency costs (e.g., arising from 
managerial entrenchment and moral hazard), and other risks (e.g., financial distress/ 
bankruptcy risks following unexpectedly severe losses to productive assets). Again, as 
noted earlier, the key agency problems that can arise between managers and different 
capital providers in the modern corporation and how those problems might be mitigated 
 48 
 
by insurance as well as the implications for the cost of equity are summarized in Table 
3.221.  
3.3 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter reviews critically seven main financial economics-based theories – 
expected utility theory, portfolio theory/CAMP, options theory, strategic competitive 
theory, signally theory, TCE theory and agency theory. Each conceptual framework has 
been used in the academic literature to explain why large and diversified companies 
insure their assets22. Each of theory rests on the notion that risk management practices 
(including insurance) arise because of market failures such as information asymmetry 
problems, agency incentive conflicts and the costs of financial distress and 
bankruptcy23.  
 
Expected utility theory postulates that risk-averse individuals purchase insurance to 
reduce risks. However, it could not explain the behavior of corporate insurance 
purchases. Portfolio theory suggests that risk management decisions such as insurance 
can be viewed as a portfolio optimaization strategy. In this sense, the maximization of 
firm value becomes a trade-off between risk transfer (insurance) and risk retention 
(capital maintenance). However, the CAPM implies that for well-diversified 
shareholders the purchase of insurance is not a value maximizing activity and that the 
purchase of insurance could actually reduce firm value. Option theory views the value 
                                                 
21Chinese PLCs with a concentrated ownership structure are usually dominated by large (state-owned) 
shareholders. As Table 3.2 illustrates, the main agency problem under such structure is the expropriation 
(tunnelling) of minority interests by controlling (block) shareholders. The problem is further exacerbated 
in China as the coexistence of non-tradable shares held by controlling shareholders and tradable shares 
held by minority shareholders(though both types of shares have equal cash flow and voting rights under 
Chinese corporate law) (e.g., see Zou et al., 2008) 
 
22 Conceptual frameworks drawn from outside the financial economics discipline such as contingency 
theory (e.g., Baird and Thomas, 1985) and stakeholder theory (e.g., Cornell and Shapiro, 1987) have been 
used in the organization and management literature to examine corporate risk management decisions. 
However, these theories are considered to be outside the scope of this study as they tend to encompass 
non-economics-based (e.g., organizational/behavioral and institutional social policy) explanations for 
managerial hedging. 
 
23 Mayers and Smith (1982) report that tax considerations could also motivate the corporate demand for 
insurance. They point out that given convex (progressive) tax schedules (e.g., due to tax loss carry-
forward provisions) insurance can help to reduce the volatility of future annual earnings and so reduce a 
firm’s expected taxes. Taxes can also affect the WACC (Lee et al., 2006). However, the non-progressive 




of equity as a call option in a levered firm with limited liability. Doherty (2000) points 
out that options theory has limitations for pricing insurance as the relative probability 
distributions that underpin insured losses and changes in share prices are likely to differ 
between firms. Strategic competitive theory argues that the managers of risk neutral 
firms can be motivated to purchase insurance as a result of strategic product-market 
considerations such as the ability to grow market share. The main shortcomings 
regarding strategic competitive theory relate to the difficulty in measuring the largely 
unobservable strategic financial impact of property insurance on market output, and 
ascertaining whether managers purchase insurance before or after they make their 
output decisions. The linkage between the strategic effect of insurance, the cost of 
insurance and the cost of capital are also not made explicit in the literature. Signalling 
theory underpins much of the academic literature on the effect of accounting financial 
disclosures on the cost of capital. However, it is difficult to model managerial disclosure 
signals due to potential variable endogeneity and sample selection bias. TCE theory 
predicts that risk management practices are determined by institutional factors such as 
accepted market practices and norms of business behavior. However, in emerging 
markets such as china there are few historical and institutional determinants of the 
current state of risk management practices as they are in more developed economies 
such as UK and US. Agency theory views insurance as an integral part of corporate 
financing policy and it contends that given imperfect market conditions, insurance 
enables firms to reduce the costs by mitigating agency problems. Insurance also ensures 
that strategic investment opportunities will be met by reducing the volatility of future 
cash flows, and thereby lowering the cost of equity of firms. Moreover, agency theory is 
the most common theoretical framework used insurance research, including studies 
using data from the Chinese corporate sector. Therefore, agency theory is selected as the 
most appropriate theoretical framework from which to derive the research hypotheses 
used in this study. These research hypotheses are developed and put forward in the 




Table 3.1: Summary of Theories of Insurance 








 Utility maximization 
 Risk aversion 
 




 Focuses on individuals 









 Financing policy does 
not affect firm value 
 
 Asset returns are 
normally distributed 
 Aim is to maximize 
economic utility of 
investors 
 
 Maximization of 
firm value becomes 
a trade-off between 
risk transfer 
(purchasing 
insurance) and risk 
retention(capital 
maintenance) 
 Variance is a crude 
measure of risk 
 It does not account for 






 Cox, et al.  
(1979) 
 Value of equity could 
be viewed as a (call) 
option with an exercise 
price equal to the face 
value of debt 
 Levered companies 
 Efficient markets 
 Value of underlying 
assets can be measured  
 Insurance claims 
are contingent upon 
the occurrence of 
insured events 
 Difficult to price 
insurance (probability 
distributions are likely 




 Ashby and 
Diacon 
(1998) 
 Insurance purchases as 
a result of strategic 
product-market 
considerations 
 Applies to oligopoly 
(duopoly) and/or 
competitive markets 
 Market equilibrium 
exists and therefore 
induces optimal 
insurance buying 
 Managers maintain 
market equilibrium 
levels of insurance 
to protect their 
share of abnormal 
economic rents 
after an unforeseen 
catastrophe 
 Difficult to measure 
the largely 
unobservable strategic 
financial impact of 
insurance before 
and/or after companies 









(Source: Derived from various studies).This table summarizes financial economics-based (positivist-deductive theories) have been reported in the literature to explain the 
corporate purchase of (property) insurance. 
 
 











 Underpins much of the 
literature on the effect 
of accounting 
disclosures on the cost 
of capital 
 Market reacts to new 
information 
 Rational behaviour of 
stakeholders 
 Publicly disclosing 
hedging activities 
such as insurance 
enables managers to 
signal anticipated 
improvements in the 
distribution of firms’ 
cash flows 
 It does not explain 
why one mode of 
disclosure is likely 
to be chosen over 
another 







 Risk management 




such as norms of 
business behavior 




 By linking the 
certainty of 
contractual exchange 
with specific asset 
purchases, insurance 
help to promote the 
security of 
transactions 
 In China there are 
few historical and 
institutional 
determinants of the 











 Incentive conflicts 
between contracting 
groups 
 Conflict control 
through contracts 
 Inefficient markets 
 Information 
asymmetries 
 Transaction costs 
(taxation, bankruptcy 
costs etc.) 
 Monitoring and 




reducing cost of 
capital 


























Arises when shareholders, particularly in 
highly levered firms, decline to reinvest 
in assets lost or impaired by an 
unanticipated catastrophic event because 
the gains from reinvestment are likely to 
accrue to debtholders rather than 
themselves. Therefore, shareholders 
exercise their ‘default put option’ under 
limited liability rules and 'walk away' 
from the firm. 
Insurance enables lost or 
impaired assets to be replaced 
or repaired without the need for 
new equity, debt or use of cash. 
Thus, the firm can return to 
being a ‘going concern’, so 
protecting the claims of debt- 
holders and other contracting 
constituents such as employees 
and minority investors. 
The cost of equity could 
be reduced by assuring 
prospective investors and 
minority investors that 








Again this agency problem particularly 
arises in highly levered firms. It occurs 
when shareholders seek to promote their 
returns at the expense of debt holders 
fixed claims by ex-post shifting firm risk 
by moving investments from 
precautionary to risky projects. This 
potential risk-shifting problem is 
anticipated by debtholders who increase 
rates of interest on loans. 
Insurance of collateralized 
assets enables debtholders’ 
payoffs to become relatively 
independent of project selection 
thus alleviating the risk of asset 
substitution and minimizing 
wealth transfers from 
debtholders to shareholders. 
The cost of equity could 
be reduced by assuring 
prospective investors and 
minority investors that 




















This problem can arise where 
shareholders and/or managers can use 
unsecured debt to engage in frivolous 
consumption and invest in negative NPV 
projects. Additionally, after 
unanticipated losses shareholders and/or 
managers could use resources for asset 
reconstruction to overinvest in risky 
assets ('empire-build') at the expense of 
other contracting constituents. 
Insurance terms and loss 
adjustment mechanisms will 
ensure that assets are replaced 
according to the indemnity 
schedule and on a 'like with-like' 
basis. 
Helps lower the equity 
cost of capital by 
assuring market investors 
that the proceeds of 
insurance claims will not 
be wasted and only used 







This problem arises where after an 
unexpectedly severe loss a firm’s cash 
position becomes acutely constrained 
and external finance costly. Therefore, 
positive NPV projects may have to be 
deferred or abandoned thus reducing firm 
value and creating a loss of market share. 
Insurance can mitigate this 
problem by ensuring that 
managers have sufficient cash 
after a catastrophe to enable 
prospectively attractive projects 
in a firm’s investment 
opportunity set to be realized. It 
also helps avoid the risk of 
managers not protecting cash 
resources earmarked for 
investment-e.g. because of inertia 
and/or negligence. 
Insurance primarily 
reduces the cost of equity 
by protecting future cash 
flows from excessive 
volatility. It also helps 
reduce agency costs of 
equity arising, for 
example, from manager 






Features Effect of Insurance 

















Occurs where shareholders (and 
managers) issue new debt at an equivalent 
or higher priority to that of existing debt. 
This can reduce the claims of primary 
secured debtholders. 
Insurance policies can mitigate 
conflicting claims on 
collateralized assets by 
specifying the primary insured's 
sole rights to claims in the event 
of losses. Insurance companies 
could also supplement banks' 
monitoring procedures by 
ensuring firms' compliance with 
insurance conditions. 
Lowers cost of equity by 
assuring prospective 
investors of the quality of 
external financial 











Managers will not be motivated to take 
risks and so maximize shareholders' value 
because they have private interests to 
protect (e.g. job security). Managerial 
risk-taking may increase the variability of 
cash flows thereby increasing the 
probability of bankruptcy. 
Insurance indemnifies assets 
against unanticipated losses and 
ensures the continued generation 
of cash flows thereby enabling 
firms to realize their financing 
and investment goals, and so 
avoid financial 
distress/bankruptcy Reducing 
downside financial risks 
encourages managers to take 
risks that benefit shareholders. 
Reduces the cost of 
equity by assuring 
investors that strategic 
investment opportunities 
will be met and 
shareholders' wealth 
maximized in the event of 
catastrophe. 




Features Effect of Insurance 








(Source: Derived from agency theory literature).This table summarizes the main incentive conflicts that can arise in firms as a result of agency problems (costs) and         








Managers compensated with stock 
options may be motivated to take risky 
actions which may benefit themselves 
and shareholders at the expense of 
debtholders and other claimants   (e.g., 
customers). 
Insurance can reduce the downside 
risk of stock options being ‘out-of-
the-money’ thus increasing the 
value of stock option plans and 
enhancing alignment between 
managerial and shareholders' 
interests. Alleviating downside 
risk reduces bankruptcy risk and 
so protects the interests of debt 
holders and other contracting 
constituents. 
Reduces the cost of 














Arises in in companies with highly 
concentrated ownership structures. 
Controlling shareholders have incentives 
to misuse/ re-direct cash to negative NPV 
projects, and/or non-optimal activities 
(e.g., high cash dividends and/or sale of 
collateralized assets). This reduces the 
value of the firm and undermines 
minority shareholders’ interests. This 
problem is exacerbated in Chinese PLCs 
where ownership structure is split into 
non-tradable shares and tradable shares.  
Insurance contracts can restrict the 
sale of collateralized assets thus 
mitigating changes in a firm’s risk 
profile. Also insurance commits 
managers to use cash flows to pay 
insurance premiums before 
making dividend distributions. 
Therefore, insurance can be used 
to control excessive dividends.  
Reduces the cost of 





and increasing overall 
firm value.  







CHAPTER 4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As previous three chapters make clear, the need for property insurance is underpinned 
by acute market imperfections such as information asymmetry problems, agency 
incentive conflicts, and the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy in the Chinese 
corporate sector. To explain how insurance affects the costs of equity of Chinese PLCs 
and guide analysis, an appropriate theoretical framework has to be utilized in order to 
direct research enquiry and give meaning to the empirical results. A review of the 
academic literature carried out in chapter 3 identified agency theory as an intuitively 
plausible framework which could be used to provide insights into the link between the 
purchase of property insurance and the cost of equity of Chinese PLCs. This chapter 
thus examines the salient propositions of the agency theory and puts forward two 
principal hypotheses derived from this theoretical framework in order to facilitate 
empirical testing.  
 
4.2 Towards a Theory of the Interface between Property Insurance 
and the Cost of Equity 
Agency theory implies that the firm-level cost of equity will fall as the amount of 
insurance increases because in the face of market imperfections (such as agency costs 
and information asymmetry problems) firm-specific (unsystematic) risks can be cost-
effectively transferred to insurance companies that have comparative advantages in risk-
pooling and claims settlement (Cho, 1988)24. Insurance companies (like banks) are also 
able to efficiently and effectively monitor managerial risk-taking (e.g., through regular 
inspections of assets) and control managerial activities through contractual covenants in 
                                                 
24  Zou and Adams (2006, p. 176) note that property insurance could mitigate both systematic and 
unsystematic risks. For example, an environmental disaster (e.g., an earthquake or flood) in the 
economically developed Eastern coastal areas of China could increase levels of systematic risk for 
Chinese firms and so have an adverse impact on their market cost of capital and level of investors’ 
returns. This reasoning further supports the view that property insurance could help to alleviate the 
sensitivity of Chinese firms’ cash flows to unexpected market risks and so reduce their costs of capital. 
However, Harrington and Niehaus (2003, p. 446) opine that any beneficial effect on a firm’s 
(opportunity) cost of capital from insuring systematic risks could be offset by lower expected cash flows 
resulting from higher insurance premium loadings. 
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insurance policies (Diamond, 1984). As mentioned earlier (chapter 3, section 3.2.7), 
these attributes can help reduce agency incentive conflicts (costs) between managers 
and external capital suppliers, and so ensure that sufficient (internal and external) funds 
are available for managers to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities (e.g., 
see Froot et al.1993; Doherty and Lamm-Tennant, 2009)25. In other words, hedging 
through the use of property insurance can potentially add value for shareholders by 
enabling them to avoid external financing and financial distress/bankruptcy costs 
associated with capital market imperfections (MacMinn and Garven, 2000). What is 
more, Nance et al. (1993, p. 270) argue that firms whose values mainly comprise 
growth opportunities face uncertain investment outcomes and potentially enhanced 
agency problems (e.g., misuse of ‘free’ cash flow). MacMinn (1987) argues that 
shareholders in firms with high growth options are more likely to engage in risk-shifting 
behavior than their counterparts with low growth options. Therefore, the managers of 
high growth option firms could engage in hedging (insurance) to bond their 
commitment to reducing the volatility of future cash flows arising from unforeseen 
perils and so reduce agency costs for shareholders and others. In a similar vein, 
insurance can help to mitigate earnings volatility in high growth option firms by 
reducing the scope for ex-post risk shifting (asset substitution) among a firm’s portfolio 
of assets (Ashby and Diacon, 1998, p. 37).  
 
Agency theory predicts a positive relation between the amount of equity retained in a 
firm and the risks associated with business activities including the risks of unexpectedly 
severe losses, mismanagement, financial distress and bankruptcy. This suggests that 
equity is essentially a form of risk capital that protects the value of a firm’s assets-in-
                                                 
25  Myers and Majluf’s (1984) ‘pecking order hypothesis’ suggests that because of information 
asymmetries internal funds will tend to be cheaper than external funds, and that managers will have a 
preference for first using accumulated cash, then debt and finally, equity in order to finance projects in 
their investment opportunity sets. Insurance therefore helps to hedge the cash flows necessary for 
managers to undertake positive NPV investment projects and so as noted earlier (chapter3, section 3.2.7), 
avoid the ‘crowding-out’ problem that can occur after an unexpectedly severe loss event (Doherty, 2000, 
pp 212-213). This characteristic of insurance not only means that firms do not have to raise costly debt 
and equity capital and bear the costs of restoring productive capacity following a major asset loss but it 
helps their managers to ensure that the firm’s long-term investment plans will be realized (Grillet, 1992). 
This in turn provides surety for existing and prospective investors thus reducing the firm’s cost of capital 
– producing what Doherty (2000) refers to as a ‘leverage neutral’ loss financing strategy for firms. Such 
arguments also imply that the ‘crowding-out’ effect can be likened to an agency cost of equity problem. 
For example, managerial inertia, shirking or carelessly behavior could result in no/under insurance 
protection for cash resources earmarked for prospectively positive NPV projects and future shareholder 




place against losses relative to the risk-free investment of those assets (Merton and 
Perold, 1993). The CAPM implies that in a single-period state with free market 
conditions the risk-free rate of return cannot be influenced by investors’ portfolio 
decisions. This suggests that if insurance is to affect the equity cost of capital then it 
must do so via the equity price premium, which is itself influenced by the firm’s market 
beta (systematic risk) (Doherty, 2000). O’Brien (2006) further reports that because 
hedging (e.g., via insurance) reduces the volatility of future cash flows (e.g., due to 
unforeseen disasters) it helps lower the cost of equity capital of the firm. Shimpi (2002) 
adds that releasing equity (risk) capital through hedging (insurance) reduces the 
deadweight costs of ‘misallocated’ capital by enabling released funds to be either 
returned to shareholders (e.g., through share repurchases) and/or invested in positive 
NPV projects. Indeed, O’Brien (2006) observes that without insurance the managers of 
a firm suffering an acute unanticipated loss event would find it difficult ex-post to 
obtain new financing to rebuild depleted assets and undertake future positive NPV 
projects26.  
 
In developing his ‘insurative model’, Shimpi (2002) views that the total level of risk 
capital held by firms is the incremental amount of equity capital in excess of that needed 
to maintain current operations, avoid agency problems, and reduce the risks/costs of 
financial distress and bankruptcy27. His research suggests that in exchange for regular 
(annual) premiums (financed from operating capital) insurance reduces a firm’s 
aggregate risk capital requirements, optimizes capital usage, alleviates agency problems 
(e.g., the managerial misuse of share capital) and reduces bankruptcy risk thereby 
lowering the overall cost of equity. Shimpi (2002) contends that the economic benefits 
of releasing equity through the purchase of insurance can be greater than the insurance 
premium paid and that because the insurer is likely to be more diversified than its 
corporate client then risk transfer could be optimal compared with a firm retaining risk. 
In other words, market exposures place retained economic capital at an increased risk of 
                                                 
26 Doherty and Tinic (1981) report that the amount of insurance supplied to, and purchased by, managers 
may be affected by the insurer’s perceived assessment of a firm’s immediate risk of financial 
distress/bankruptcy. That is, insurance coverage may be constrained by the insurer’s assessment of the 
firm as a ‘going concern’ in the short-term. 
 
27 Shimpi (2002) also asserts that an excess amount of equity may be held by firms in order to signal 




depletion following a loss event; but retaining capital in anticipation of such losses is 
inevitably costly. Therefore, insurance reduces capital tied-up in market risk thereby 
releasing risk capacity for more economically productive uses within the company. 
Shimpi’s (2002) ‘insurative’ model explicitly recognizes that the financing 
opportunities of managers include both on-balance sheet finance like equity, and off-
balance sheet (contingent) capital such as insurance. In other words, Shimpi (2002) 
argues that capital structure decisions and risk management (insurance) decisions are 
‘two sides of the same coin’. 
 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis postulates that managers could over-invest 
(e.g., in negative NPV projects) unless controlled by independent monitors and/or 
bound by contractual mechanisms such as debt covenants28. The requirement to make 
regular premiums under insurance policies could therefore induce corporate managers to 
generate free cash flows to meet their periodical contractual obligations and ensure that 
the ‘real’ advisory services and monitoring functions of insurance companies continues 
to provide value for shareholders (e.g. see Stulz, 1990). Hau (2006) argues that property 
insurance, even at actuarially unfair rates of premium, may be optimal where firms’ 
outputs are subject to large financial penalties in cases of contractual breach, which 
could occur after a severe loss event. For example, Hau (2006, p. 274) states that a “. . . 
rise in insurance coverage raises the contracted level of output and revenue in both good 
and bad states such that the marginal benefit of property insurance is higher than the 
expected marginal benefit of post loss financing.” Hau and MacMinn (2006) also show 
that insurance can alleviate the adverse agency problems associated with a speculative 
overinvestment strategy induced by stock option-based executive compensation 
schemes. Hau (2007) further demonstrates that the (property) insurance requirements of 
debt contracts mitigate the opportunity costs of risky asset reconstitution after a severe 
loss event and so helps to preserve shareholders’ wealth. Insurance can further mitigate 
agency costs arising from aberrant managerial behavior such as that adversely affecting 
employees, third parties and externalities (e.g., pollution costs) (Ashby and Diacon, 
1998, p. 37). While Haushalter et al. (2007) take a strategic focus for the use of hedging, 
they also point out that hedging (insurance) can reduce the agency costs of equity by 
                                                 
28 Overinvestment here refers to the agency problem where managers could overinvest in (self-gratifying) 
projects relative to the investment level that currently maximizes shareholders’ wealth (e.g. see Tufano, 




encouraging managers to engage in investment activities that protect a firm’s 
competitive position and market share (i.e., reduce predation risk). Such activities could 
help to reduce the costs of equity for companies, particularly those operating in highly 
competitive markets.29 
 
Zou and Xiao (2006) report that managers of Chinese PLCs, particularly those in SOEs, 
could be motivated to use equity rather than debt because the level of debt finance may 
be restricted and/or impose too many constraints on usage. This situation could, 
however, increase agency costs for investors by increasing opportunities for managers 
to use funds inappropriately – for example, by increasing rates of perquisite 
consumption. These institutional risks and intrinsic agency incentive conflicts could 
substantially increase the cost of equity capital for Chinese PLCs (Zou and Adams, 
2008b). However, insurance can alleviate such problems by subjecting managers and 
their systems of corporate governance to the external risk assessment and monitoring 
activities of insurance providers. This attribute can help to reduce the costs that capital 
providers face in screening issuers’ creditworthiness ex-ante and monitoring compliance 
with their expectations of risk and return on their investment ex-post (Grace and 
Rebello, 1993). Property insurance could also help to increase the traded liquidity of a 
firm’s shares by assuring brokers, analysts and investors as to the future cash flow 
generating opportunities of a firm’s underlying assets. This quality can further help to 
reduce a firm’s cost of equity capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 2000). In other words, 
insurance can help promote the liquidity of shareholdings by mitigating information 
asymmetries and reducing agency costs between ‘insiders’ (manager and/or current 
shareholders) and ‘outsiders’ (prospective investors /traders/ analysts) 30 . Improving 
liquidity also helps the functioning of financial markets (Amihud and Mendelson, 2000) 
- an important issue for a large emergent economy, such as China, with widely 
acknowledged information asymmetry problems between buyers and sellers of 
securities (Zhang and Ding, 2006). Moreover, Froot et al. (1993, p. 1653) argue that 
                                                 
29 In fact, Jiang et al. (2012) report that China’s corporate sector has become more competitive over the 
last decade or so.  
 
30 For this reason, the managers of small firms and IPOs in particular, are expected to voluntarily insure 
assets and publicly disclose the level of premiums paid/amount of indemnity coverage. Additionally, an 
IPO’s underwriters will inevitably hope for a fully subscribed listing and so taking out adequate property 
insurance cover is likely to be in their interest as well as for the listing company and their analyst 




hedging (e.g., via insurance) alleviates potential agency costs as it enables managers to 
generate ‘free’ cash flows and reduce inter-temporal earnings volatility. This attribute 
could again help to reduce the cost of equity - for example, by assuring investors as to 
the quality of the firm’s future growth opportunities.   
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
4.3.1 Main Hypotheses 
 
In essence, agency theory predicts that, amongst other things, managers could decide 
ex-ante to insure their assets because: (a) it mitigates information asymmetry problems 
by transferring risk externally and relying on the ability of the insurer to effectively 
screen and monitor the firm’s risk profile through its underwriting activities; (b) 
insurance reduces the amount of equity held by the firm to cover severe unanticipated 
loss events thus optimizing capital utilization; and (c) insurance provides surety to 
investors regarding the realization of future growth opportunities (e.g., by mitigating the 
volatility of future cash flows and reducing bankruptcy risk), reduces investors’ 
concerns about the probability of financial distress following extreme loss events, and 
minimizes of agency costs (e.g., investment crowding-out, and manager risk aversion). 
That is, insurance mitigates the agency problems and protects the interests of financial 
claimants such as shareholders (Zou et al., 2003; Zou and Adams, 2006; Jiang, et al., 
2012). As a result, investors would require a lower return on invested capital if a firm 
insures its property (productive assets). This leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Other things being equal, firms purchasing property insurance are likely to 
have a lower cost of equity than firms not purchasing property insurance. 
 
Furthermore, in China, investors invariably face severe information asymmetry 
problems (e.g., due to inadequate accounting disclosures on risk aspects of the business) 
and other frictions (e.g., perquisite consumption by managers) which inhibits the 
efficiency of market investment decisions (Zou and Adams, 2008b). Such potential 
agency conflicts and other market inefficiencies (e.g., lack of risk management 
knowledge and expertise) could mean lower-insuring Chinese PLCs are operating sub-
optimally in equilibrium and incurring higher costs of equity (lower traded values) than 
their counterparts with higher insurance coverage. This reasoning further suggests that 
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firms purchasing higher levels of property insurance are likely to have a lower cost of 
equity than firms with lower levels of property insurance. However, insurance policies 
are indemnity contracts. Therefore, any ex-post claim payments will thus be capped at 
the minimum of actual loss and the sum insured. In other words, the ability of insurance 
to reduce the cost of equity is unlikely to be without limits (e.g. see Zou, 2010). 
Therefore, over-insurance of an asset would invariably incur extra ‘deadweight’ costs 
but bring no financial benefits to firm. Over-insurance can also increase risks for 
shareholders. For example, over-insurance can promote managerial entrenchment 
(inertia) and increase the risk that managers will exercise excessive caution in the use of 
productive assets. This can reduce the opportunities for creating value for shareholders 
in highly competitive markets such as China (Tufano, 1998). Excess spending on 
(property) insurance can also exacerbate liquidity problems for firms and in extreme 
cases, increase financial distress/bankruptcy risks. This suggests that beyond some 
optimal point, increasing insurance spending could increase the cost of equity because 
investors see it as a ‘waste of money’ that increases agency costs (e.g., managerial 
inertia and moral hazard) and associated business risks such as lost investment 
opportunities. This reasoning suggests that the relation between the extent of property 
insurance use and the cost of equity could take a non-linear U-shape function. 
Therefore: the second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Other things being equal, there is likely to be a U-shape relation between the 
cost of equity and the extent of property insurance use. 
 
These two primary hypotheses will be tested during the course of the research project. 
However, as other factors can influence the property insurance-cost of equity relation, 
control variables (e.g., firm size, leverage, and so on) will enter the analysis conducted 
in the Chapter 6 (section 6.4.3). 
4.3.2 Subsidiary Hypothesis 
 
If hypotheses 1 and 2 are empirically consistent with the agency theory notion that 
property insurance reduces the cost of equity of firms, a further investigation into 
whether insurance reduces the cost of equity by mitigating agency problems could be 
insightful. As Table 3.2 makes clear, some agency problems between shareholders and 
managers could lead to firms reducing investment expenditures. For example, managers 
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have incentives to avoid risk-taking and even forgo value-enhancing risky projects to 
protect their career and enjoy a ‘quiet-life’ (i.e., manager risk-aversion incentive). Also, 
manager may have to defer or abandon positive NPV projects as the firm’s cash 
position becomes acutely constrained after an unexpectedly severe loss (i.e., investment 
crowding-out problem). However, with the protection of firms’ productive assets by 
property insurance, managers’ investment decisions might be less conservative and 
more optimal from the perspective of maximizing shareholders’ utility. Thus, a potential 
benefit of a reduction in the cost of equity via the purchase of property insurance is 
expected to facilitate a firm’s investment in positive NPV projects by resolving those 
problems. Consequently, a third hypothesis is that 
 
H3: Other things being equal, firms with property insurance (or more property 
insurance) are likely to spend more on prospective investment, and have a lower 
cost of equity compared with those firms with no property insurance (or lower 
property insurance).  
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter draws on the main aspects of agency theory and considers their 
implications for explaining the link between property insurance and the cost of equity in 
the Chinese corporate sector. Three test hypotheses are put forward in this chapter in 
order to direct empirical testing. To protect and promote the shareholder wealth 
maximization function, agency theory holds that insurance can mitigate the key agency 
problems in firms listed in Table 3.2, and as such, help lower their cost of equity. 
However, the ability of property insurance to completely reduce agency costs may be 
limited. Therefore, the relation between the extent of property insurance use and the 
cost of equity could U-shaped. Furthermore, if insurance reduces the costs of equity as 
predicted by agency theory, then this could be a result of mitigating agency incentive 
conflicts such as the managerial risk aversion and the investment crowding-out 
problems. In other words, property insurance can encourage managerial risk-taking and 
facilitate the investment of positive NPV projects thereby increasing value for 
shareholders. The research approach used in this study to test empirically each of the 
three hypotheses advanced in this part of the thesis is now examined in the next chapter 
of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 5. COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL METRICS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Firms do not pay set annual returns to the equity investors, and, the cost of equity is not 
directly observable and difficult to calculate (Fama and French, 2004). Therefore, it is a 
challenge to quantify accurately the cost of equity capital in the finance literature; 
indeed there is no well-accepted model for estimating the cost of equity. The cost of 
equity capital can be defined in different ways depending on one’s perspective. From 
the managerial view, it is the rate used to discount the future cash flows of a project 
under consideration; and from investors view, it is their expected rate of return traded-
off against the level of risk undertaken. In the academic literature, researchers have 
proposed various cost of equity metrics including ex-post models (e.g., the CAPM); and 
the Fama-French three-factor (FF3F) model) and ex-ante (accounting-based) valuation 
models (e.g., the residual income valuation (RIV) model; abnormal earnings growth 
(AEG) model, the price earnings growth (PEG) model, and the modified PEG (MPEG) 
model). The main difference between ex-post and ex-ante cost of equity models is that 
the former metrics use historical information on realized stock returns to compute the 
cost of equity, while the latter employ analysts forecasts data to derive measures of the 
cost of equity. Whilst all these cost of equity models have advantages they also have 
limitations in different financial and institutional contexts (eg., see Perold, 2004). 
Therefore, this chapter of thesis reviews and selects those metrics for determining the 
cost of equity capital that best fit the Chinese context of the present study.  
 
5.2 Ex-post Cost of Equity Models 
As Table 5.1 makes clear, there are four main ex-post models that are commonly used 
to estimate the cost of equity, namely the CAPM, FF3F model, Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) and the non-parametric Rubinstein-Leland Model (R-L). The latter three 
models are all derived in some respects from the basic CAPM (Fama and French, 2004). 





5.2.1 The CAPM 
 
As noted earlier in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2), the CAPM as developed by Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965) represents a benchmark in asset pricing theory and draws heavily on 
the concepts of portfolio thereby developed by Markowitz (1952). It is also the most 
commonly used metric to estimate the cost of equity both in the academic literature and 
finance practice (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Essentially, the CAPM basically 
addresses the question: how does the riskiness of an investment (asset) affect its return? 
(Perold, 2004). The model takes into account a firm’s systematic (i.e., non-
diversifiable/market) risk, which is reflected by the market beta (ß).                            
The cost of equity under the CAPM is defined as:    
)( fmifi RRRR                                                                                                                                         [5.1] 
where: Ri = the CAPM cost of capital for firm i; 
 Rf = the expected return on a default risk-free rate asset (e.g., a government security); βi 
= a measure of the systematic market risk for firm i, with βi= Cov(Ri,Rm)/Var(Rm); Rm = 
the expected return on the market portfolio. 
 
The key contribution of the CAPM is that it explicitly recognizes that asset 
diversification directly influences securities’ returns and market prices (Fama and 
French, 2004). This insight has helped influence, amongst other things, the practice of 
capital budgeting, portfolio analysis and investment strategy (Perold, 2004). However, 
the CAPM is subject to strict maintained assumptions (e.g., the absence of transaction 
costs and taxes). Additionally, the market’s expected risk premium has to be estimated 
ex-ante (as a proxy for expected asset value) because future asset prices are not directly 
observable (Fama and French, 2004). What is more, the historical magnitude of the 
market risk premium and the effects of institutional environment factors (e.g., the state 
of the macroeconomy) are often difficult to determine with precision. For example, 
Botosan (1997) and Lakonishok (1993) argue that it would need at least 60 years of 
realized security returns to estimate a reliable CAPM derived beta and so compute a 
reasonably accurate and statistically robust estimate of the cost of equity. The CAPM 
has other notable limitations as a cost of equity metric. For example, Lee and Cummins 
(1998) report that the CAPM is not only a single-period model and as such, cannot deal 
effectively with cross-temporal variations in firms’ risk profiles (e.g., betas), but that it 
is also founded on assumptions of perfect information in markets and multivariate 
normal securities’ returns data. Perold (2004) adds that the CAPM assumes that all 
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investors have equal access to the same investment opportunities and that they make the 
same estimates of individual assets’ expected returns. 
 
Fama and French (2004), Perold (2004), amongst others, report that there have been 
several variants on the basic CAPM in the literature. For example, Lambert et al. (2007) 
recast the CAPM into a form that explicitly allows for inter-correlated cash flows 
between firms. They show that the ratio of expected future cash flows to the covariance 
of a firm’s cash flows with the market’s cash flows is a key determinant of the equity 
cost of capital. Lambert et al. (2007) further demonstrate that better public disclosure of 
financial information helps to reduce the market risk premium and so lowers the cost of 
equity. 31  Wei (1988) develops a hybrid of the CAPM and APT metrics and 
demonstrates that this hybrid model is an important advancement on the standard 
CAPM. However, the hybrid model still retains many of the shortcomings of the CAPM 
such as the single-period context. Indjejikian (2007, pp. 423-424) further notes that the 
static single-period assumption of the CAPM is too simplistic and that investors are 
likely to be interested in how their asset portfolios are affected by future investment 
opportunities. As a result, he argues that the CAPM can offer only limited theoretical 
insights into the determinant factors affecting asset prices in market. For example, he 
contends that time-invariant models cannot accommodate changing levels of market 
uncertainty over time. As insurance premiums and coverage levels vary over periods of 
high and low uncertainty, the CAPM and its hybrid models are therefore likely to have 
shortcomings in the context of the present study. This is particularly likely to be the 
case in emerging markets such as China where highly volatile share price movements 
are observed over time (Zhang and Ding, 2006). Zhang and Ding (2006,p. 385) also 
report that in the recent past, China’s less stringent accounting rules have enhanced 
information asymmetry problems for investors. This institutional limitation potentially 
reduces the effectiveness of the CAPM for estimating the equity cost of capital. 
Nonetheless, the CAPM’s relative simplicity and popularity in academic and 
practitioner circles does warrant its use as a comparative benchmark metric in this study. 
 
                                                 
31 Perold (2004, p.21) describes another variant on the basic CAPM-namely, the International CAPM 
(ICAPM). The ICAPM introduces the effects of foreign exchange rate movements on asset prices and the 
risk-return of asset portfolios, and consequently, investors’ decisions.  
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5.2.2 Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
 
An early conceptual advancement on the CAPM is Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 
(Adams, 2002) In estimating asset prices (cost of equity), the APT is generally applied 
in the same way as the CAPM. However, APT requires less strict assumptions of 
portfolio and investors’ behavior than those of the CAPM. For example, Grinblatt and 
Titman (1987) report that the CAPM assumes that: a) returns on assets follow a normal 
distribution over time; b) investors are rational decision-makers; and c) portfolio 
investors can access security markets without informational and/or regulatory 
restrictions. In contrast, APT does not require such strict these assumptions to hold and 
so it is ostensibly more flexible and comprehensive in terms of its potential application 
in different financial and institutional contexts (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 1998, 
p.231). The salient features of the APT model are that it incorporates key 
macroeconomic variables (e.g., inflation and interest rate risk) that might affect 
investors’ expected returns and thus the cost of equity (Adams, 2002). The APT model 
can be defined as: 
nnfRr   ...2211                                                                                     [5.2] 
where: δ1 . . . δn = risk factor values;  
β1 . . . βn = betas for each factor loading.  
 
Lee and Cummins (1998) show that APT produces more reliable cost of equity 
estimates than the CAPM but they report that it is rarely used in practice for various 
reasons. Such reasons include the heavy analytical constraints that APT places on data 
(e.g., the requirement for synchronous and frequently traded share price data) and the 
theoretical inability to determine the macroeconomic factors (and their direction of 
influence) that impact directly on securities’ returns. Additionally, a key assumption of 
APT is that there is a wide number of bonds available in the market to enable a firm to 
create/replicate a portfolio that effectively diversifies the market pricing risk of its 
equity (which is necessary in order to derive reliable and robust cost of equity 
estimates). Given such an assumption, several researchers (e.g., Ross 1976; Grinblatt 
and Titman. 1987) have argued that APT is most suitable for estimating asset prices 
(cost of equity) when firms have well-diversified portfolios. However, given the lack of 
data on firms’ asset portfolios in the Chinese corporate sector, APT is unlikely to be a 




5.2.3 FF3F Model 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) report that the FF3F model is another cost of equity metric 
that is sometimes used by finance practitioners. Conceptually, the FF3F model extends 
the CAPM by incorporating key risk factors that help to control for the effects of firm 
size (market capitalization) and corporate growth prospects (the book-to-market equity 
ratio) on the cost of equity capital. Empirical evidence (e.g. Fama and French 1992, 
1993) shows that including such factors could capture expected returns on firms’ asset 
portfolios that is not explained by the CAPM’s classical beta. Other potentially 
important explanatory variables of expected securities’ returns are leverage (debt-equity 
ratio) and the price-earnings ratio (Fama and French, 1992). In essence, the FF3F model 
predicts that, all else equal, large firms will tend to have relatively lower overall costs of 
equity than small firms because of their lower risk profile. The book-to-market ratio is 
also often interpreted as providing a market risk premium for financial distress (Fama 
and French, 1995). Consequently, other things being equal, firms whose investment 
opportunity set largely comprises growth options rather than assets-on-place are 
expected to have higher costs of equity than other firms. The FF3F model can be 
expressed as: 
hhissifmmifi rrErrE   ])([)(                                                                                          [5.3] 
where: rf = risk-free rate;  
βmi = the market beta;  
βsi = the beta for size;  
Ωs = the expected market risk premium for firm size;  
βhi = the beta for the book-to-market equity factor; and 
Ωh = the expected market risk premium for the book-to-market ratio.  
 
Bornholt (2007, p.70) points out that although there is some convincing empirical 
evidence in favor of the FF3F model, there are two main criticisms with the metric. First, 
the method used by Fama and French (1992,1993,1995,1997) to construct their firm 
size and book-to-market factors is empirically rather than theoretically driven and seems 
‘ad hoc’ in nature. Second, it is difficult to determine precise forward-looking estimates 
of the three factor sensitivities and market risk premiums, particularly as securities that 
experience initial gains (losses) tend to carry these gains (losses) forward over the 
remainder of the accounting period. Fama and French (2004) refer to this phenomenon 
as the “momentum effect”. In fact, empirical evidence from the UK reported in Ashton 
and Tippett (1998) shows that estimates of firms’ betas are sensitive to mis-
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specification of the market portfolio leading to biased estimations regarding the effects 
of book-to-market ratios in explaining asset prices (cost of equity). This limitation with 
the FF3F model may be difficult to address in practice and this possibility has led 
Gregory and Michou (2009, p. 679) to state that the FF3F model “… paints a fairly 
bleak picture of the prospects for being able to estimate the cost of capital of any firm or 
industry with any degree of accuracy.” Cummins and Phillips (2005) further argue that 
the FF3F model requires lengthy estimation periods of 30 years or more to derive robust 
results. As publicly available financial data for Chinese PLCs only became available 
after 1997 (Zou et al., 2003), this constraint is likely to be a major limiting factor in 
using the FF3F model in present study. Additionally, like the CAPM and the APT 
model, the FF3F model requires synchronous and frequent securities trading. These 
considerations could also reduce the applicability of the FF3M in this research project 
given that some segments of the Chinese stock market (e.g. State-owned utilities) are 
often thinly traded (Sun and Tong, 2003). 
 
5.2.4 Rubinstein and Leland (R-L) Model 
 
The CAPM and its variants operate under the assumption that the risk and return of a 
market portfolio of assets is mean-variance efficient where it is assumed that (a) all 
asset returns are normally (and thus symmetrically) distributed; and (b) investors care 
only about the mean and variance of expected returns (which implies that they view 
upside and downside risks with equal preference)(Fama and French, 2002, 2004). 
However, in practice, Leland (1999) argues that neither assumption can be justified as 
portfolio returns are in general not normally distributed. He further points out that even 
if the underlying assets' returns are normally distributed, the returns of portfolios that 
use options on those assets and/or use dynamic strategies would not be normally 
distributed. Also, many market investors are typically not risk-averse-types but rather 
risk-takers. Consequently, investors would distinguish between upside and downside 
risks in making their portfolio choices. For example, positively skewed security returns 
are preferred by most rationally-minded investors, which implies that in equilibrium 
portfolio asset prices held by a firm are unlikely to be consistent with the mean and 
variance rule of a normally distributed market portfolio (Leland, 1999). Therefore, as 
noted previously, the basic theoretical underpinnings of the CAPM may not hold in 
reality particularly in China. Fama and French (2004, p.44) arrive at a similar 
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conclusion from their analysis of the empirical validity of the CAPM. Compared with 
the intrinsic mean-variance rule of the CAPM and its variants, the R-L model has a non-
parametric (distribution-free) feature that can capture all elements of the distributional 
frequency of asset price risk including skewness, kurtosis and higher moments. Kozik 
and Larson (2001) proposed an “N-moment CAPM” which also addresses the skewed 
risk-return (price) distribution issue. However, compared with the R-L model, Kozik 
and Larson’s (2001) variant model is limited by the moments associated with investors’ 
risk-return preference; it also requires securities’ returns to be finite over time. These 
conditions are unfortunately difficult to control for empirically (Wen, Martin, Lai, and 
O’Brien, 2008) and therefore, likely to be inappropriate in the context of the current 
study.  
 
Leland (1999) showed that the CAPM and the R-L model give similar asset price (cost 
of equity) estimates for assets that are symmetrically distributed. However, for assets 
where returns are asymmetrically distributed, Leland (1999) finds that the R-L model 
gives more statistically robust estimates of the cost of equity than the CAPM. Wen et al. 
(2008) use the R-L model to calculate the cost of equity for US property-liability 
insurance companies. The non-parametric assumptions underlying the R-L model 
therefore appear to offer prospects for its application in this study given the 
acknowledged volatility and frequent ‘thin trading’ observed in China’s stock markets 
(e.g., see Poon et al., 1998, Sun and Tong, 2003). Researchers such as Fama and French 
(1997) and Cummins and Phillips (2005) also contend that industry factors and time-
effects (e.g., the state of macroeconomic conditions) can influence the cost of equity. 
Such influences can be accommodated within the R-L model as in the time-series asset 
pricing analysis conducted in Wen et al.(2008). Wen et al. (2008) further note that the 
R-L model requires no more information to implement than the basic CAPM but that it 
nonetheless captures all the key elements of asset risk, including skewness and kurtosis 
that describe the shape of the asset price distribution. The R-L model can be expressed 
by: 
])([)( fmifi RRERRE                                                                                         [5.4] 
where: E(Ri) = required return for asset i; 
 Rf = risk-free rate; and 

























         
However, a key constraint of the R-L model is that for it to be effectively applied 
empirically a measure of the degree of investors’ risk aversion (so-called parameter b) 
has to be estimated. In most of the academic literature, the degree of risk aversion of 
investors is related to the market equity risk premium (Fama and French 2002, 2004). 
Leland (1999) viewed parameter b as the market’s price of risk-namely, the market’s 
instantaneous excess rate of return divided by the variance of the market’s instantaneous 
rate of return. Numerous researchers have attempted to quantify the degree of risk 
aversion. For example, Friend and Blume (1975) used an empirical survey of consumer 
wealth allocation to estimate parameter b. Campbell (1996) includes the effects of 
human capital and the mean aversion character of the stocks index to estimate the value 
b as 3.63. Wen et.al. (2008) specify an integer of four based on Campbell (1996) as a 
common preference parameter b measure. On this basis, Wen et al. (2008) assume that b 
= 4 and use a risk-free rate of 3 percent and a market risk premium of 5 percent in order 
to estimate the equity cost of capital. However, the parameter b estimated using 
historical Chinese stock market data, is negative and so it does not seem practical to use 
the R-L model in present study.  
 
5.3 Ex-ante Cost of Equity Models 
As noted earlier, researchers such as Fama and French (2002, 2004) argue that ex-post 
cost of equity models are imprecise due to uncertainties regarding estimating the 
magnitude and timing of market risk premiums and risk loadings. Other researchers 
(e.g.,Elton 1999; Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Botosan, Plumlee and Wen, 2011) also 
find that the correlation between expected market returns and realized securities returns 
is weak. This observation accentuates concerns about the validity ex-post models to 
accounting and consistently and accurately estimate the equity cost of capital.  
 
In view of such limitations, accounting-based ex-ante cost of equity models have been 
developed and reported in the academic literature. These metrics include the dividend 
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discount model (DDM)-the longest established ex-ante cost of equity estimation metrics 
as well as more recent developments such as RIV model (e.g., Feltham and Ohlson, 
1995), AEG model (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001), PEG and MPEG 
model (e.g., Easton, 2004). In essence, the RIV, AEG and MPEG models are earnings-
based valuation models that are predicated on the general idea of substituting asset 
prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts with an equity valuation equation. In these cases, 
the implied cost of equity is derived as the internal rate of return that equates current 
share prices with the expected future sequence of residual income or abnormal (i.e., 
above market average) earnings growth. These four ex-ante cost of equity models are 
reviewed below.  
 
5.3.1 The DDM 
 
A widely used variant of the DDM is the Gordon Dividend growth model (see, Gordon, 






t  1                                                                                                               [5.5] 
 
where: Dt+1 = the next expected dividend (Dt×(1+g)); 
Pt = current share price; and 
g = the constant growth rate of dividends. 
 
Due to its simplicity, the DDM is popular amongst academic researchers and 
practitioners. The model has three main assumptions. First, the industry returns cash to 
shareholders; second, dividends paid are a fixed proportion of earnings; third, dividend 
payments grow at a steady rate perpetually. The first assumption also incorporates share 
repurchases in case the shares being bought back are expired-for example, by not being 
redistributed among employees and staff. These assumptions are more likely to hold in 
case of mature industries. Apart from that, this model cannot be used for firms that do 
not pay dividends. Moreover, a constant growth rate of dividends implicitly assumes 
that distributable earnings grow perpetually at a steady rate, which is unlikely to hold in 
reality. Also, this model requires a long time-series of dividend forecasts as the effect of 
future dividends on valuation diminishes at a slow rate. For the above reasons, DDM is 




5.3.2 The RIV Model 
 
Over the last decade or so, the RIV model has become a prominent method in the 
academic accounting and finance literature for calculating the cost of equity. Sutton 
(2004, p.131) defines the broad framework of RIV as the overall change in net assets 
(NA) in the year, excluding the effects of dividends (D) and changes in share capital 
(∆SC).  Thus for year t:  
ttttt DSCNANACI   )( 1  
where : CI = comprehensive income; 
NA = net assets; 
∆SC = changes in share capital; and 
D = dividends. 
 
Excluding changes in share capital eliminates the ‘non-clean’ net income reported in the 
income statement generated under GAAP. A key attribute of the RIV model is its ability 
to utilize published accounting data to determine the corporate cost of equity and hence 
firm valuation. The RIV method uses analysts forecasts of a company's excess annual 
earnings (i.e., annual net income after charging for the cost of the equity capital 
employed), which are then brought back to current values by discounting projected 
earnings using a measure of the cost of equity. The cost of equity is derived by taking 
the intrinsic value of a firm’s equity as the initial (accounting) book value (i.e., invested 
equity capital) plus the NPV of future residual income (i.e., value created) emerging 
from business operations (e.g. Feltham and Ohlson 1995; Ohlson 1995). However, 
specification of the valuation model under the RIV framework relies on the assumptions 
made of the terminal value of firm. For example, Gebhardt et al. (2001) assume that the 
return on equity (ROE) will linearly decline to an industry-based ROE in 12 years. 
Claus and Thomas (2001) assume that the residual earnings develop at a constant rate 
beyong the forecast horizon. Under such assumptions, current share price ‘P0’ can be 
represented as a function of book value ‘B’ per share, steady state growth in clean 
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where : P0 = current share price; 
ROE = return on equity; 
B = book value per share; 
g = constant growth rate; and 






Clearly, from the notation, it is evident that the cost of equity of a given firm could be 
calculated from readily available accounting data, which can be advantageous 
empirically (Ohlson, 1995). On the other hand, the RIV model has acknowledged 
shortcomings. For example, with the RIV model the market valuation of the firm 
depends on the NPV of expected dividends per share, and so applying the RIV model 
requires determining a ‘clean surplus’ (Walker 1997) 32 . However, the academic 
literature records that the use of annual earnings can be inconsistent with the concept of 
clean surplus accounting, notably the requirement to accurately determine abnormal 
annual earnings for firms (Walker, 1997). Botosan and Plumlee (2005) also show that as 
a cost of equity metric, the RIV model does not perform well in continental European 
countries where lax corporate accounting rules and practices (or ‘dirty surplus’ 
accounting) often exist. However, in defence of the RIV model, Ohlson (1995, p. 662) 
argues that the expected values of ‘dirty surplus’ items are approximately zero, which 
essentially ‘assumes away’ the possible problem of potentially confounding effects. 
Ohlson (1995) further points out that the prospect of “noise” being introduced into clean 
surplus accounting need not be severely detrimental to RIV as a concept. However, in 
the context of China, corporate accounting standards and practices have largely been 
inconsistent with the concept of clean surplus accounting until very recently. For 
example, Chinese PLCs have only been required to strictly follow International 
Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) which encourages clean surplus accounting 
from January 2007. As the data used in this study are from 2003 to 2007, it is thus not 
feasible to utilize the RIV model in this study.  
 
5.3.3 AEG Model 
 
As with the FF3F model, the AEG model estimates the cost of equity in line with firm-
specific risk factors (e.g., firm size). The core aspects of the AEG model show how 
next-period earnings per share (EPS) and EPS growth relate to a firm’s current price per 
share (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2005). Gebhardt et al.(2001) and Gode and 
                                                 
32 In essence, ‘clean surplus’ accounting assumes that the market value of the firm is the sum of its book 
value plus the sum of abnormal earnings that the firm is expected to generate over its life time. Abnormal 
earnings are the difference between accounting earnings and the opening book value of assets multiplied 





Mohanram (2003) report that implied cost of equity capital estimates based on both the 
RIV and AEG models are generally reliable and consistent cross-sectionally and over 
time. However, compared with the RIV model, the AEG model has some clear 
advantages. For example, the AEG model neither requires a book value construct for 
assets nor does it rely on the assumption of clean surplus accounting. Furthermore, the 
related assumptions regarding relevant future income valuation mean that annual EPS 
data are notionally as easy to work with as total annual earnings. Additionally, the 
possibility of changes in the value of outstanding shares has little adverse implications 
for firm valuation, while investment returns revolve around earnings creation and their 
subsequent growth, not asset accounting-based book values and their subsequent growth 
(Ohlson 2001). 
 
In deriving an estimate of the cost of equity, the AEG model uses capitalized next-
period earnings per share (EPS) as the first value component, and it then adds the NPV 
of capitalized expected changes in annual earnings, adjusted for dividends, as the 
second component (Ohlson, 2001). From Ohlson (, 2001) the AEG cost of equity 
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where: EPSt+1 and EPSt+2 = one and two years forecasts of earnings per share;                                             
DPSt+1 = the one year forecast of dividend per share;  
Pt = the current price; and 
(r-1) =  the perpetual growth rate to which  the short-term growth declines gradually 
over time.  
 
Nonetheless, Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth. (2005) contend that this specification of the 
AEG model cannot fully take into account complex scenarios such as the evolution of 
expected EPS over time. For example, a firm could incur increasing annual losses 
before realizing above normal EPS performance thereby making accurate estimates of 
the cost of equity difficult to achieve in practice. In addition, Easton and Monahan 
(2005) and Guay, Kothari and Shu (2005) report that the relation between future 
realized securities’ returns and implied cost of equity capital estimates based on AEG 




5.3.4 PEG and MPEG Models 
 
The PEG model derives the implied cost of equity from a firm’s share price-earnings 
growth relation and as such, it is a special case of the AEG model (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2005). Easton (2004) posits that a key feature of the PEG model is that it utilizes rates 
of return implied by current asset prices and forecasts of future payoffs (earnings and 
earnings growth). This is analogous to internal rates of return calculated from the 
market price of a bond and coupon payments. Easton (2004) demonstrates empirically 
that cost of equity estimates derived from the PEG model perform better than those 
based on the price-earnings (P/E) ratio using data drawn from the US corporate sector. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) evaluate the RIV, AEG, and PEG models and they also 
find that the PEG model generates the most consistently robust results in repeated 
statistical tests of the cost of equity among US firms with different risk profiles (e.g., in 
terms of betas, leverage, price-to-book values, and so on). Lee et al. (2006) further 
suggest that the PEG model is parsimonious compared with the AEG and RIV models, 
and has the key advantage of utilizing readily observable accounting-based parameters. 
Moreover, the PEG model performs well where ‘clean surplus’ assumptions (e.g., 
efficient market information (good accounting)) might not hold in reality (as may, for 
institutional reasons, be the case in China). Subject to fewer assumptions, Easton (2004) 
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where: EPSt+2 and EPSt+1 = one and two year forecasts of a firm’s earnings per share; 
Pt = the current share price, assuming zero abnormal return beyond the forecast horizon; 
DPSt+1 = Dividend per share at year t+1. 
 
However, if the assumption that Chinese firms’ long-term earnings growth extends 
beyond the forecast horizon does not fit the corresponding market’s expectations, then 
the implied cost of equity derived from the PEG (MPEG) model could be “noisy”. 
Another potential shortcoming is that the PEG (MPEG) model requires EPS to be 
positive over time (which is an unrealistic assumption in highly volatile markets such as 
China). This limitation could further bias samples towards less risky firms thus 
producing unreliable estimates of the cost of equity (Lee et al., 2006, pp. 14-15). 
Consequently, such drawbacks need to be taken into account when interpreting cost of 




ability of the MPEG model to cater for many institutional difficulties, such as inefficient 
corporate accounting, makes it a potentially interesting cost of equity model to evaluate 
alongside more established metrics such as the CAPM.  
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter reviews the main cost of equity estimation models in the accounting and 
finance literature and summaries of those cost of equity metrics are presented in Table 
5.1. First, ex-post cost of equity models are evaluated. The CAPM is the most common 
cost of ex-post equity metric adopted by academics and finance practitioners, and so 
sued in this study (though it has acknowledged disadvantages). The APT and FF3F cost 
of equity models were originally developed from CAPM and sought to capture 
unsystematic risk and the pricing of assets more accurately by, for example, controlling 
for macroeconomic effects (e.g. rates of interest) and/or firm-specific factors(e.g. firm 
size). However, APT FF3F and R-L models are limited in practice due to the lack of 
sufficient and suitable data, and so will not be used in the present study. Second, ex-ante 
accounting valuation models are evaluated. The longest established ex-ante cost of 
equity metric is the DDM. However the DDM assumes that the cost of equity can be 
inferred from future dividend growth rates, which is implausible. Because of possible 
‘dirty surplus’ items arising as a result of undeveloped Chinese accounting standards 
and practices up to 2007, the RIV suffers from this shortcoming and so will not be used 
in this study. The AEV model is particularly sensitive to the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts of future long-term earnings growth which may again be problematical in an 
emergent market like China with an embryonic financial analyst community. On the 
other hand, the MPEG model derives from the AEG model but it is a more 
parsimonious model which has been shown to produce the most reliable and consistent 
estimates of the cost of equity. Consequently, the MPEG model is the preferred ex-ante 
cost of equity metric to be employed for comparative purposes in this study. However, 
the MPEG model has acknowledged limitations (e.g., the requirement for analyst 
forecast of EPS to be always positive). As a result, appropriate qualifications will be 
made in interpreting the empirical results derived from the MPEG model as well as the 
other cost of equity metrics analyzed.  The methods adopted to test the hypotheses will 
be elaborated in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of the Cost of Equity Models 
 
Models Assumptions Advantages Disadvantages 
CAPM  Investors are rational  
 Returns are normally distributed 
 Perfect competitive market 
 Simple and logical model to price an 
individual security  
 Single-factor model that might not deal 
with cross-temporal variations in firms’ risk 
profiles 
APT  Investors are rational  
 Returns are normally distributed 
 Perfect competitive markets 
 Incorporates macroeconomic risk factors 
that affect the returns. 
 Requires synchronous and frequently traded 
share price data 
 Difficult to determine macroeconomic 
effects  
FF3F  Investors are rational  
 Returns are normally distributed 
 Perfect competitive markets 
 Incorporate risk factors that control for the 
effects of firm size and growth prospects  
 Factor betas might change over time, thus 
not suitable for firms with shorter return 
series.  
R-L  Investors are rational  
 Perfect competitive markets 
 Captures skewness and other higher order 
moments of the return distribution 
 Difficult to estimate the degree of 
investors’ risk aversion. 
DDM  The industry returns cash to 
shareholders 
 Dividend payments grow at a steady 
rate perpetually 
 Fixed rate  
 Simple to apply  The assumption that dividend payments 
grow at a steady rate perpetually is unlikely 
to hold in reality 
RIV  Clean surplus  Incorporates widely available accounting 
information  
 Residual surplus accounting cannot be 
applied on per share basis 
AEG  Short-term growth rate asymptotically 
declines to perpetual growth rate with a 
rate δ(1≤δ≤(1+Ke)) 
 Empirically shown to be a more consistent 
(e.g., Claus and Thomas, 2001) 
 Cannot fully take into account complex 
scenarios (e.g., the evolution of expected 
EPS over time) 
MPEG  The short-run growth forecast also 
captures the long-run future 
 Empirically shown to be a more consistent 
estimation (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 
2005) 
 Year t+1, and year t+2 “abnormal earnings” 
are positive. 







CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This study uses statistical analysis to test empirically the main hypotheses put forward 
in Chapter 4. This chapter provides the rationale for the research approach and the 
manner in which it is implemented in this research project. The chapter also describes 
the data used in this study, defines and measures the variables used, outlines the 
procedure of estimating cost of equity, and specifies the models employed.  
 
6.2 Data 
This research project initially considered using all A-share companies listed at the 
SHSE and SZSE from 2004 to 2009 (the total no of companies was 1709 in 2009). In 
order to obtain detail information of property insurance purchased (e.g. coverage, 
deductibles, and previous claim), a survey of these A-share holding companies was 
conducted for each year (2004-2009). In the event, the survey and subsequent follow-
ups produced a very low response rate (≤ 5% of the n = 300 sample of firms targeted). 
 
Given the low response rate of the survey, instead of using insurance coverage and 
deductibles stated in the insurance policy, the annual corporate spending on property 
insurance scaled by the total book value of insurable physical asset is employed as a 
proxy for insurance coverage in this study. As in Zou (2010), corporate annual 
insurance expenditures are manually collected from companies’ annual reports and 
accounts. From 1997 onwards, corporate disclosure rules in China required listed 
companies to itemize major financial statement items in the notes to financial 
statements in annual reports and some companies voluntarily reported insurance 
expenditure under “amortized expense items”.  However, the accounting disclosure 
rules were changed from 2007 onwards, whereby corporate insurance spending need not 
be separately identified under “amortized expense items”. This raises the possibility of 
data inconsistency through the period arising changes in accounting rules (see Chapter 
2, section 2.4.3). Importantly, Chinese PLCs without property insurance cannot be 
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identified from the annual reports and accounts. As a result, data manually collected 
from annual reports would potentially suffer from a sample selection bias.  
 
In view of these data collection challenges, data on the annual insurance expenditures 
(as noted early in chapter 1 section 1.2, footnote 8), were obtained from a database of 
CIE compiled NBSC. The CIE database covers a large number of Chinese companies 
(approximately 15,000 companies, including a large number of listed companies). 
Although it does not cover all A-share listed companies, the CIE data for insurance 
premium reports a value of 0 if there is no property insurance purchased in a fiscal year. 
Therefore, the CIE dataset is not prone to selectivity bias for the purpose of the analysis 
conducted in the present study. Matching with the list of all A-share companies, a 
sample of 329 PLCs are extracted from the CIE in 2003, and 472, 422, 442 and 472 
companies are extracted from CIE in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively 33 . 
Companies were manually checked to rule out financial services companies (e.g. banks, 
insurance companies, investment companies) because they account and report under 
different rules from other companies and tend to have different capital structures. 
Material reorganizations, such as those involving asset swaps, debt transfers, and/or 
divestitures among associated companies, can dramatically change a firm’s asset base, 
capital structure and can often lead to structural industry changes (Zou 2010). 
Therefore, companies that experienced material reorganizations from 2003 to 2007 were 
also excluded. In total 2,137 firms with insurance data from 2003 to 2007 were 
extracted from the CIE as a base panel. It is important to note that the CIE insurance 
data are not consolidated compared with data collected from the annual reports and 
accounts. Accordingly, it is a maintained assumption of this study that firms have the 
same cost of equity as at group-level (see Chapter 1, section 1.6).  
 
Company-specific share price data were extracted from Datastream and accounting 
information was obtained mainly from the CIE. If it is not available in the CIE, data 
were obtained from the Wind Financial Information System (developed by Shanghai 
Wind Ltd) which is a leading data provider to institutional investors in china. The two 
data sources (CIE and WIND) were, however, cross-checked across firms/years to 
                                                 
33 Those extracted PLCs from CIE are manually checked in case of mismatch.  As CIE data are compiled 
based on the annual financial survey conducted by the NBSB, the PLCs in the CIE may not attend survey 
consistently over 2003 to 2007.  As noted in Chapter 1, footnote 8, insurance premiums have not been 
routinely collected by NBSC since 2008.  
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ensure data consistency. Analysts’ earnings forecast data used to estimate implied cost 
of equity were obtained from CSMAR Securities Research Database (developed by 
Shenzhen GTA Ltd. and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University), which is again a 
dataset that is often used in academic research. The cost of equity for the final sample of 
1,156 firms (out of 2,137) over 5 years (2003 to 2007) were estimated using the CAPM, 
and 331 firms (out of 2,137) were estimated using the MPEG method. This study thus 
uses an unbalanced panel of 395 firms from the period of analysis-2003 to 2007. 
 
6.3 Statistical Procedures 
This study employs three main statistical procedures to analyze the data collected and 
test the direction and significance of causality predicted by the two main hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 5. These statistical procedures include univariate and bivariate 
analyses and multivariate regressions.  
 
6.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
The cross-sectional and time-series unbalanced data are first pooled and described using 
descriptive statistics including mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, 
minimum, maximum and number of observations.(See Chapter 7, section 7.2 Table 7.1 
Panel A). This practice helps to summarize the overall characteristics of the dataset and 
so ascertain the patterns (e.g., the distributions) for each variable used. Second, the 
means and medians of firm-specific characteristics for insurance users and non-users are 
computed. Both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test, 
hereafter WMW test) are performed to test for statistically significant differences 
between the means (t-test) and medians (WMW test) of these characteristics for users 
and non-users of property insurance. The reason for using non-parametric WMW tests 
as a supplement to parametric t-test equivalents is that such a test is less sensitive to the 
distributional differences (e.g., variance) between two sample groups. Hence it is more 
likely to produce robust results (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). The results of these tests 





6.3.2 Bivariate Analysis 
 
The bivariate analysis conducted in this study involves testing associations between the 
dependent and independent variables. Pair-wise Pearson correlation/Spearman rank test 
analyses are performed for the selected variables. Bryman and Cramer (1997) argue that 
an investigation of associations among variables through correlation analysis is an 
initial but important step in explaining the underlying phenomena in which researchers 
are primarily interested. Chow (1982) further indicates that from an econometric 
perspective, correlation analysis should be performed prior to carrying out multivariate 
tests in order to mitigate the risk that variable measurement errors and/or inter-
correlated variables may remain undetected, and so distort the statistical significance of 
multivariate results. Additionally, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are performed to 
ascertain whether or not the coefficient estimates in the multivariate tests are potentially 
rendered inefficient as a result of multicollinearity (Kutner, Nachtsheim and Neter, 
2004).  
 
6.4 Models and Variables 
In this section, the models used to test the hypotheses 1 and 2 are specified, and 
variables employed in the models are described. To investigate whether insurance 
purchase decision impacts on cost of equity (hypothesis 1), the following regressions 




ERP_CAPM = estimated equity risk premium (proxy for the cost of equity) produced by 
CAPM; 
INS = insurance purchase decision; 
LEV = leverage; 
LnMV = firm size (logarithm of market value of equity); 
LnMB = logarithm of market to book ratio, price-to-book; 
CASH = liquidity risk; 
NSHARE = proportion of non-tradable share; 
α = industry dummies, industry fixed effect; 
β = year dummies, year fixed effect; and 












Furthermore, to investigate the relation between the amount of insurance and cost of 
equity (hypothesis 2), the following regression equation [6.2] is employed 
 
 
where the variables are as defined in equation [6.1], except for: 
 INSCOV = the extent of property insurance or insurance coverage; 
 INSCOV2 = square of insurance coverage. 
 
 
6.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The equity risk premium (proxy for the cost of equity: ERP_CAPM) is the dependent 
variable in above regression model and is estimated using the CAPM (see equation 
[5.1]). Two versions of ERP_CAPM are used in the regression model and produced by 
raw beta regressed from the market model and the industry-adjusted beta respectively. 
In the CAPM, only beta varies across companies, the market risk premium (defined as 
the difference between E(Rm) and rf), is deemed to be the same to all companies in the 
panel. The cost of equity can be specified as ERPi = βi×market risk premium: more 
specifically, ERPi= βi×[ E(Rm)- rf]. Therefore, in order to obtain ERP, beta, and market 
risk premium need to be estimated.  
 
6.4.1.1 Estimating the Beta 
 
Since beta cannot be observed directly, the value must be estimated. The most common 
metric used to estimate a company’s raw beta is the market model: i.e., Ri= α+βRm+ε 
[6.3]. In the market model (equation [6.3]), the stock’s return Ri, is regressed against the 
market’s return Rm. In this study, a specific share’s return i is calculated as discretely 
compounded adjusted prices (e.g., dividend, right issue): i.e., (Rt=Pt+1-Pit/Pit). As the 
true market portfolio is unobservable, the value-weighted return on SZSE and SHSE is 































where MCSZ = market capitalization of SZSE; 















SZIndex = price index of SZSE; and 
SHIndex = price index of SHSE. 
 
To run the regression, previous 60 months data are used (e.g, see Cummins and Phillips, 
2005). The measurement period for the raw regressions included at least 24 data points 
(24 month returns). Koller, Geodhart and Wessel (2004) argued that using high-
frequency data such as daily or weekly returns could be problematical when shares are 
rarely traded. An illiquid security can have many reported returns equal to zero, not 
because its value is constant but because it has not been traded. Consequently, estimates 
of beta on illiquid securities tend to be biased downwards. Koller et al. (2004) further 
pointed that another problem with using high-frequency data is the ‘bid-ask bounce’. 
Periodical share prices are recorded at the last trade date, and the recorded price 
depends on whether the last trade was a purchase (using the ask-price) or a sale (using 
the bid-price). Therefore, a distortion in beta estimation can be caused by a security 
whose intrinsic value remains unchanged and only ‘bounces’ between the bid and ask 
prices. (Corsi, Zumbach, Muller, and Dacorogna, 2001)   
         
To improve the precision of the beta estimation, industry-adjusted company betas were 
calculated, and as in Koller et al. (2004) a four-step process was employed. First, each 
company’s raw beta was unlevered. A company’s raw beta is reflected not only by its 
operating risk, but by the financial risks it takes. A company with more debt faces 
greater financial risks, and the increase in such risks is reflected in the beta. Therefore, 
to compare companies with similar operating risks (i.e., to obtain an industry beta), the 
effect of leverage needs to be removed. To undo the effect of leverage, the raw beta is 
divided by a leverage factor based on a company’s market-debt-to-equity ratio at time t 
(1+long term debt/market value of equity). Second, the industry unlevered beta is 
obtained by calculating the median of unlevered beta for each industry-year. Third, the 
industry unlevered beta is re-levered to each company’s target debt-to-equity ratio 
(using market values at time 2010 as proxies 34 ). Finally, the re-levered beta is 
                                                 
34 A company’s target debt-to equity ratio is not directly observable and current market values are usually 
used as proxies (Koller et al., 2004). The reason to use market value at time 2010 is that the market values 
in 2011 in China are unlikely to reflect companies’ true target capital structures due to significant impact 




‘smoothed’ using the Bloomberg’s formula for industry-adjusted company beta = 
0.33+0.67(re-levered beta)35. 
6.4.1.2 Estimating the Market Risk Premium 
 
How to quantify the market risk premium is one of the most debated issues in finance 
(Koller et al., 2004). Indeed, there is no well-accepted model for estimating the market 
risk premium (Koller et al., 2004). Basically, methods to estimate the market risk 
premium fall into three general categories. First, involves estimating the future risk 
premium by measuring and extrapolating historical returns. Second, regression analysis 
is employed to link current financial market variables, such as the aggregate dividend-
to-price ratio, to project the expected market risk premium. Third, accounting-based 
valuation techniques are used, along with estimates of the return on investment and 
growth, to ‘reverse engineer’ the market’s cost of capital.36  
 
None of these models, however, precisely estimates the market risk premium. The use 
of current financial ratios, such as the aggregate dividend-to-price ratio, the aggregate 
book-to-market ratio, or the aggregate ratio of earnings to price, to estimate the 
expected return on stock is well documented. Many prior studies have tested this 
concept (e.g., Fama and French, 1988; Stambaugh, 1999; Lewellen, 2004). However, 
for an emerging market, such as China, having a relatively short history (20 years or so) 
and high volatility of share prices, the market risk premium estimation using the ‘ratio 
method’ could be negative. However, a negative risk premium is inconsistent with the 
appetite of risk-averse investors who require a return for the risk undertaken. The use of 
the reverse-engineering model by employing analysts’ earnings forecasts to estimate 
implied market risk premium is known to be optimistic (upward-biased)(Easton and 
Sommers, 2007). Therefore, in present study, historical data are used to estimate past 
record market risk premiums. The rationale is that the risk aversion of investors in 
China has not significantly changed over the past 20 years (Zheng et al., 2008). As a 
result, the use of historical excess returns should be a reasonable proxy for future 
premiums. Here the market risk premium is calculated as average of value-weighted 
                                                 
35 Bloomberg’s smoothing mechanism is in the spirit of Blume’s (1975) study, which suggests betas 
revert to the mean. Therefore, this formula reduces extreme betas towards the overall average.  
 
36  Such accounting-based valuation models include the dividend capitalization model reported in 
Botosan(1997); the residual income valuation model in Gebhardt et al. (2001), and Claus and Thomas 
(2001); and the abnormal earnings growth model used in Gode and Mohanram (2003).  
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excess return on SZSE and SHSE stocks relative to the one-year Chinese government 
bond rate from 1992 to 2008 (The longest data series that are available on Datastream 
and CSMAR). Although long-term government bonds better match the duration of a 
company’s cash flows than do short-term bonds, long-term government bonds in China, 
such as 10-year Chinese government bond tends to be illiquid (Zheng et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the annual Chinese government bond rate is used in the present study. The 
annual average excess return computed in this way is 7% per annum. 
 
6.4.2 Independent Variables 
 
The independent variable (INS) in equation [6.1] represents the insurance purchase 
decision, and is measured as a dummy variable, equals to 1 if firms purchase insurance, 
and 0 otherwise. The independent variable (INSCOV) in equation [6.2] is a continuous 
variable that denotes the financial extent of property insurance use by Chinese PLCs. 
INSCOV is defined as the annual (amortized) corporate spending on property insurance 
scaled by the prior year-end book value of tangible assets (e.g. fixed assets and 
inventory). The measurement of INSCOV is consistent with prior studies (Hoyt and 
Khang, 2000; Zou and Adams, 2008a; Zou, 2010; Jia, et al., 2011; Jiang, et al., 2012). 
However, it is worth noting that Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) report that this 
measurement does not directly reflect the extent of asset coverage and so it can be  a 
“noisy” proxy for the proportion of assets covered by insurance because insurance 
premiums may be affected by other factors(e.g., deductibles and different risk profiles 
assets). However, as noted earlier (in section 6.2), insurance data other than annual paid 
out insurance premiums are not available from public sources and so represents an 
unavoidable limitation of this research project. Another independent variable 
(INSCOV2) enters model [6.2], and is the square of annual corporate spending on 
property insurance scaled by the prior year-end book value of tangible assets.  
 
6.4.3 Control Variable 
 
As noted in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.1) the cost of equity can be influenced by firm-
specific factors. Therefore six firm-related risk characteristics are included as control 
variables, namely: firm size (LnMV), the price-to-book (LnMB), leverage (LEV), 
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liquidity (CASH), share ownership type (NSHARE) and industry-effects (INDUS1-18). 
The variables are defined and briefly motivated below.  
 
Firm size (LnMV) is defined as natural logarithm of the market value of equity, 
measured at the end of the fiscal year.  The inverse relation between firm size and cost 
of equity is expected as Berk (1995) argues that market value and total firm-specific risk 
are inherently negatively related.  
 
Price-to-book (LnMB) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the market value of 
equity-to-book value of equity. Both the numerator and denominator are measured at 
the end of the fiscal year. Prior research has found mixed evidence on the relation 
between growth opportunities and cost of equity. Chung and Charoenwong (1991) 
observe a positive relation between equity risk and firm’s growth opportunities in the 
US corporate sector. Berk (1995) argues that price-to-book values are negatively 
associated with the cost of equity, as price-to-book is positively related to the market 
value of equity and as a result, it is negatively related to total firm risk.  From their US 
study, Botansan and Plumlee (2005) contend that price-to-book values are positively 
linked with the market value of equity. However, their research shows that price-to-
book values are positively related to market betas, and thus positively linked with the 
cost of equity. Therefore, no clear prediction is made for the relation between the cost of 
equity and price-to-book values.  
 
Leverage (LEV) is represented by the long-term debt to total assets ratio, measured at 
the end of the fiscal year. Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that an increase in the 
level of debt in a firm’s capital structure causes an increase in financial risk (insolvency) 
that can threaten the ability of the firm to remain a going concern. Zou (2010) contends 
that leverage may also affect firm value through magnifying business operating risk. 
Therefore, a positive relation between leverage and the cost of equity is predicted. 
 
Liquidity risk (CASH) is measured as cash and cash equivalent scaled by the book 
value of total assets measured at the end of the fiscal year. CASH is an inverse proxy for 
liquidity risk: the greater the value of CASH, the lower liquidity risk and vice versa. 
Firms with better liquidity position (more cash) are likely to invest in positive NPV 
project and so less prone to the ‘investment crowding-out’ problem (see Chapter 3, 
 88 
 
Table 3.2). Therefore, a negative relation between CASH and the cost of equity is 
expected.  
 
NSHARE is defined as the proportion of non-tradable A-shares to total shares in issue. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1), controlling-minority shareholder incentives 
conflicts are potentially acute in China due to the split-share structure in many PLCs 
(Zou et al., 2008). Non-tradable shareholders’ interests are not directly affected by 
changes in market share prices while tradable shareholders’ interests are influenced by 
such changes. Additionally, concentrated ownership structure gives non-tradable 
shareholders in Chinese PLCs the potential to dominate firm decisions and benefit 
themselves at the expense of minority shareholder interests. Therefore, investors would 
in all probability perceive the risks of such potential ‘tunneling’ activities to be high and 
thus require higher returns in such cases. Consequently, the extent of non-tradable share 
held by PLCs is likely to be a reasonable proxy of the degree of controlling-minority 
shareholder incentive conflicts that might affect the cost of equity in China. From the 
prior literature, a positive relation between NSHARE and ERP (the proxy for the cost of 
equity) is predicted.  
 
In this study, industry dummies (INDUS 1-18) are also included in the regression analysis 
to control for industrial factors that are likely to affect a firm’s cost of equity. The 2010 
WIND industry classification system is used to divide firms by industry type (see 
Appendix A). Time dummies are also used to capture time-related market and 
macroeconomy-wide factors that are common to all sample firms.  
 
6.5 Alternative Estimate of ERP-the MPEG Model 
As a robustness test, an alternative measure of the cost of equity is used based on the 
modified PEG model of Easton (2004), where the ERP is implied by analysts earning 


























where: ERP_MPEG = implied equity risk premium (an alternative proxy for the cost of 
equity) produced by MPEG at t+1 conditional on information at time t; 
INS = insurance purchase decision;                 
LEV = leverage; 
LnMV = firm size (logarithm of market value); 
LnMB = logarithm of market to book ratio, price-to-book; 
CASH = liquidity risk; 
NSHARE = proportion of non-tradable share; 
UBETA = unlevered beta; 
STD_ERR = idiosyncratic return volatility; 
FERR = analysts’ forecast error; 
LnRET12 = price run up 
α = industry dummies, industry fixed effect; 
β = year dummies, year fixed effect; and 
ε = error term. 
 
Furthermore, to investigate the relation between amount of insurance and cost of equity 
and alternative specification to equation [6.2] is employed namely: 
 
where the variables are defined as in equation [6.5], except for  
 INSCOV = the extent of property insurance or insurance coverage; 
 INSCOV2 = square of insurance coverage. 
 
6.5.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in the above models [6.5] and [6.6] is an alternative proxy for 
the cost of equity (implied equity risk premium: ERP_MPEG ) that  equals the ex-ante 
implied cost of equity estimated by the MPEG model minus the risk-free rate which is 
defined as the yield to maturity of one-year zero coupon rate for a Chinese government 
bond. ERP_MPEG is derived from the following formula:   
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where epst+2 and epst+1 = earnings per share forecast one and two year ahead of year t; 
DPSt = dividend per share at year t; 
 rft = yield to maturity of zero coupon one year Chinese government bond at  year t. 
 
Analysts’ forecasts for EPS are obtained from the CSMAR database. However, 

























t+1 and epst+2 are negative meant that only 331 ERP_MEPG values are obtained 
throughout the five years, 2003-2007.  
6.5.2 Other Variables in the Regression 
 
The main independent variables are INSCOV and INSCOV2 and are as defined above in 
models [6.5] and [6.6]. The control variables are also as defined previously (in section 
6.4.3) However, four more control variables-namely, unlevered beta(UBETA), 
idiosyncratic risk (STD_ERR) analysts’ forecast error (FERR), and price run-up 
(LnRET12) are added in the MEPG model regression in equation [6.5] and [6.6].  
 
Systematic Risk is defined as unlevered beta (UBETA) and measured by the raw beta 
estimated from market model regression using the previous 60 monthly returns (at least 
24 monthly observations) divided by one plus the ratio of long-term debt to market 
value of equity as described in the second step for estimating industry-adjusted beta 
noted earlier in section 6.4.1.1. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) report that the rationale for 
using the unlevered beta is argue that when levered beta is included in the model, the 
interpretation of the coefficient estimate is unclear because the levered beta captures 
leverage risk as well as market risk. The coefficient estimate on UBETA is expected to 
be positive if systematic risk increases the yield demanded by equity holders (Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2005).  
 
Idiosyncratic risk (STD_ERR) is also controlled for in the regression model. It is defined 
as the risk that is unique to a particular firm, so it is also called firm-specific risk. By 
definition, idiosyncratic risk is independent of the common movement of the market. 
Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors hold a portfolio of stocks to diversify 
idiosyncratic risks. As a result, only systematic risk is priced and idiosyncratic risk is 
not (Doherty, 2000, p. 88). However, Merton (1987) suggests that idiosyncratic risks 
can be priced when investors do not hold diversified portfolios. Drawing evidence from 
the SHSE, Drew, Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2004) show that idiosyncratic volatility 
is priced in share value. Following Chen, Huang and Wei (2013), idiosyncratic risk is 
measured as the standard deviation of the residual monthly returns in market model 
regression using the previous 60-month stock returns (at least 24 months). Based on the 
prior literature (e.g., Drew et al., 2004) a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and 




Prior studies shows that analyst’s earnings forecasts (FERR) can be systematically 
biased, with the direction and magnitude of the bias correlated with various firm-year 
characteristics (e.g., see Guay et al. 2005; Hughes, Liu and Su, 2008). Using biased 
earnings forecasts as inputs in the valuation equation inevitably produces biased implied 
cost of equity estimates. For example, Easton and Sommers (2007) suggest that the 
implied cost of equity estimated by analysts’ forecast is well known to be optimistic 
thus yielding upward biased estimators. Therefore, to control for the effect of such bias, 
analysts’ forecast error is included to control for the effect of forecast optimism. 
Following the study of Chen et al. (2013), forecast error is defined as the difference 
between actual EPS and forecast EPS. When actual EPS from WIND is missing, the 
actual EPS value obtained from DataStream is used. A negative relation between FERR 
and the cost of equity (ERP_MPEG) is predicted.  
 
To mitigate the possibility of analysts’ sluggishness in processing information 
(Nekrasov and Ogneva, 2011), price run-up during the previous 12 months (denoted as 
LnRET12), is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the compounded stock 
returns in the previous 12 months. A negative relation between price run-up (LnRET12) 
and the cost of equity (ERP_MPEG) is predicted.  
 
6.6 Endogeneity 
The endogeneity of insurance has always been a major concern in the studies of the 
economic consequences of insurance decisions (Zou 2010). Robustness tests are 
therefore conducted to address potential endogeneity problems.  
 
First, it is possible that poor corporate governance leads to both poor risk management 
(i.e., the purchase no insurance or purchase low levels of insurance) (e.g., see Adams, et 
al., 2011) and a high cost of equity. To address this concern, three key corporate 
governance variables are included in the baseline regression. These variables aim to 




 Board size (BOARD_SIZE) is defined as the number of board members. The board of 
directors’ role is to provide independent oversight of management and hold 
management accountable to shareholders for its actions. Large boards can bring in 
additional expertise, extensive business and political network and increased monitoring 
capacity and reduce agency cost (Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007). Therefore, shareholders 
should price securities lower for the return trade-off arising from sound governance 
systems. Accordingly, all else eual, a well-governed firm’s cost of equity should be 
lower than that of a poorly governed firm. However, a large board might be ineffective 
in improving firm performance and resolving agent incentive conflicts - for example, 
because of conflicting decision-making amongst board members (Jensen, 1993). As a 
result, no prior prediction of the impact of board size on the cost of equity is made.  
 
Board independence (IND_BOARD) is the ratio of independent board members to board 
members. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that independent directors are likely to be 
motivated to act independently and prudently in their role as risk monitors, so as to 
maximize the value of their human capital in the external labour market. Better 
monitoring of managerial decision-making can further lower the degree of managerial 
entrenchment and opportunistic behavior and so enhance a firm’s financial 
performance. Thus, shareholders are likely to seek less price protection for firm-specific 
and systematic risks, and so lower the cost of equity. Therefore, other things being 
equal, a negative relation between percentage of independent outside directors and cost 
of equity is predicted.  
 
CEO duality (CEO_CHAIR) is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 if the CEO is 
also the Chairman and 0 otherwise. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) advocate separating 
the CEO and chairman functions as it facilitates effective internal monitoring and 
control and reduces the likelihood of excessive risk-taking (and hence raising equity 
costs). In contast, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) contend that a single individual as 
CEO and Chairman brings advantages, such as sure-footed decision-making and a 
centralized system of organizational control. Therefore, no prior prediction of impact of 
CEO duality on the cost of equity is made.  
 
Second, to further address potential endogeneity, an instrumental variable (IV) 
regression approach that treats INS and INSCOV as endogenous is also employed. The 
 93 
 
method of instrumental variables (IV) provides a possible solution to the problem of an 
endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2002). Specifically, INS is instrumented 
by equation [6.8], and its fitted value (INS*) is incorporated as an explanatory variable 



















where HRP_FIRM = firms having high property risk; 
CITYDUM = firms locating in place where suffer high natural disastrous risk; 
COD = cost of borrowing; 
CAPX = Capital expenditure to total asset; 
MAN_OWN = the proportion of total shares in issue held by managers; 
STATE_OWN = the proportion of total shares in issue held by state; 
ASSTAN = asset tangibility; 
LEV = leverage; and 
Other variables are defined as in the equation [6.1] 
 
The IV regression procedure employed is a two-stage process. First, three instrument 
variables for corporate insurance purchase decision are used37:  
 
High risk firms (HRP_FIRMS) is a dummy variable denoted 1 if a firm belongs to an 
industry that faces inherently high accidental risks to assets and so likely to purchase 
property insurance, and 0 otherwise. Industries facing high accidental risk include 
businesses such as manufacturers of chemicals, plastics and rubber, oil and gas 
extraction/refining, coal mining, and metallurgical engineering. However, this dummy 
variable does not capture the level of a firm’s future expected cash flows. Therefore, it 
is not expected to closely match cost of equity levels. 
 
High risk location (CITYDUM) is a dummy variable denoted 1 if a firm locates in the 
place which faces severe environmental hazards (e.g. flooding, earthquakes etc.), and 0 
otherwise. More specifically, a firm located on the east coast or central China (locations 
particularly susceptible to severe environmental hazards such as storms and flooding) is 
denoted 1, and 0 otherwise. There is no a priori relation between this dummy and the 
cost of equity.  
                                                 
37 The endogenous variable (the insurance purchase decision) is a binary variable, and instrumental 
variables for insurance purchase decision are two binary variables and one continuous variable. However, 
Wooldridge (2002, p.84) contend that, one or both of endogenous variable and instruments can be binary 




Cost of borrowing (COD) is the cost of borrowing and incorporated as a third 
instrument in the analysis. Zou and Adams (2008a) postulate that Chinese firms with 
higher costs of borrowing tend to purchase property insurance to facilitate borrowing. 
COD is defined as a firm’s average borrowing cost (i.e., interest expense charged to the 
income statement/book value of total debt). 
 
Second, following prior studies (e.g. Hoyt and Khang,2000; Mayer and Smith, 1982; 
Zou and Adams,2006), the capital expenditure to asset ratio (CAPX), State ownership 
(STATE_OWN) and managerial ownership (MAN_OWN)  and tangible assets (ASSTAN) 
are also included as control variables.  
 
CAPX is defined as annual capital expenditure over total assets. Smith and Watts (1992) 
argue that relative to firms with few growth opportunities, firms with greater growth 
options tend to be riskier as their managers are normally given more discretion over 
investment decisions. Consequently, managerial decisions in firms with high growth 
prospects might be less transparent to outside parties than other firms thus potentially 
increasing agency costs. Therefore, it is expected that, other things being equal, 
managers of high growth firms are likely to have greater incentives to purchase property 
insurance than their counterparts in firms with fewer growth prospects.  
 
Zou and Adams (2006) contend that in the Chinese corporate sector State ownership 
(STATE_OWN) could exacerbate agent-principal incentives conflicts because of the 
general and a lack of incentives for delegated State agencies (bureaucracies) to closely 
monitor managers in the companies that they oversee. Browne and Hoyt (2000) suggest 
that managerial incentives to purchase property insurance to manage asset-loss risks 
(and so control agency conflicts) could be reduced where the State is a major 
shareholder. This is because the State bears the full economic and social welfare costs 
arising from the adverse consequences of risky managerial decisions. However, Jia et al. 
(2010) argue that firms with highly concentrated State-owned shareholdings could buy 
more property insurance as their majority State shareholders could have less diversified 
interests outside of the firm compared with other investors. Therefore, no prior 




There are two competing hypotheses regarding the influence of managerial ownership 
on the corporate purchase of insurance in the finance literature, namely the managerial 
risk-aversion and incentive-alignment hypotheses. For example, Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that as insider ownership increases managers are expected to become increasingly 
risk averse because they have a greater economic interest invested in the company. As a 
result, managers are more likely to engage in risk management (purchase property 
insurance). On the other, hand, Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) propose their 
incentive alignment hypothesis, which suggests that as insider ownership increases, 
managers’ economic interests become more closely aligned with those of shareholders. 
As a result, managers could be motivated to increase the level of business risk and/or 
engage in less risk management activity (not purchase property insurance) in order to 
economize on operating risks.  
 
Tangible-asset (ASSTAN) is also included as a control variable. Intuitively, firms with 
more tangible productive assets are more like to purchase insurance (Zou et al., 2003; 
Zou and Adams, 2006, 2008a). In addition, to control for the possibility that the 
correlation between leverage and property insurance is conditional upon a firm’s 
tangible assets, the interaction between leverage and tangible asset intensity is include 
in the regression. Both variables are centered on their mean (mean is subtracted from 
the original value) before constructing the interaction term in order to avoid possible 
multicollinearity between the interaction term and the component variables (e.g. see 
Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). 
 
INSCOV is instrumented in equation [6.9]. Then its fitted value (INSCOV*) is 

























where INSCOV_INDUS_MEDIAN = industry median of insurance coverage. 
 
Following recent studies (Adams et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2012) the industry median 
INSCOV in the same city excluding the firm in question in the same year is used as an 




2010 WIND industrial sector categories. City is categorized into 7 regional locations, 
namely east, north-east, west, central, south, south-west, and north-west. Conceptually, 
Chinese firms operating in the same industry and geographical location are expected to 
have similar levels of property risk. Therefore, the instrument should be correlated with 
a firm’s property insurance coverage but it is unlikely to directly influence a firm’s cost 
of equity except through the firm’s property insurance38. Other variables are same as in 
equation [6.8].  
 
6.7 Model Specification and Variables for Hypothesis 3 
The following procedure is adopted to test hypothesis 3-namely that whether the 
reduction of the cost of equity through insurance results from mitigating agency 
problems such as investment project investment crowding-out and/or managerial risk 
aversion between shareholders and managers.  
 
First, CAPX is regressed on INSCOV, where capital expenditure-to-total asset ratio 
(CAPX) is taken as an inverse proxy for investment crowding-out and/or managerial 
risk, and controlling for other factors 39 . More specifically, the model is shown in 
equation [6.10] below: 
 ititititit LnMBCSNDFINSCOVCAPX 43210  itti       [6.10]   
where NDF = New debt financing, defined as (total liabilities in year t+1 minus total 
liabilities in year t)/total assets in year t (see Zou (2010)); 
CS = Cash flow to sales ratio, defined as (EBITA-tax)/Sales; and 
Other variables are the same as in equation [6.1] and [6.2].  
Agency theory suggests that insurance can facilitate investment in positive NPV 
projects when firms face a set of investment opportunities. In other words, firms with 
insurance or a relative higher level of insurance are likely to suffer less from investment 
crowding-out and/or managerial risk aversion. Therefore, a positive relation between 
property insurance use and CAPX is expected. Following Zou (2010), NDF and CS are 
included as control variables. Price-to-book (LnMB)-an inverse proxy for the investment 
                                                 
38 This is the reason of removing the firm in question in computing the median INSCOV and controlling 
for industry fixed-effects. 
 
39 The relation between property insurance use and the cost of equity is unlikely to be driven by the 
endogeneity problem of insurance, if the results are consistent with main hypotheses 1 and 2 after 
conducting the robustness test. Therefore, tests of hypothesis 3 stated in chapter 4 section 4.3.2 will be 
based on the original INSCOV. 
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opportunities-is also included. A positive relation between CAPX and NDF and CS, and 
a negative linkage with LnMB are predicted. Second, if the results of the first-step 
regression analysis are consistent with what is hypothesized, then CAPX will be 
included in the baseline equation [6.1] to test whether the investment crowding-out 
and/or managerial risk aversion are priced in the cost of equity. The rationale for this 
procedure is to capture the impact of property insurance on resolving those agency 
problems in the first step, and then examine what the impact of those problems on the 
cost of equity in the second-step. Put another way, if there is indeed a positive linkage 
between property insurance use and CAPX in the first-step and a negative relation 
between CAPX and the cost of equity in the second-step, then it is likely that the 
reduction of the cost of equity results from the role of property insurance in mitigating 
agency incentive conflicts, such as the investment crowding-out and/or managerial risk 
aversion problems.  
 
6.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter describes the dataset used and the period covered by the empirical analysis. 
The study uses data from the CIE database complied by the NBSC. The final sample 
comprises 1,156 firm/year observations over the period of 2003 to 2007. This chapter 
also describes the research design, including statistical procedures, model specification, 
definition of variables used to test the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4, and 
especially, the estimation of the dependent variable. This chapter raises the possibility 
of variable endogenity and so describes the robustness checks utilized to mitigate such a 
concern. The empirical results obtained from models specified in this chapter are now 












The use of agency theory for explaining the linkage between the cost of equity and 
property insurance for PLCs has been examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis. From this 
analysis, the three hypotheses that are put forward in Chapter 4 and the control variables 
noted in Chapter 6 are now tested using the statistical procedures described in Chapter 
6. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the 
univariate results and section 7.3 presents the bivariate results that are computed using 
Pearson and Spearman correlation analysis. Section 7.4 reports the multivariate results, 
while section 7.5 presents the robustness checks. Finally, section 7.6 concludes this part 
of the thesis.  
 
7.2 Univariate Results 
Panel A of Table Table 7.1 gives the descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
explanatory variables for the pooled company/year sample of China-based PLCs for the 
period 2003-2007. The equity risk premium (ERP_CAPM RAW BETA) ranges from 2% 
to 13% and from 4% to 17% after being adjusted by industry (ERP_CAPM INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED BETA). The dispersion is much wider than for US PLCs reported in Fama 
and French (2002) which is from 2% to 7% and for UK PLCs that vary between 2% to 
5% as noted in Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003). This suggests that the emerging 
Chinese stock market is more volatile than developed Western stock markets. While the 
average equity risk premium estimated by CAPM (ERP_CAPM) in this study is around 
7%, the alternative measure for the average equity risk premium computed using the 
MPEG (ERP_MPEG) is 5.5%. Such a variation could, however, reflect differences in 
sample size. In the present study, the average annual property insurance spending 
(INSCOV) is around 0.4% relative to firms’ tangible assets. This percentage is 0.1% and 
0.2% higher than those reported in the Zou and Adams (2006) and Zou (2010) 
respectively, suggesting an increase in commercial property insurance spending by 
Chinese PLCs in recent years.  However, average insurance spending is 0.1% lower 
than that reported for US and Canadian firms surveyed in 1999 by MacMinn and 
Garven (2000). Therefore, although property insurance is a common risk management 
tool in Chinese companies, the level of spending is relatively lower than that of Western 
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companies. In order to gain some idea of the economic significance of such insurance 
spending, the approach of Adams et al. (2011) and Jiang et al. (2012) is followed 
whereby the median property insurance intensity is divided by 0.3% to derive the 
approximate percentage of the sum insured relative to the value of the beginning-of-
period tangible assets. The proportion covered is about 18% which is substantially 
lower than the figure of 93.8% reported for example, in Jiang et al.’s (2012) study 
which included a large number of unlisted small and medium size entities (SMEs)40. 
This observation suggests that relatively bigger and publicly quoted companies in China 
are more likely to retain property risks on their balance sheet compared with SMEs.   
 
For the corporate governance variables, the average number of non-tradable shares 
issued by firms (NSHARE) in the sample is approximately 50%, suggesting the 
possibility of controlling-minority shareholders’ incentive conflicts as previously 
mentioned in Chapter 6 section 6.4.3. Regarding ownership, the average shareholdings 
of the State (STATE_OWN) and insiders (MAN_OWN) are 30% and 0.02%, 
respectively. Managerial ownership is 0.04% and 0.05% lower than that reported in Zou 
and Adams (2006) and Zou (2010) respectively, while the degree of State-ownership is 
similar to these studies. This suggests the possibility of a gradual change in the nature of 
managerial compensation schemes in Chinese PLCs over the last five years or so. The 
mean (median) of board size for Chinese PLCs in the current dataset is around 10 and 
the standard deviation is 2.08, suggesting relatively small variation in the size of 
corporate boards across firms in the sample.  
 
Panel B of Table Table 7.1 shows the equity risk premium (proxy for the cost of 
equity) and insurance coverage in different percentiles. The bottom 10 percentile of 
Chinese firms in the dataset spent nothing on property insurance during sample year. 
The equity risk premium estimated by MPEG (ERP_MEPG) is 0.7% and is significant 
lower than that estimated by CAPM (ERP_CAPM) in 10 percentile. Again, such a big 
gap could be due to differences in sample size rather than differences in the estimation 
method used.  
 
                                                 
40 Adams et al. (2011) and Jiang et al. (2012) reported that about 0.3% is roughly the mean of the 
premium rates changed by PICC (a major insurance provider in China) on an average industrial business 
during the sample period This admittedly crude estimate might be confounded by large scale 
under/misvaluations of firm value, however, 18% is not an insignificant figure. 
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Table 7.1: Chinese PLCs, 2003-2007: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
Variables Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max N 
ERP_CAPM(RAW BETA) 0.071 0.071 0.013 0.012 4.102 0.022 0.126 1,156 
ERP_CAPM(INDUSTRY- 
ADJUSTED BETA) 0.071 0.069 0.009 4.426 6.858 0.043 0.170 1,156 
ERP_MPEG 0.055 0.031 0.061 1.574 3.162 0.012 0.306 331 
INS 0.779 1.000 0.415 -1.348 2.816 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INSCOV 0.004 0.001 0.014 3.716 17.959 0.000 0.046 1,156 
INSCOV2 0.000 0.000 0.003 5.809 39.126 0.000 0.002 1,156 
LEV 0.070 0.032 0.092 2.090 9.373 0.000 0.829 1,156 
CASH 0.140 0.115 0.099 1.313 5.248 0.000 0.642 1,156 
LnMB 0.951 0.803 0.777 1.226 6.944 -0.821 6.631 1,156 
LnMV 21.414 21.270 0.981 1.097 5.159 19.277 26.445 1,156 
UBETA 0.941 0.934 0.275 0.147 3.954 0.468 1.680 1,156 
STD_ERR 0.203 0.184 0.095 7.407 29.991 0.071 2.051 1,156 
NSHARE 0.516 0.548 0.170 -0.929 4.063 0.000 0.826 1,156 
FERR -0.030 0.000 0.183 -3.304 24.685 -1.774 1.124 331 
LnRET12 0.047 0.000 0.439 -0.481 4.905 -2.289 1.206 1,156 
STATE_OWN 0.300 0.324 0.232 0.052 1.738 0.000 0.850 1,156 
MAN_OWN 0.002 0.000 0.030 16.858 306.477 0.000 0.643 1,156 
BOARDSIZE 9.685 9.000 2.080 0.764 4.512 3.000 18.000 1,156 
INDBOARD 0.333 0.333 0.083 -2.454 11.415 0.000 0.571 1,156 
CEO_CHAIR 0.143 0.000 0.350 2.040 5.161 0.000 1.000 1,156 
CAPX 0.035 0.012 0.057 3.280 18.726 0.000 0.587 1,156 
CS 0.124 0.054 0.258 4.773 28.414 0.000 1.771 1156 
NDF 0.068 0.022 0.105 2.817 15.331 0.000 0.927 1,156 
INS* 0.809 0.853 0.442 -0.045 2.955 0.000 2.462 1,156 
INSCOV* 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.978 3.229 0.000 0.024 1,156 
INSCOV2* 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.492 10.758 0.000 0.001 1,156 
INDUS1 0.021 0.000 0.143 6.722 46.188 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS2 0.056 0.000 0.230 3.853 15.844 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS3 0.024 0.000 0.154 6.190 39.311 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS4 0.016 0.000 0.124 7.825 62.238 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS5 0.107 0.000 0.310 2.538 7.443 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS6 0.003 0.000 0.051 19.553 383.336 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS7 0.007 0.000 0.083 11.896 142.507 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS8 0.004 0.000 0.066 15.106 229.204 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS9 0.001 0.000 0.029 33.956 1154.001 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS10 0.231 0.000 0.422 1.277 2.630 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS11 0.062 0.000 0.242 3.622 14.122 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS12 0.048 0.000 0.213 4.251 19.068 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS13 0.170 0.000 0.375 1.761 4.102 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS14 0.040 0.000 0.196 4.709 23.172 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS15 0.019 0.000 0.137 7.040 50.565 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS16 0.024 0.000 0.154 6.190 39.311 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS17 0.008 0.000 0.088 11.201 126.452 0.000 1.000 1,156 
INDUS18 0.119 0.000 0.323 2.361 6.572 0.000 1.000 1,156 
(Source: Research data). This table gives the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables for the unbalanced panel (pooled firm/year) observations of 631 PLCs for 2003-2007 in 
regression equation 6.1 (n=1,156) and equation 6.2(n=331). ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) = Raw beta 
times market risk premium 7%, where the raw beta is estimated by a market model regression using the 
previous 60-monthly returns (at least 24 months). ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA) = 
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Industry-adjusted beta multiplied by the market risk premium of 7%, where the industry-adjusted beta is 
the relevered industry median of unlevered raw beta estimated by a market model regression using the 
returns from previous 60 months (at least 24 months). ERP_MEPG = Implied cost of equity based on the 
MPEG model of Easton (2004) minus risk free rate, where risk free rate is defined as yield to maturity of 
zero coupon one year Chinese Government bond. INS = A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm has 
property insurance in the fiscal year; 0 otherwise. INSCOV = The annual (amortized) corporate spending 
on property insurance scaled by the prior year-end book value of tangible assets (e.g., fixed assets and 
inventory). INSCOV2 = The square of annual corporate spending on property insurance scaled by the 
prior year-end book value of tangible assets. LEV = Long term debt to total asset ratio, both measured at 
the beginning to the fiscal year. CASH = Cash and cash equivalent scaled by book value of total assets, 
both measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. LnMB = Natural logarithm of the ratio of market value 
of equity to book value of equity. Both are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. LnMV = Natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. UBETA = 
Systematic risk, measured by raw beta estimated from market model regression using the returns from 
previous 60 months (at least 24 months)  divided by one plus the ratio of long-term debt to market value 
of equity. STD_ERR = Idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of the residual monthly 
returns in market model regression using the previous 60 months’ stock returns (at least 24 months). 
NSHARE = the proportion of non-tradable A share. FERR = Analyst forecast error, defined as (Actual 
EPS - consensus analyst forecast EPS)/price. LnRET12 = Price run-up, defined as natural logarithm of 
one plus the compounded stock returns in the previous 12 months. STATE_OWN = the proportion of 
stock held by State. MAN_OWN = The proportion of stocks held by managers. BOARDSIZE = Number 
of board members. INDBOARD = Number of outside directors/board size. CEO_CHAIR = A dummy 
variable equals one when the CEO is also the Chairman of a firm, and zero otherwise. CAPX = Capital 
expenditure to asset ratio, defined as annual capital expenditure/total assets both at the end of the fiscal 
year. CS = Cash flow to sales ratio, defined as (earnings before interest and tax (EBITA) – tax)/sales. 
NDF = New debt financing, defined as (total liabilities in year t+1 minus total liabilities in year t)/total 
assets in year t. INS* = Insurance choice fitted by a random-effects probit model with instrument 
variables and other control variables. INSCOV* = Insurance coverage use fitted by a random effects tobit 
model with instrument variable and other control variables. INSCOV2* = Squared term of INSCOV*.  
INDUS1-18 = Industry dummies labeled 1 for the relevant industrial sectors outlined in Appendix A, and 
0 otherwise. 
Panel B: The Cost of Equity and Insurance Coverage  
  Percentiles 
Variables 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th 
INSCOV 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.050 
ERP_CAPM     





0.064 0.067 0.069 0.073 0.078 0.105 
ERP_MEPG 0.007 0.014 0.031 0.077 0.140 0.269 
(Source: Research data). This table gives equity risk premium (dependent variables, proxy for the cost of 
equity) used in analysis in different percentiles. ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) = Raw beta times market risk 
premium of 7%, where raw beta is estimated by a market model regression using the previous 60-monthly 
returns (at least 24 months). ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA) = Industry-adjusted beta 
times market risk premium of 7%, where industry-adjusted beta is re-levered industry median of 
unlevered raw beta estimated by a market model regression using the previous 60 months returns (at least 
24 months). ERP_MEPG = Implied cost of equity based on the MPEG model of Easton (2004) minus 
risk-free rate, where the risk-free rate is defined as yield to maturity of zero coupon one year Chinese 
Government bond.  
 
Panel A of Table 7.2 reports the means and medians of the explanatory variables for 
property insurance user/non-users. It also reports the results of two sample t-tests and 
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non-parametric Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests. The former tests differences in 
the means of the continuous variables between the property insurance users/non-user. 
And the latter tests differences in the median of continuous variables between the 
property insurance user/non-user. It can be seen from Table7.2 that both the t-tests and 
WMW tests are statistically significant for the the cost of equity estimated by the 
CAPM at conventional levels of confidence. This suggests that the cost of equity for 
property insurance user is significantly lower than that of non-users by about 10 basis 
points. This preliminary finding supports hypothesis 1 proposed in Chapter 6. 
Additionally, statistically significant differences in leverage and growth opportunities 
are found between property insurance users and non-users. This observation is also 
consistent with prior studies (Zou and Adams, 2006; Zou, 2010) that property insurance 
users tend to have higher leverage and growth opportunities compared with non-users. 
Moreover, the t-tests and WMW statistics both reveal statistically significant differences 
for STD_ERR and UBETA between users and non-users of property insurance, 
indicating that the systematic as well as unsystematic risk of property insurance users 
are lower than those of non-users by 10 and 46 basis points, respectively. The statistics 
also indicate that while property insurance users are more likely to have higher 
concentrations of State ownership (STATE_OWN) than non-users, property insurance 
users tend to have lower levels of insider ownership (MAN_OWN) compared with non-
users. However, no statistically significant differences in BOARDSIZE and INBOARD 
are found between property insurance users and non-users. 
 
Panel B of Table 7.2 reports the results of non-parametric chi-square (χ2) tests of 
independence between the property insurance decision and the non-metric variables. 
The results reveal that there are geographical and industrial differences in the insuring 
behavior of sample firms. The property risk profile of firms (HRP_FIRMS) also appears 
to influence the corporate insurance decision. While these χ2 tests are indicative of 
possible linkages between the property insurance purchase decision and corresponding 
independent variables, they do not signify the direction of such relations.  
 
 
Table 7.2: Chinese PLCs, 2003-2007: Comparison of Firm 
Characteristic between Insurance Users and Nonusers    
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Panel A: Independent Sample T-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
Test 
 (Source: Research data). This table reports the results of t-tests and non-parametric WMW tests of metric 
variables distinguished between property insurance user and non-user groups. ERP_CAPM (RAW 
BETA) = Raw beta times market risk premium 7%, where raw beta is estimated by a market model 
regression using the previous 60 months returns (at least 24 months). ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED BETA) = Industry-adjusted beta times market risk premium of 7%, where industry-adjusted 
beta is relevered industry median of unlevered raw beta estimated by a market model regression using the 
previous 60-monthly returns (at least 24 months). ERP_MEPG = Implied cost of equity based on the 
MPEG model of Easton (2004) minus risk free rate , where risk free rate is defined as yield to maturity of 
zero coupon one year Chinese Government bond. LEV = Long term debt to total asset ratio, both 
measured at the beginning to the fiscal year. CASH = Cash and cash equivalent scaled by book value of 
total assets, both measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. LnMB = Natural logarithm of the ratio of 
market value of equity to book value of equity. Both are measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
LnMV = Natural logarithm of the market value of equity, measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
UBETA = Systematic risk, measured by raw beta estimated from market model regression using the 
previous 60 months return (at least 24 month observations) divided by one plus the ratio of long-term debt 
to market value of equity. STD_ERR = Idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of the 
residual monthly returns in market model regression using the previous 60 months return (at least 24 
months). NSHARE = the proportion of non-tradable A share. FERR = Analyst forecast error, defined as 
(Actual EPS - consensus analyst forecast EPS)/price. LnRET12 = Price run-up, defined as natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the compounded stock returns in the previous 12 months. STATE_OWN = the 
proportion of stock held by State. MAN_OWN = the proportion of stocks held by managers. 
BOARDSIZE = Number of board members. INDBOARD = Number of outside directors/board size. 
CEO_CHAIR = A dummy variable equals 1 when the CEO is also the Chairman of a firm, and 0 
otherwise. The labels ***, **, and* indicate statistically significant difference from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
Panel B: Chi-square Tests of Independence between Non-Metric 
Variables and Insurance Participation 
variable 



















0.071 0.069 0.009 0.070 0.068 0.006  6.125***  2.185** 
ERP_MEPG 0.057 0.032 0.075 0.054 0.031 0.057  0.347  0.231 
LEV 0.051 0.017 0.085 0.075 0.040 0.094 -3.645*** -4.937*** 
CASH 0.151 0.115 0.116 0.137 0.116 0.093  1.880**  0.844 
LnMB 21.441 21.295 1.048 21.406 21.259 0.962  2.085**  2.396** 
LnMV 1.040 0.935 0.760 0.926 0.766 0.781  0.508  0.306 
STD_ERR 0.203 0.191 0.068 0.202 0.183 0.101  0.096  1.658* 
NSHARE 0.504 0.544 0.185 0.519 0.550 0.166 -1.235 -0.721 
UBETA 0.978 0.976 0.274 0.932 0.922 0.274  2.038**  2.215** 
FERR -0.032 0.000 0.189 -0.030 0.000 0.181 -0.160  1.354 
LnRET12 0.089 0.014 0.417 0.035 0.000 0.445  1.708**  1.892* 
CAPX 0.032 0.007 0.057 0.036 0.057 0.057 -2.815*** -3.238*** 
NDF 0.061 0.066 0.096 0.070 0.053 0.107 -1.912* -0.752 
CS 0.165 0.019 0.340 0.113 0.023 0.228  2.863*  0.950 
STATE_OWN 0.272 0.278 0.240 0.309 0.335 0.229 -2.239** -2.289** 
MAN_OWN 0.006 0.000 0.048 0.001 0.000 0.023  1.981**  1.724* 
BOARDSIZE 9.777 9.000 2.077 9.657 9.000 2.080  0.795 -0.218 
INDBOARD 0.331 0.333 0.090 0.333 0.333 0.081 -0.319 -0.081 
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Variables χ2 Stat d.f. p-value 
CEO_CHAIR 1.373 1        0.241 
HPR_FIRM 31.777 1        0.000*** 
CITYDUM 4.501 1        0.034** 
INDUS1 8.144 1        0.004*** 
INDUS2 3.964 1        0.046** 
INDUS3 22.340 1        0.000*** 
INDUS4 0.302 1        0.583 
INDUS5 2.160 1        0.142 
INDUS6 0.004 1        0.951 
INDUS7 2.324 1        0.127 
INDUS8 4.557 1        0.033** 
INDUS9 12.304 1        0.000*** 
INDUS10 1.655 1        0.198 
INDUS11 0.139 1        0.709 
INDUS12 2.649 1        0.104 
INDUS13 24.500 1        0.000*** 
INDUS14 5.413 1        0.020** 
INDUS15 3.849 1        0.050** 
INDUS16 1.431 1        0.232 
INDUS17 25.655 1        0.000*** 
INDUS18 39.970 1        0.000*** 
(Source: Research data). This table reports Chi-square Tests of independence between non-metric 
variables and insurance purchase choice (insurance participation). CEO_CHAIR = A dummy variable 
equals one when the CEO is also the Chairman of a firm, and zero otherwise. HPR_FIRM = a dummy 
variable for whether a firm belongs to  the manufacturing of chemicals, plastics and rubber, oil and gas 
extraction/refining, coal mining, and metallurgical engineering industry is denoted as 1, and 0 otherwise.  
CITYDUM = a dummy variable for whether a firm locates in east coast and central is denoted as 1, and 0 
otherwise. INDUS1-18 = Industry dummies labeled 1 for the relevant industrial sectors outlined in 
Appendix, and 0 otherwise. The labels ***, **, and* indicate statistically significant difference from zero 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
7.3 Bivariate Results 
Table 7.3 Panel A presents the correlation coefficients matrix for the dependent 
variables and explanatory variables used in this study. The Pearson correlation and 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients reveal statistically significant negative 
associations between the cost of equity (ERP_CAPM RAW BETA and ERP_CAPM 
INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED) and property insurance purchase decision (INS). This result 
suggests that firms purchasing property insurance are likely to have a lower cost of 
equity compared with those that do not purchase property insurance, thereby tentatively 
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supporting hypothesis 1.  Consistent with expectations, both cost of equity variables 
estimated by CAPM (raw beta and industry-adjusted beta) are negatively correlated 
with firm size (LnMV) (p≤0.01, two-tailed), growth opportunity (LnMB) (p≤0.01, two-
tailed) and liquidity (CASH) (p≤0.05, two-tailed) implying that Chinese PLCs that are 
bigger, with more growth opportunities, and higher level of liquidity tend to have lower 
costs of equity. In line with Modigliani and Miller (1958), LEV is also found to be 
positively associated with ERP_CAPM as estimated from market model (p≤0.1, two-
tailed), and industry-adjusted ERP_CAPM (p≤0.01, two-tailed), indicating that highly 
levered firms are likely to have higher costs of equity. However LEV is not significantly 
correlated with ERP_MPEG as estimated by the MPEG model of Easton (2004). 
Consistent with the CAPM, unlevered beta (UBETA) is significant and positively 
correlated with the cost of equity. As predicted, NSHARE is found to be positively 
associated with the industry-adjusted ERP_CAPM (p≤0.01, two-tailed) and ERP_MPEG 
(p≤0.05, two-tailed) indicating that firms with more non-tradable shares tend to have 
higher equity costs. This result appears to support the argument of Zou et al. (2008) that 
Chinese PLCs with a greater proportion of non-tradable shares in their capital structure 
are likely to have more acute controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts. In 
turn, this situation results higher costs of equity. The correlation between ERP_MEPG 
and FERR is -0.099 which is consistent with prior studies such as Easton and Sommers 
(2007) suggest that the earnings forecasts tend to be optimistic41. A positive correlation 
between the cost of equity ERP_CAPM and insurance coverage INSCOV and INSCOV2 
is also found. However, correlation measures the strength of linear (Pearson correlation) 
and monotonic associations (Kennedy, 1998). Moreover, INSCOV is also correlated 
with other determinants of cost of equity (e.g. LnMB, LEV, and CASH). Therefore, the 
bivariate results might be misleading. Therefore multivariate regression analysis that 
controls for other determinants of the cost of equity is conducted in the next section of 
this thesis.  
 
Panel B of Table 7.3 presents the associations between explanatory variables. UBETA is 
negatively correlated with INS (p≤0.05, two-tailed). This finding is consistent with 
Adams and Hillier (2000) who argue that insurance purchases can reduce firms’ 
systematic risk and thus be reflected in a lower beta. The statistically significant 
                                                 
41 Note that FERR is calculated as actual EPS minus forecasted EPS. Therefore FERR represents an 
inverse proxy of analyst forecast optimism. 
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correlation between the explanatory variables raises the possibility of multicollinearity. 
This is particularly the case for INSCOV and INSCOV2, which are correlated with each 
other, and the correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.83 and significant 
at the 1% level (two-tailed).  
 
Table 7.3: Chinese PLCs, 2003-2007: Correlation Coefficients    
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients Matrix for Dependent Variables and 
Explanatory Variables 
  Pearson Correlation Spearman Correlation 
  
ERP_ 




















INS -0.015** -0.071*** -0.020 -0.022** -0.079***  0.046 
INSCOV  0.167***  0.189***  0.021  0.088***  0.317***  0.078* 
INSCOV2  0.123***  0.123***  0.034  0.088***  0.317***  0.078* 
LnMB -0.099*** -0.285*** -0.120*** -0.143*** -0.365***  0.019 
LnMB -0.191*** -0.207*** -0.121*** -0.221*** -0.228*** -0.106** 
LEV  0.002*  0.431***  0.011  0.001*  0.424***  0.030 
CASH -0.084*** -0.167***  0.036 -0.071*** -0.137***  0.003 
STD_ERR  0.048*  0.075**  0.148***  0.062**  0.171***  0.188*** 
NSHARE  0.032  0.079***  0.144***  0.058**  0.188***  0.151*** 
UBETA  0.910***  0.161***  0.030  0.900***  0.005  0.034 
FERR -0.051* -0.008 -0.133***  0.026  0.006 -0.099** 
LnRET12 -0.061** -0.223*** -0.016 -0.115*** -0.391*** -0.080* 
CAPX -0.094*** -0.127*** -0.035 -0.080*** -0.155*** -0.075 
 (Source: Research Data)This table gives pairwise Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between 
dependent and explanatory variables for year 2003-2007. ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) is defined as market 
premium of 7% multiplied by beta estimated from market model. ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY- ADJUSTED 
BETA) is defined as market premium of 7% multiplied by industry-adjusted beta. The rest of variables are 




Panel B: Correlation Coefficients Matrix for Explanatory Variables 
 
(Resource: Research data). Panel B reports pairwise correlation for the years 2003-2007. Pearson correlation coefficients are in the lower triangle (unitalized) and 
Spearman correlation coefficients are in the upper triangle (italised). Variables are defined in Appendix A. The labels ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. The industry dummies are omitted for brevity.  
 
Variable INS INSCOV INSCOV 2 LnMB LnMV LEV CASH STD_ERR NSHARE UBETA FERR LnRET12 
 0.468*** 0.468*** -0.062*  0.016  0.147***  0.001 -0.072**  0.048 -0.073** -0.007 -0.042 
INSCOV  0.053  1.000*** -0.197*** -0.172***  0.135*** -0.069** -0.049  0.049  0.007  0.039 -0.207*** 
INSCOV 2  0.024  0.831*** -0.197*** -0.173***  0.135*** -0.069** -0.049  0.049  0.007  0.039 -0.207*** 
LnMB -0.061** -0.018  0.022  0.183*** -0.044  0.030  0.128*** -0.170*** -0.050 -0.050  0.117*** 
LnMV -0.015 -0.225*** -0.094*** 0.117***  0.046  0.0850***  0.105*** -0.120*** -0.134*** -0.071**  0.154*** 
LEV  0.107*** -0.035 -0.037 -0.026  0.074** -0.174*** -0.029  0.053 -0.202*** -0.028  0.034 
CASH -0.055* -0.045 -0.002 -0.012  0.057* -0.209***  0.000  0.038  0.007  0.090*** -0.070** 
-0.003  0.068**  0.047  0.148*** 0.068** -0.038  0.002 -0.121***  0.092*** -0.093***  0.263*** 
NSHARE  0.036  0.032  0.013 -0.148*** -0.077***  0.039  0.048 -0.068**  0.022  0.004 -0.315*** 
-0.067**  0.063  0.052 -0.038 -0.112*** -0.211*** -0.007  0.065** -0.002  0.030 -0.044 
FERR -0.005  0.042  0.014 -0.077*** -0.063** -0.033  0.056* -0.046  0.024 -0.040 -0.131*** 












However, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) (shown in Appendix B) for INSCOV and 
INSCOV2 are 3.55 and 3.41 respectively which are moderate, and below the low threshold 
10 (Kennedy 1998, p. 190). Also, the largest condition indices calculated by finding the 
square root of the maximum eigenvalue divided by the minimum eigenvalue are around 
5.65, which is much less than the suggested threshold 30. (O’Brien, 2006).  Therefore, it 
appears that multiconllinearity is unlikely to be a severe problem in this study. 
Nevertheless, in the robustness check, the regression analysis is run again using the mean-
centered value of INSCOV and INSCOV2 so as to further address the concern of 
multiconllinearity. 
 
7.4 Multivariate Results 
Regression models [6.1] and [6.2] are employed to test hypotheses 1 and 2 proposed in 
Chapter 4 section 4.3. The regression results are analyzed in sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 below.   
7.4.1 Property Insurance Choice Decision and the Cost of Equity 
 
Table 7.4, Panel A reports the multivariate regression results between the cost of equity 
(using ERP_CAPM RAW BETA) and the property insurance purchase choice (INS) based on 
a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) panel regression. Panel B reports the results from 
running OLS regression using ERP_CAPM INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA as alternative 
proxy for the dependent variable cost of equity. The Wooldridge test was conducted to 
check for serial correlation and the resulting F-statistics are 10.23 and 6.38 respectively. 
Both computed F-statistics reject the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation. 
Peterson (2009) suggests that failing to control for temporal and cross-sectional correlation 
among sample firms may underestimate the standard errors in a panel data regression. 
Thus, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level to control for within-firm 
serial correlation and year fixed-effects are included to control for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, an alternative Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are employed to control for the serial 
correlation as well as heteroskedasticity in the panel dataset.  
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Table 7.4: Chinese PLCs, 2003-2007: Property Insurance Purchase 
Choice and Cost of Equity (Baseline Regression) 











intercept +/-  0.1085*** 0.0126 0.0114 10.23 0.00 
INS - -0.0013** 0.0009 0.0009 -1.79 0.04 
LnMV - -0.0016*** 0.0006 0.0005 -2.99 0.00 
LnMB +/- -0.0001 0.0010 0.0008 -0.16 0.44 
LEV +  0.0008** 0.0001 0.0001 1.97 0.03 
CASH - -0.0107** 0.0056 0.0052 -2.08 0.02 
NSHARE + -0.0013 0.0023 0.0023 -0.59 0.56 
YEAR 2004 +/-  0.0029*** 0.0009 0.0010 2.93 0.00 
YEAR 2005 +/-  0.0042*** 0.0013 0.0013 3.17 0.00 
YEAR 2006 +/- -0.0052*** 0.0012 0.0013 -4.15 0.00 
YEAR 2007 +/- -0.0023 0.0015 0.0016 -1.45 0.15 
INDUS1 +/-  0.0022 0.0028 0.0025 0.87 0.39 
INDUS2 +/-  0.0011 0.0028 0.0027 0.40 0.69 
INDUS3 +/-  0.0094 0.0063 0.0070 1.35 0.18 
INDUS4 +/- -0.0031 0.0028 0.0025 -1.22 0.22 
INDUS5 +/-  0.0128 0.0031 0.0128 1.01 0.32 
INDUS6 +/- -0.0003 0.0036 0.0032 -0.10 0.92 
INDUS7 +/-  0.0053 0.0024 0.0037 1.44 0.15 
INDUS8 +/- -0.0040* 0.0026 0.0024 -1.66 0.10 
INDUS9 +/-  0.0009 0.0025 0.0023 0.41 0.68 
INDUS10 +/- -0.0006 0.0029 0.0025 -0.25 0.80 
INDUS11 +/-  0.0100*** 0.0031 0.0030 3.38 0.00 
INDUS12 +/-  0.0001 0.0025 0.0022 0.03 0.98 
INDUS13 +/- -0.0049 0.0036 0.0032 -1.52 0.13 
INDUS14 +/- -0.0027 0.0052 0.0042 -0.64 0.52 
INDUS15 +/-  0.0086** 0.0041 0.0038 2.25 0.02 
INDUS16 +/-  0.0050 0.0069 0.0073 0.68 0.50 
INDUS17 +/-  0.0013 0.0027 0.0024 0.56 0.58 
No. of  Obs 1,156 
     
Std. Err. adjusted for 395 clusters  
   
 
R-square 0.11 
    
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation F = 10.23 P>F = 0.0000   
 (Source: Research data) This table shows the results of regressing risk premium on the property insurance 
purchase choice. The dependent variable: risk premium is computed as the raw beta times the market risk 
premium of 7%. The raw beta is estimated from market model (stock return regressing against market return) 
using the previous 60-monthly returns (at least 24 months). Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at the firm level. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West errors adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed 
when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
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intercept +/-  0.0750*** 0.0077 0.0071 10.52 0.00 
INS - -0.0018** 0.0009 0.0007 -2.14 0.03 
LnMV - -0.0030** 0.0010 0.0009 -1.79 0.04 
LnMB +/- -0.0013** 0.0007 0.0006 -2.00 0.02 
LEV +  0.0400*** 0.0060 0.0056 7.16 0.00 
CASH - -0.0065*** 0.0022 0.0021 -3.08 0.00 
NSHARE + -0.0004 0.0012 0.0011 -0.33 0.74 
YEAR 2004 +/-  0.0027*** 0.0005 0.0005 5.76 0.00 
YEAR 2005 +/-  0.0057*** 0.0008 0.0009 6.45 0.00 
YEAR 2006 +/- -0.0041*** 0.0005 0.0005 -7.95 0.00 
YEAR 2007 +/- -0.0014** 0.0007 0.0007 -2.07 0.04 
INDUS1 +/- -0.0099 0.0104 0.0095 -1.04 0.30 
INDUS2 +/-  0.0023** 0.0009 0.0010 2.41 0.02 
INDUS3 +/- -0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 -1.12 0.27 
INDUS4 +/-  0.0087 0.0105 0.0096 0.91 0.37 
INDUS5 +/-  0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.46 0.65 
INDUS6 +/-  0.0136 0.0009 0.0111 1.22 0.22 
INDUS7 +/- -0.0016 0.0009 0.0026 -0.63 0.53 
INDUS8 +/- -0.0095*** 0.0006 0.0021 -4.62 0.00 
INDUS9 +/- -0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 -0.49 0.63 
INDUS10 +/- -0.0026* 0.0016 0.0014 -1.92 0.06 
INDUS11 +/- -0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 -0.78 0.44 
INDUS12 +/- 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.51 0.61 
INDUS13 +/- -0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 -1.04 0.30 
INDUS14 +/-  0.0026*** 0.0010 0.0009 2.77 0.01 
INDUS15 +/-  0.0048* 0.0029 0.0029 1.67 0.10 
INDUS16 +/- -0.0056* 0.0030 0.0030 -1.88 0.06 
INDUS17 +/-  0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 1.40 0.16 
No. of Obs 1,156 
     




    
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation F = 6.38 P>F = 0.0000     
(Source: Research data) This table shows the results of regressing risk premium on the property insurance 
purchase choice decision. The dependent variable: risk premium is computed as the industry-adjusted beta 
times the market risk premium of 7%.  The industry-adjusted beta is re-levered industry median of unlevered 
raw beta estimated by a market model regression using the previous 60- monthly returns (at least 24 months). 
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-statitics are based on Newey-West 
errors adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-tailed 




After controlling for firm size (LnMV), price-to-book (LnMB), leverage (LEV), liquidity 
(CASH), proportion of non-tradable share (NSHARE), and year/industry effects, the 
property insurance choice decision (INS) is significant and negatively related to both the 
cost of equity variables ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) and ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED BETA) at the 5% level (one-tailed). The results are consistent with the 
univariate and bivariate results, and support hypothesis 1 that firms purchasing property 
insurance tend to have lower costs of equity. Furthermore, the results are consistent with 
the agency theory-based argument that property insurance can provide surety to investors 
by mitigating volatility of future cash flows, agency problems (costs), and 
bankruptcy/financial distress risks. These attributes result in a lower cost of equity. The 
coefficient estimate for INS is -0.0018 (t=-2.14), while the dependent variable is 
ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA) in the model. This suggests that in economic 
terms a one standard deviation increase in INS (0.415, see Table 7.1 Panel A) is associated 
with a 7.5 basis point decrease in the cost of equity, which is about 1.1% of the sample 
mean cost of equity (ERP_CAPM  INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA 0.071, see Table 7.1 
Panel A).  
 
The signs for the control variables accord with those predicted and are consistent with most 
prior studies. LnMV is statistically significant and negatively associated with ERP_CAPM 
(RAW BETA) at the 1% level (one-tailed) and ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED 
BETA) at the 5% level (one-tailed), indicating that relative larger firms are likely to have 
lower cost of equity.  The same result is also reported in Botosan and Plumlee (2005) using 
US data and Chen, Li and Zou (2012) using Canada data. The coefficient estimates for 
LnMB are negative in both models, but the variable is only significantly related to 
ERP__CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA). CASH is found to be negative and 
statistically significant, using both proxies for the cost of equity, implying that as predicted, 
firms with lower liquidity risk tend to have lower costs of equity. Moreover, as expected, 
LEV is found to be both positive and statistically significant with ERP_CAPM (RAW 
BETA) and ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA). This finding is consistent with 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) view that, all else equal, firms with greater bankruptcy risks 
are likely to have higher costs of equity.  
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7.4.2 The Extent of Property Insurance Use and the Cost of Equity 
 
Table 7.5 Panels A and B report the multivariate regression results between the cost of 
equity (ERP_CAPM RAW BETA and ERP_CAPM INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA) and the 
extent of property insurance use (INSCOV). The Wooldridge (2002) test was also 
conducted to determine the presence of serial correlation. The F-statistics are 27.77 and 
13.07 respectively, and reject the null hypothesis of no first-order auto-correlation for the 
firm/year sample. Thus, as previous standard errors are adjusted for clustering at firm-level 
and year fixed-effects are included to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
(Peterson, 2009). Furthermore, alternative Newey and West (1987) HAC standard errors 
are employed to further alleviate concerns of over-time and cross-firm correlations. 
 
After controlling for other potential determinants of the cost of equity in the models, the 
coefficient estimate for INSCOV is negative and INSCOV2 is positive. Both are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level (one-tailed) where the dependent variables are 
ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) and ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA). These 
results are consistent with hypothesis 2, and suggest that there is a U-shape relation 
between the cost of equity and the extent of property insurance use. The inflection point 
occurs when INSCOV takes approximately 0.037 when ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) is used 
for the cost of equity proxy and around 0.08 when ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED 
BETA) is employed to estimate the cost of equity. This result supports Zou’s (2010) finding 
that there is an inverted-U shape relation between the extent of insurance use and firm 
value in the Chinese corporate sector. Given that the inflection point occurs above the 90th-
99th percentile of observed insurance spending, property insurance use is likely be 
beneficial to the majority of firms in the sample of this study. This observation further 
supports the prediction derived from agency theory that PLCs buying insurance/having 
higher insurance coverage are likely to be at an economic advantage (i.e., in terms of lower 
cost of equity and higher firm value) compared with PLCs not buying property 
insurance/having lower insurance operating in markets such as China, where potential 
agency conflicts and other inefficiencies (e.g., lack of risk management knowledge and 
expertise) are likely to be pronounced.  
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Table 7.5: Chinese PLCs, 2003-2007:  The Extent of Property 
Insurance Use and the Cost of Equity (Baseline Regression) 











intercept +/-  0.1139*** 0.0118 0.0108 10.51 0.00 
INSCOV - -0.0989** 0.0570 0.0593 -1.67 0.05 
INCOV2 +  1.3550*** 0.2729 0.2831 4.79 0.00 
LnMV - -0.0016*** 0.0006 0.0005 -3.16 0.00 
LnMB +/- -0.0000 0.0009 0.0008 -0.03 0.49 
LEV +  0.0108** 0.0055 0.0051 2.10 0.02 
CASH - -0.0037** 0.0461 0.0042 -1.91 0.03 
NSHARE + -0.0015 0.0023 0.0023 -0.66 0.51 
YEAR 2004 +/-  0.0026*** 0.0009 0.0010 2.74 0.01 
YEAR 2005 +/-  0.0048*** 0.0014 0.0014 3.36 0.00 
YEAR 2006 +/- -0.0052*** 0.0012 0.0013 -4.17 0.00 
YEAR 2007 +/- -0.0022 0.0015 0.0015 -1.43 0.15 
INDUS1 +/- -0.0090 0.0061 0.0068 -1.31 0.19 
INDUS2 +/-  0.0025 0.0028 0.0025 0.98 0.33 
INDUS3 +/-  0.0013 0.0029 0.0027 0.49 0.62 
INDUS4 +/-  0.0093 0.0063 0.0071 1.32 0.19 
INDUS5 +/- -0.0030 0.0028 0.0025 -1.20 0.23 
INDUS6 +/-  0.0128 0.0031 0.0128 1.00 0.32 
INDUS7 +/-  0.0000 0.0034 0.0031 0.01 0.99 
INDUS8 +/-  0.0066* 0.0022 0.0036 1.85 0.06 
INDUS9 +/-  0.0010 0.0025 0.0023 0.46 0.65 
INDUS10 +/- -0.0003 0.0029 0.0025 -0.13 0.89 
INDUS11 +/-  0.0090*** 0.0029 0.0028 3.21 0.00 
INDUS12 +/-  0.0002 0.0025 0.0022 0.08 0.93 
INDUS13 +/- -0.0049 0.0036 0.0032 -1.52 0.13 
INDUS14 +/- -0.0019 0.0052 0.0042 -0.45 0.65 
INDUS15 +/- -0.0084** 0.0041 0.0038 -2.20 0.03 
INDUS16 +/-  0.0055 0.0070 0.0074 0.75 0.46 
INDUS17 +/-  0.0016 0.0026 0.0024 0.66 0.51 
No. of Obs 1156 
     




    
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation F = 27.77 P>F = 0.0000 
 
Inflection point ,where, INSCOV = 0.037       
(Source: Research Data).This table shows the panel regression results of testing non-linear U-shape 
relation between the cost of equity and the extent of property insurance use.  The dependent variable: risk 
premium is computed as the raw beta times the market risk premium of 7%. The raw beta is estimated 
from market model (stock return regressing against market return) using the previous 60 months returns 
(at least 24 months observations). Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at firm level. The t-
statistics are based on Newey-West errors adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity The labels 
***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional 
















intercept +/-  0.0786*** 0.0068 0.0068 10.91 0.00 
INSCOV - -0.0638** 0.0107 0.0120 -1.89 0.02 
INCOV2 +  0.3698** 0.1143 0.1284 1.79 0.04 
LnMV - -0.0003** 0.0002 0.0002 -1.66 0.05 
LnMB +/- -0.0014** 0.0006 0.0006 -2.42 0.04 
LEV +  0.0072*** 0.0019 0.0019 3.85 0.00 
CASH - -0.0415*** 0.0064 0.0059 -7.08 0.00 
NSHARE +  0.0000 0.0012 0.0011 0.04 0.97 
YEAR 2004 +/-  0.0026*** 0.0005 0.0004 5.83 0.00 
YEAR 2005 +/-  0.0053*** 0.0008 0.0009 6.22 0.00 
YEAR 2006 +/- -0.0040*** 0.0005 0.0005 -8.10 0.00 
YEAR 2007 +/- -0.0013** 0.0006 0.0007 -2.01 0.05 
INDUS1 +/- -0.0101 0.0104 0.0095 -1.06 0.29 
INDUS2 +/-  0.0023** 0.0009 0.0010 2.37 0.02 
INDUS3 +/- -0.0007 0.0004 0.0006 -1.33 0.19 
INDUS4 +/-  0.0088 0.0104 0.0096 0.92 0.36 
INDUS5 +/-  0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.48 0.63 
INDUS6 +/-  0.0138 0.0009 0.0111 1.24 0.22 
INDUS7 +/- -0.0018 0.0008 0.0026 -0.70 0.49 
INDUS8 +/-  0.0090*** 0.0007 0.0021 4.35 0.00 
INDUS9 +/- -0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 -0.45 0.65 
INDUS10 +/- -0.0027** 0.0015 0.0014 -2.03 0.04 
INDUS11 +/- -0.0006 0.0009 0.0008 -0.73 0.46 
INDUS12 +/-  0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.48 0.63 
INDUS13 +/- -0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 -1.05 0.30 
INDUS14 +/-  0.0023** 0.0010 0.0010 2.41 0.02 
INDUS15 +/-  0.0047 0.0030 0.0029 1.64 0.10 
INDUS16 +/- -0.0058* 0.0029 0.0029 -1.95 0.05 
INDUS17 +/-  0.0013 0.0011 0.0010 1.31 0.19 
No. of Obs 1156 
     




    
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation F = 13.07 P>F = 0.0000 
 
 
Inflection point ,where, INSCOV = 0.08       
 (Source: Research Data).This table shows the panel regression results of testing nonlinear U-shape 
relation between the cost of equity and the extent of property insurance use. The dependent variable: risk 
premium is computed as the industry-adjusted beta times market risk premium of 7%. The industry-
adjusted beta is re-levered industry median of unlevered raw beta estimated by a market model regression 
using the previous 60 months returns (at least 24 months). Robust standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at firm level. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West errors adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-
tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. 







The signs for the control variables are consistent with the results for the insurance 
purchase decision and the cost of equity models. LnMV, LnMB and CASH are 
statistically significant and negatively related to ERP_CAPM (INDUTSTRY-
ADJUSTED BETA) indicating that bigger Chinese PLCs with more growth 
opportunities and greater amounts of cash are likely to have lower costs of equity. As 
predicted, the coefficient estimate for LEV is statistically significant and positively in 
both models. However, the estimated coefficients for the idiosyncratic return volatility 
(STD_ERR) and proportion of non-tradable shares (NSHARE) are not statistically 
significant in both models.  
 
7.5 Alternative Estimates of the cost of Equity (ERP_MPEG) 
Sensitivity tests for the alternative estimates of the costs of equity are also conducted. 
Tables 7.6 and Table 7.7 report the multivariate results between the cost of equity 
(ERP_MPEG)42 and property insurance purchase choice decision (INS) and the extent 
of property insurance use (INSCOV). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at firm-
level and year/fixed-effects are included to control for potential common shocks 
(Peterson, 2009). The Wooldridge (2002) test was also conducted to test the presence of 
serial correlation. The F-statistics are 10.23 for model [6.5] and 13.07 for model [6.6]. 
Both tests reject the null hypothesis of no first-order auto-correlation in the sample of 
Chinese PLCs. Therefore, Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation 
consistent (HAC) standard errors are also employed to further alleviate concerns of 
overtime and cross-firm correlation. 
 
As illustrated in Table 7.6, the coefficient estimate for INS is statistically significant at 
the 5% level (one-tailed) and remains negative. This is in line with the result generated 
from model [6.1]. Amongst the control variables, firm size (LnMV) is statistically 
significant at the 1% (one-tailed) and the sign remains negative. Amongst the control 
variables, firm size (LnMV) is statistically significant at the 1% (one-tailed) and the sign 
remains negative. As predicted, the systematic risk (UBETA) is positively related to the 
implied cost of equity (p ≤0.05, one-tailed). The rest of the control variables are not 
statistically significant in this model. 
                                                 
42 The alternative estimates for the cost of equity are based on Easton (2004) 
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Table 7.6: Chinese PLCs, 2003-2007:   Property Insurance Purchase 
Choice and the Cost of Equity 











intercept +/- -0.1096* 0.0682 0.0654 -1.91 0.06 
INS - -0.0099** 0.0060 0.0064 -1.68 0.05 
LnMV - -0.0121*** 0.0031 0.0029 -4.11 0.00 
LnMB +/-  0.0053 0.0068 0.0070 -0.76 0.25 
LEV +  0.0113 0.0391 0.0382 0.30 0.38 
CASH - -0.0044 0.0271 0.0282 -0.16 0.44 
UBETA +  0.0125** 0.0082 0.0081 1.78 0.04 
STD_ERR + -0.0382 0.0347 0.0360 -1.06 0.15 
FERR - -0.0676** 0.0340 0.0314 -2.15 0.02 
LnRET12 - -0.0256 0.0344 0.0321 -1.22 0.12 
NSHARE + -0.0145 0.0174 0.0167 -0.87 0.39 
YEAR 2005 +/- -0.1054*** 0.0131 0.0134 -7.85 0.00 
YEAR 2006 +/- -0.0814*** 0.0133 0.0139 -5.84 0.00 
YEAR 2007 +/- -0.0940*** 0.0128 0.0131 -7.16 0.00 
INDUS1 +/- -0.0242** 0.0113 0.0122 -1.99 0.05 
INDUS2 +/- -0.0179 0.0098 0.0109 -1.64 0.10 
INDUS3 +/- -0.0047 0.0124 0.0130 -0.36 0.72 
INDUS4 +/-  0.0148 0.0169 0.0168 0.88 0.38 
INDUS5 +/-  0.0008 0.0104 0.0115 0.07 0.94 
INDUS6 +/- -0.0040 0.0141 0.0148 -0.27 0.79 
INDUS7 +/- -0.0287** 0.0140 0.0139 -2.06 0.04 
INDUS8 +/- -0.0176 0.0122 0.0127 -1.39 0.17 
INDUS9 +/-  0.0306** 0.0125 0.0126 2.42 0.02 
INDUS10 +/- -0.0174 0.0107 0.0113 -1.55 0.12 
INDUS11 +/-  0.0030 0.0139 0.0164 0.19 0.85 
INDUS12 +/- -0.0015 0.0098 0.0109 -0.14 0.89 
INDUS13 +/- -0.0110 0.0103 0.0110 -0.99 0.32 
INDUS14 +/- -0.0289** 0.0121 0.0125 -2.31 0.02 
INDUS15 +/-  0.0053 0.0124 0.0128 0.42 0.68 
INDUS16 +/-  0.0915*** 0.0299 0.0302 3.03 0.00 
INDUS17 +/-  0.0091 0.0112 0.0120 0.76 0.45 
No. of Obs 331 
     
Std. Err. adjusted for 196 clusters  
   
 
R-square 0.46 
    
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation F = 10.23 P>F = 0.0000   
(Source: Research Data). This table shows the results of regressing risk premium on property insurance 
purchase choice. The dependent variable: risk premium is the implied cost of equity based on the MPEG 
model in Easton (2004) minus the risk-free rate, where the risk-free rate is defined as yield to maturity of 
zero coupon one year Chinese Government bond. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West errors adjusted for autocorrelation. The labels ***, 
**, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional variables 






Table 7.7: Chinese PLCs, 2003-2007:   The Extent of Property 
Insurance Use and the Cost of Equity 











intercept +/- -0.1265* 0.0701 0.0674 -1.88 0.06 
INSCOV - -0.0305 0.7396 0.7373 -0.04 0.48 
INCOV2 +  2.3099 6.1209 6.1030 0.38 0.35 
LnMV - -0.0125*** 0.0032 0.0030 -4.11 0.00 
LnMB +/-  0.0052 0.0071 0.0072 0.72 0.28 
LEV +  0.0060 0.0371 0.0364 0.17 0.43 
CASH -  0.0023 0.0281 0.0287 0.08 0.47 
UBETA +  0.0012 0.0128 0.0137 0.09 0.47 
STD_ERR + -0.0340 0.0345 0.0363 -0.94 0.18 
FERR - -0.0689** 0.0254 0.0326 -2.11 0.02 
LnRET12 - -0.0112 0.0134 0.0155 -1.05 0.30 
NSHARE +/- -0.0170 0.0163 0.0159 -1.07 0.29 
YEAR 2005 +/- -0.1052*** 0.0130 0.0133 -7.89 0.00 
YEAR 2006 +/- -0.0806*** 0.0146 0.0152 -5.31 0.00 
YEAR 2007 +/- -0.0931*** 0.0127 0.0131 -7.13 0.00 
INDUS1 +/- -0.0258** 0.0115 0.0125 -2.07 0.04 
INDUS2 +/- -0.0164 0.0097 0.0109 -1.50 0.13 
INDUS3 +/- -0.0002 0.0136 0.0137 -0.01 0.99 
INDUS4 +/-  0.0160 0.0170 0.0170 0.94 0.35 
INDUS5 +/-  0.0001 0.0105 0.0117 0.01 0.99 
INDUS6 +/- -0.0063 0.0136 0.0146 -0.43 0.67 
INDUS7 +/- -0.0280** 0.0137 0.0138 -2.03 0.04 
INDUS8 +/- -0.0096 0.0106 0.0113 -0.85 0.39 
INDUS9 +/-  0.0299** 0.0125 0.0126 2.37 0.02 
INDUS10 +/- -0.0148 0.0104 0.0110 -1.34 0.18 
INDUS11 +/-  0.0016 0.0138 0.0164 0.10 0.92 
INDUS12 +/- -0.0010 0.0098 0.0109 -0.09 0.93 
INDUS13 +/- -0.0109 0.0101 0.0108 -1.00 0.32 
INDUS14 +/- -0.0207** 0.0094 0.0103 -2.01 0.05 
INDUS15 +/-  0.0043 0.0124 0.0128 0.33 0.74 
INDUS16 +/-  0.0927*** 0.0324 0.0327 2.84 0.01 
INDUS17 +/-  0.0117 0.0111 0.0119 0.99 0.32 
No. of Obs 331 
     
Std. Err. adjusted for 196 clusters  
   
 
R-square 0.46 
    
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation F = 11.32  P>F = 0.0000     
(Source: Research Data).This table shows the panel regression results of testing nonlinear U-shape 
relation between the cost of equity and the extent of property insurance use. The dependent variable: risk 
premium is implied cost of equity based on the MPEG model in Easton (2004) minus the risk-free rate, 
where the risk-free rate is defined as yield to maturity of zero coupon one year Chinese Government 
bond. Robust standard errors are standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-statistics 
are based on Newey-West errors adjusted for autocorrelation. The labels ***, **, and* indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted 




For the results of the relation between the extent of insurance use and the cost of equity 
(model [6.6], shown in Table 7.7), although the signs of INSCOV and INSCOV2 remain 
the same, they are not statistically significant. Among the control variables, only firm 
size (LnMV) is negative and statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001, one-tailed)43.  
 
7.6 Robustness Tests 
To examine the robustness of the regression results presented in section 7.4, three main 
diagnostic tests are conducted. First, to investigate the extent to which the results are 
driven by within-firm and/or cross-firm variations, a firm fixed-effects regression and 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression 44  are employed. Second, to address possible 
endogeneity with regard to the property insurance decision, a set of corporate 
governance variables are introduced to the baseline models [6.1] and [6.2]. A two-stage 
least square (2SLS) regression is then estimated45. In the manner described previously 
in Chapter 6 (section 6.4). Lastly, to further alleviate concerns about potential 
multicollinearty, model 6.4 is run again using demeaned INSCOV and INSCOV2 instead 
of actual INSCOV and INSCOV2 (e.g. see Jaccard et al., 1990). 46 
 
7.6.1 Within-Firm and Cross-Firm Variations 
 
The fixed-effects regression analysis also helps to address concerns regarding possible 
omitted time-invariant variable. To the extent that unobservable firm heterogeneity 
could influence INS and INSCOV, and is fixed over time, then a fixed-effects regression 
procedure can effectively eliminate biases due to omitted correlated variables. The 
results of the fixed-effects regression and the Fama-MacBeth (FM) regression procedure 
                                                 
43The lack of statistically significant variables could be the result of insufficient data points since the 
number of observation drops substantially from 1,156 to 331 in conducting the sensitivitytests.  
 
44 The Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach essentially comprises two steps. In the first step, for each single 
time period, a cross-sectional regression is performed. Then, in the second step, final coefficient estimates 
are obtained as the average of the first step coefficient estimates. It is widely used for the CAPM related 
panel analysis to control for cross-sectional correlation. In this study, the standard errors of Fama-
MacBeth (1973) are Newey-West (1987) HAC standard errors. 
 
45 While 2SLS is one kind of IV approach it is noted that not all IV approaches are 2SLS.  
 
46 The results are reported in Appendix C. No significant difference is found compared with the baseline 
regressions. The range of inflection points is also close to the baseline models.  
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for the property insurance purchase decision and the cost of equity are reported in Table 
7.8 columns (1) to (4). Results for the extent of property insurance use and the cost of 
equity are reported in Table 7.9 columns (1) to (4). The empirical results are consistent 
with the baseline regression indicating that the coefficient estimates are not driven by 
within-firm or cross-firm variations. The coefficient estimates for INS are still 
statistically significant and negative in fixed-effects and FM regression (at least p≤0.05, 
one-tailed). Among the control variables, the coefficient estimates for LnMV and CASH 
are statistically significant and negative (at least p≤0.05, one-tailed), while the 
coefficient estimate for LEV is statistically significant and positive (at least p≤0.05, one-
tailed). In addition, LnMB is statistically significant and negatively related to 
ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA) in the fixed-effect and FM models (at 
least p≤0.1, two-tailed).  
 
The results of the fixed-effects regression and FM regression for the extent of property 
insurance use and the cost of equity are reported in Table 7.9. (1) to (4). No significant 
statistical difference is found compared with the results of baseline regression. The 
estimated coefficient for INSCOV remains negative and for INSCOV2 remains positive. 
Both are statistically significant in both models at the 5% level (one-tailed). These 
findings again suggest the existence of a U-shape relation between the extent of 
property insurance use and the cost of equity for those Chinese PLCs in the sample. The 
inflection points occur in those models when INSCOV take in the range from 0.009 to 
0.085, which are above 90th percentile of observed insurance spending. Therefore, the 
empirical findings are consistent with the results obtained from the baseline regression 
analysis that property insurance use appears beneficial for the majority of the sample 
firm. Among the control variables, LnMV, LEV, CASH are statistically significant and 
consistent with theory and the results of prior studies in both models. However, LnMB 
is only statistically significant and negatively related to ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED BETA) in the FM model at the 1% level (two-tailed).  
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Firm Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth Control for Corporate Governance 
   +/- (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















INS -      -0.0018**      -0.0006**  -0.0016**  -0.0003***  -0.0011** -0.0008** 
  
(-1.91) (-1.89) (-2.78) (-3.18) (-1.89) (-1.97) 
LnMV -      -0.0024**   -0.0036***  -0.0026**     -0.0005**   -0.0022***   -0.0003*** 
  
(-2.14) (-2.77) (-2.47) (-2.39) (-3.63) (-2.96) 
LnMB +/-      -0.0011      -0.0002*     -0.0006  -0.0012***      -0.0006       -0.0013* 
  
(-0.68) (-1.66) (-0.51) (-4.16) (-0.60) (-1.93) 
LEV +       0.0064**    0.0253***   0.0010**   0.0442***       0.0008**    0.0396*** 
  
       (1.68) (6.58) (2.34) (4.51) (1.91) (6.59) 
CASH -      -0.0135**   -0.0009*** -0.0162**  -0.0063*** -0.0104**   -0.0064*** 
  
(-2.18) (-2.59) (-2.83) (-5.60) (-1.87) (-2.85) 
NSHARE +      -0.0027      -0.0002     -0.0005     -0.0006      -0.0004       -0.0006 
  
(-1.29) (-0.10) (-1.05) (-1.34) (-0.12) (-0.35) 
BOARDSIZE +/- 
    
     -0.0001       -0.0000 
      
(-0.73) (-0.07) 
INDBOARD - 
    
     -0.0162**       -0.0022** 
      
(-2.44) (-2.33) 
CEOCHAIR +/- 
    
       0.0001        0.0004 
      
(0.09) (0.78) 








Table 7.8 Continued 
Year Fixed-effects 
 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed-effects 
 
no no yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed-effects 
 
yes yes no no no no 
R-Square   0.18 0.41 0.20 0.59 0.16 0.44 
No. of Obs.   1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,110 1,110 
 (Source: Research data). This table presents the result of regressing risk premium on insurance purchase choice by firm fixed effect regression, Fama-MacBeth regression and 
the result of introducing a set of corporate governance variables. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report result where ERP_CAPM(RAW BETA) is used as dependent variable, and 
computed as raw beta times the market risk premium of 7%, where raw beta is estimated from market model (stock return regressing against market return)using the previous 
60 months return (at least 24 months observations). Columns (2), (4) and (6) report result where ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA) is used as dependent variable, 
computed as industry-adjusted beta times the  market risk premium of 7%, where industry-adjusted beta is relevered industry median of unlevered raw beta estimated by a 
market model regression using the previous 60 monthly return (at least 24 month). The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on Newey-West errors for FM regressions, 
and others are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The labels ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional 
variables have predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. The coefficient estimates for the constant, year and industry indicators are omitted for the sake of 
























Firm Fixed Effects Fama-MacBeth Control for Corporate Governance 
   (+/-) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















INSCOV -  -0.0121** -0.0658**  -0.0763**  -0.0215**    -0.0446**  -0.0182** 
  
(-1.91) (-1.93) (-2.59) (-2.42) (-1.97) (-1.89) 
INSCOV2 +    0.6705** 0.3941**  1.1633**  1.0379**       0.9428***    0.2420** 
  
(-1.84) (1.79)         (2.65) (2.41) (3.51) (2.14) 
LnMV -  -0.0026**   -0.0027***  -0.0025** -0.0004*     -0.0022***  -0.0003** 
  
(-1.89)  (-2.74) (-2.57) (-2.33) (-3.59) (-1.78) 
LnMB +/- 0.0012       -0.0004 0.0002     -0.0014***        -0.0006      -0.0012*** 
 
 
(0.77)  (-1.25) (0.20) (-4.64) (-0.72) (-2.88) 
LEV +    0.0053**      0.0248***   0.0013*     0.0437***   0.0005**       0.0395*** 
  
(1.95) (7.38)  (2.38) (4.61) (1.88) (7.49) 
CASH -  -0.0134**   -0.0053**  -0.0150**     -0.0044***   -0.0102**      -0.0050*** 
  
(-2.18) (-1.92) (-2.83) (-5.45) (-1.81) (-2.96) 
NSHARE +      -0.0023         0.0001      -0.0003       -0.0004  -0.0002         -0.0001 
  
(-1.11)         (0.05) (-0.22) (-1.21) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
BOARDSIZE +/- 
    
 -0.0002         -0.0000 
      
(-1.19) (-0.12) 
INDBOARD - 
    
       -0.0156***    -0.0023** 
      (-3.19) (-2.12) 
CEOCHAIR +/- 
    
        -0.0002         -0.0004 
   (-0.13) (-0.88) 
      
 
  









Table 7.9 Continued        
Year Fixed-effects 
 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed-effects 
 
no no yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed-effects 
 
yes yes no no no no 
R-Square  0.17 0.40 0.21 0.59 0.17 0.47 
No. of Obs.   1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,110 1,110 
Inflection point ,where, INSCOV =  0.009 0.085 0.033 0.020 0.024 0.037 
(Source: Research data). This table presents the result of testing nonlinear U-shape relation between the cost of equity and the extent of property insurance use by employing 
Fama-MacBeth regression and the result of introducing a set of corporate governance variables. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report result where ERP_CAPM(RAW BETA) is used 
as dependent variable, and computed as raw beta times the market risk premium of 7%, where raw beta is estimated from market model (stock returns regressing against 
market returns)using the previous 60 monthly return (at least 24 monthly observations). Columns (2), (4) and (6) report result where ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED 
BETA) is used as dependent variable, computed as the industry-adjusted beta times the market risk premium of 7%. The industry-adjusted beta is re-levered industry median 
of unlevered raw beta estimated by a market model regression using the previous 60 monthly returns (at least 24 months). The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on 
Newey-West errors for FM regressions, and others are adjusted for clustering at firm level. The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels 
(one-tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. The coefficient estimates for the constant, year and industry indicators 








7.6.2 Endogeneity: Corporate Governance Variables 
 
The results of entering three more corporate governance variables into the regression 
analysis are reported in Tables 7.8 and 7.9, columns (5) and (6). Similar results are 
found as per the baseline regressions. For the property insurance purchase decision and 
the cost of equity model, the coefficient estimate for INS remains statistically significant 
and negative at the 5% level (one-tailed). The control variables are more ‘strongly’ 
significant compared with those in the baseline regression, where ERP_CAPM 
(INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA) is used as the dependent variable as shown in the 
Table 7.9 column (6). For example, LnMV is significant at the 1% level (one-tailed), 
while it is significant at the 5% level (one-tailed) in the baseline regression. Among the 
corporate governance variables, the estimated coefficient for board independence 
(INDBOARD) is statistically significant and negative (p≤0.05, one-tailed) implying that 
firms with more independent board members are likely to have lower cost of equity, for 
example, because investors are assured that outside directors help control the effects of 
a dominant CEO. However, BOARDSIZE and CEO_CHAIR are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels of confidence. It is a similar pattern with regard to the 
extent of property insurance use and the cost of equity model where Tables 7.8 and 7.9, 
columns (5) and (6) indicate that the size of the board and CEO duality do not have a 
statistically significant impact on the cost of equity. Moreover, the statistical 
significance of INSCOV and INSCOV2 stay the same, as do the control variables. The 
inflection points occur in the two models when INSCOV equals 0.024 and 0.037, which 
are above 90th percentile of observed property insurance spending. Again, the results are 
consistent with those from the baseline regression, which suggests that property 
insurance use is likely to be beneficial for the majority of sample firms in the dataset. 
Among the corporate governance variables, the independence of board (INDBOARD) is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (one-tailed) where ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) is 
used as dependent variable and at the 5% (one-tailed) level where ERP_CAPM 








7.6.3  Endogeneity: Instrumented Variable Estimation 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6 (section 6.6), endogeneity of the property insurance decision 
could be a major concern in studies of the economic consequences of insurance 
decisions and risk management (Zou, 2010). Therefore, to test the robustness of the 
results from the baseline regression analysis regarding endogeneity, an instrumental 
variable approach is employed.   
 
7.6.3.1 Property Insurance Purchase Decision and the Cost of Equity 
 
The property insurance purchase decision (INS) is instrumented by Equation [6.5] in the 
first-stage of analysis. It is estimated using a random-effects Probit regression to reflect 
two dummy values (1/0) of the property insurance choice decision and the panel data 
nature of cross-section/time-series sample of Chinese PLCs. Before presenting the 
results, the validity of the three instrumental variables (HPR_FIRMS, CITYDUM and 
COD) is tested.  First, the Wald test of their joint significance generated a chi-square 
(χ2) statistic of 87.23 (df = 3), which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Furthermore, the Spearman correlation between INS and INS* (fitted value of insurance 
choice) is 0.40 (p-value = 0.000). These findings support the relevance of these 
instruments. Second, the Hansen J-statistic for the over-identification test of three 
instrumental variables is 1.586 (p-value = 0.212), which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that all instruments are not over-identified. Lastly, Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
of endogeneity of INS generated a chi-square (χ2) statistics of 2.572 (p-value = 0.121) 
technically fails to reject the null hypothesis that INS is exogenous.  
 
The results reported in Panel A of Table 7.10 demonstrate that the property insurance 
choice decision is positively related to the high-property-risk firm dummy, geographical 
location, capital expenditure, asset tangibility ratio and leverage, however negatively 
related to managerial ownership and size of firm. These results are consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Zou and Adams, 2006). The finding that capital expenditure is positively 
associated with insurance purchase decision provides evidence that the managers of 
high growth option firms are likely to engage in hedging (insurance) to bond their 
commitment to shareholders by reducing the volatility of future cash flows arising from 
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unforeseen perils. In other words, insuring productive assets helps reduce agency costs 
for shareholders, and other contracting constituents (e.g., debtholders). 
 
Panel B of Table 7.10 reports the results for the second stage regression. The fitted INS 
(INS*) is found to be statistically significant and negative at the 5% level (one-tailed), 
which is consistent with the results from baseline regression. Thus, the observation that 
firms with property insurance tend to have lower costs of equity is robust and does not 
seem to be severely affected by endogeneity problems.  
 
Table 7.10: Chinese PLCs (2003-2007): Property Insurance Purchase 
Choice and the Cost of Equity (2SLS IV Approach) 
Panel A: First-Stage Regression (Random Effects Probit Model Y = 
INS) 
Variables Exp. Sign Coefficient 
Instrument for INS 
  HPR_FIRMS + 1.0612*** 
  
                         (2.64) 
CITYDUM + 0.6747*** 
  
                         (2.43) 
COD +                        3.3005 
  
                         (1.38) 
CAPX +                        0.7925** 
  
                         (1.78) 
MAN_OWN +/-                       -3.4241* 
  
                          (-1.72) 
STATE_OWN +/-                        0.2037 
  
                          (0.85) 
ASSTAN +                        0.3169** 
  
(1.89) 
LEV +  0.2782*** 
  
(3.93) 
ASSTAN_LEV +                        0.7094** 
  
(1.83) 
Other predetermined variables from the model 6.1 
LnMV - -0.1906*** 
  
(-2.20) 
LnMB +/-                       -0.1497* 
  
(-1.66) 
CASH +/-                       -0.1826 
  
(-0.33) 
NSHARE +/-                        0.0299 
    (1.00) 
Year and other industry dummies yes 
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Wald χ2  87.23 
(Source: Research data).Panel A presents the first-stage random effects Probit regression of INS on the 
instrument variables (high-property-risk firm dummy, high-property-risk location dummy and interest 
cost of borrowing) and predetermined control variables included in the second-stage regression of the cost 
of equity. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering 
at the firm level. The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-
tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. The 
coefficient estimates for the constant, year and industry indicators are omitted for the sake of brevity. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
Panel B: Second-Stage Regression of the Cost of Equity on the Fitted 
Property Insurance Purchase Choice 







 INS* -  -0.0005** -0.0007** 
  
(-1.76) (-1.88) 
LnMV -    -0.0022*** -0.0004** 
  
(-3.52) (-1.93) 
LnMB +/-       -0.0005  -0.0011** 
  
(-0.57) (-2.22) 
LEV +  0.0020**     0.0378*** 
  
(1.91) (6.04) 
CASH -  -0.0108**  -0.0052*** 
  
(-1.95) (-3.15) 









        
No. of Obs. 1,156 1,156 
R-square   0.16 0.47 
(Source: Research data).Panel B presents results from the second-stage regression of the cost of equity on 
the fitted extent of insurance use (INS*). INS* is fitted by a first-stage random effects Probit regression of 
INSCOV on the instrument variables (high-property-risk firm dummy, high-property-risk location dummy 
and interest cost of borrowing) and control variables for INS, and the predetermined control variables 
included in the second-stage regression of cost of equity. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based 
on robust standard error adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The labels ***, **, and* indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted 
signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. The coefficient estimates for the constant, year and industry 






7.6.3.2 The Extent of Property Insurance Use and the Cost of Equity 
 
Similar to the instrument of INS reported above in section 7.6.3.1, the extent of property 
insurance use (INSCOV) is instrumented by Equation [6.6] in the first-stage analysis. 
However, now INSCOV is estimated using a random effects Tobit regression to reflect 
the existence of zero insurance observations and the panel data nature of the cross-
section/time-series sample of Chinese PLCs. The Spearman correlation between 
INSCOV and INSCOV* (fitted value of INSCOV) is 0.45, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and thereby supports the relevance of the instrument. The 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity of INSCOV generated a chi-square (χ2) 
statistics of 2.612 (p-value = 0.110), which technically fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that INSCOV is exogenous. 
 
Panel A of Table 7.11 presents the results form Tobit regression for the first stage. The 
extent of property insurance use is positively related to the instrumental variable 
INSCOV_INDUS_MEDIAN, capital expenditure, asset tangibility ratio, leverage, and 
proportion of shares held by the State. However, the extent of property insurance 
purchased is negatively related to firm size. Except for the asset tangibility ratio, the 
other results are consistent with prior studies (e.g. Zou and Adams, 2006; Zou and 
Adams, 2008a; Zou, 2010). The finding of a positive relation between STATE_OWN 
and INSCOV is also consistent with Jia et.al’s (2011) study that finds that Chinese firms 
with more State-owned shareholdings are expected to purchase more property insurance 
than firms with less State-owned shares-for example, because property insurance 
coverage could relieve the government from making large payments in the event of 
unexpectedly severe asset losses. The positive coefficient estimate for the asset 
tangibility ratio shows that not surprisingly, Chinese PLCs with more tangible assets are 
likely to purchase more property insurance. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
instrumental variable INSCOV_INDUS_MEDIAN is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (one-tailed) supporting the use of  instrumental vairables in the analysis.  
 
Panel B of Table 7.11 shows the results for the second-stage regression. The fitted 
variables INSCOV and INSCOV2 (INSCOV*, INSCOV2*) are found to be statistically 
significant (at least at p≤0.05, one-tailed). The coefficient estimate for INSCOV* 
remains positive and the coefficient for INSCOV2* remains negative again indicating 
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the non-linear U-shape relation between the extent of property insurance use and the 
cost of equity, - a result that is consistent with that of baseline regressions. The results 
of these control variables are similar to those for the baseline regressions as well47. The 
inflection point occurs when INSCOV equals to 0.0378, above the 90th percentile of 
observed insurance spending. Therefore, the result that Chinese PLCs that purchase 
higher levels of property insurance are likely to have lower costs of equity is robust and 
does not seem to be severely affected by endogeneity problems. 
 
Table 7.11: Chinese PLCs (2003-2007):  The Extent of Property 
Insurance Use and the Cost of Equity (2SLS IV Approach) 
Panel A: First-Stage Regression (Random Effects Tobit Model, Y = 
INSCOV) 
Variables Exp. Sign Coefficient 
Instrument for INSCOV 
  INSCOV_INDUS_MEDIAN +     0.1221*** 
  
(2.14) 
Control variables for INSCOV 
  CAPX +   0.0062** 
  
(1.74) 
MAN_OWN +/-       -0.0109 
  
(-0.86) 
STATE_OWN +/-        0.0011* 
  
(1.88) 
ASSTAN +      0.0035*** 
  
(2.33) 
LEV +        0.0004 
  
(1.21) 
ASSTAN_LEV +        0.0070* 
  
(1.54) 
Other predetermined variables from the model 6.2 
  LnMV -     -0.0023*** 
  
(-5.64) 
LnMB +/-    -0.0030*** 
  
(-5.94) 
CASH +/-      -0.0033 
  
(-1.12) 
NSHARE +      -0.0025 
    (-1.44) 
Year and industry dummies   Yes 






Wald χ2   448.74 
                                                 
47 The identification of the U-shaped relation between property insurance and the equity cost of capital 
emphasizes the importance of controls for endogeneity of the property insurance decision.  
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(Source: Research data).Panel A presents the first-stage random-effects Trobit regression of INSCOV on 
the instrument variable (industry median of  INSCOV in the same city excluding the firm in question in 
the same year) and control variables for INSCOV, and predetermined control variables included in the 
second-stage regression of the cost of equity.  t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust 
standard error adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-
tailed otherwise), respectively. The coefficient estimates for the constant, year and industry indicators are 
omitted for the sake of brevity. Variable definitions are in Appendix A.  
 
Panel B: Second-Stage Regression of the Cost of Equity on the Fitted 









INSCOV* -   -0.0885**    -0.0309*** 
  
(-1.89) (-2.49) 
INSCOV2* +      1.2023***   1.6629** 
  
(2.43) (1.90) 
LnMV -   -0.0020** -0.0010* 
  
(-2.21) (-1.71) 
LnMB +/-        -0.0002 -0.0002* 
  
(-1.11) (-1.79) 
LEV +         0.0092*     0.0404*** 
  
(1.68) (7.48) 
CASH -        -0.0099**    -0.0067*** 
  
(-2.33) (-3.19) 









R-Square   0.15 0.46 
No of Obs.   1,156 1,156 
Inflection point ,where, INSCOV =  0.038 0.009 
(Source: Research data).Panel B presents results from the second-stage regression of the cost of equity on 
the fitted extent of insurance use (INSCOV*) and its square term (INSCOV2*). INSCOV* is fitted by a 
first-stage random-effects Tobit regression of INSCOV on the instrument variable (industry median of 
INSCOV) and control variables for INSCOV, and the predetermined control variables included in the 
second-stage regression of cost of equity. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on robust 
standard error adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levesl (one-tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-
tailed otherwise), respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year and industry indicators are omitted 







7.7 Results of Insurance Use, Sub-Optimal Investment and the Cost of 
Equity (Hypothesis 3) 
As noted earlier, the results of relation between property insurance use and the cost of 
equity are unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity problem of the insurance decision. 
Therefore, the analysis in this section is based on the original INSCOV. Panel A of the 
Table 7.12 reports the results of the first step regression between CAPX (capital 
expenditure-to-total assets) and INSCOV based on the panel OLS regression. Panel B 
and C of Table 7.12 present the results of the second step regression adding CAPX  in 
model [6.2] where the dependent variables are ERP_CAPM(RAW BETA) and 
ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED BETA), respectively. As previously, standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level and year, industry fixed effect are 
included to control for potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (e.g., see 
Peterson, 2009).  
 
After controlling for the effect of other factors on CAPX, the sign of the estimated 
coefficient for INSCOV is statistically positive at the 1% level (one-tailed) in the first-
step regression, suggesting that firms with higher levels of property insurance are likely 
to spend more on prospective projects and less prone to the effects of investment 
crowding-out and/or managerial risk aversion problems. This finding is in line with 
what was previously predicted in Hypothesis 3 (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.2). The 
control variables are also consistent with prior predictions and previous reserch (e.g., 
Zou, 2010). In the second-step regression, CAPX is significantly positively related to 
both ERP_CAPM, while the signs for INSCOV and INSCOV2 remain the same as in 
earlier tests. Moreover, the inflection points are again within the similar range as in 
previous tests (see section 7.4.2). This observation further indicates that the effects of 
investment crowding-out and/or managerial risk aversion are priced by investors in the 
cost of equity. In other words, firms are rewarded by the reduction of the cost of equity 
if those agency problems are not severe. Putting the results of the two-steps of analysis 
together, the findings are thus consistent with Hypothesis 3 that firms with property 
insurance or more property insurance are likely to spend more on prospective 
investment projects. Furthermore, such firms with property insurance appear to suffer 
less from investment crowding-out and/or managerial risk aversion problems, and tend 
to have lower costs of equity compared with those firms that do not insure their 
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productive assets. This is believed to be the first empirical evidence of its kind 
supporting the view that property insurance helps to reduce firms’ costs of equity by 
mitigating agency problems. This observation also complements the findings of Zou 
(2010) that property insurance can actively increase the value of firms by facilitating 
new positive NPV investment projects.  
 
Table 7.12: Chinese PLCs (2003-2007): Property Insurance Use, Sub-
Optimal Investment and the Cost of Equity 
Panel A Property Insurance, Sub-Optimal Investment (Dependent 
Variable = CAPX) 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficient 
      Std. 
Err 
t-stat p-value 
intercept +/-  0.0366*** 0.0054  6.82 0.00 
INSCOV +  0.0734** 0.0366  2.00 0.05 
NDF +  0.0641*** 0.0134  4.77 0.00 
CS +  0.0031 0.0000  0.08 0.93 
LnMB - -0.0028* 0.0009 -1.91 0.06 
YEAR 2004 +/- -0.0026 0.0038 -0.69 0.49 
YEAR 2005 +/- -0.0059 0.0048 -1.22 0.22 
YEAR 2006 +/- -0.0045 0.0047 -0.96 0.34 
YEAR 2007 +/- -0.0040 0.0051 -0.79 0.43 
INDUS1 +/-  0.0082 0.0171  0.48 0.63 
INDUS2 +/-  0.0064 0.0063  1.02 0.31 
INDUS3 +/-  0.0195* 0.0109  1.78 0.08 
INDUS4 +/-  0.0134 0.0201  0.67 0.51 
INDUS5 +/-  0.0240*** 0.0081  2.96 0.00 
INDUS6 +/-  0.0362*** 0.0036  9.97 0.00 
INDUS7 +/- -0.0031 0.0085 -0.36 0.72 
INDUS8 +/- -0.0105*** 0.0033 -3.15 0.00 
INDUS9 +/- -0.0185*** 0.0050 -3.73 0.00 
INDUS10 +/-  0.0104** 0.0047  2.19 0.03 
INDUS11 +/-  0.0170* 0.0088  1.94 0.05 
INDUS12 +/-  0.0123* 0.0066  1.85 0.07 
INDUS13 +/-  0.0333*** 0.0068  4.91 0.00 
INDUS14 +/-  0.0154* 0.0080  1.92 0.06 
INDUS15 +/-  0.0158 0.0214  0.74 0.46 
INDUS16 +/-  0.0480*** 0.0181  2.66 0.01 
INDUS17 +/-  0.0168* 0.0095  1.77 0.08 
R-square 0.10 
    
Std. Err. adjusted for 395 clusters  
   No of Obs 1,156         
(Source: Research Data). Panel A presents the first-step OLS regression of INSCOV on CAPX. The t-
statistics are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The labels ***, **, 
and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional variables have 
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predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. CS is 
winzorised at the top and bottom of 1 percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. 
 
 
Panel B Dependent Variable = ERP_CAPM (RAW BETA) 
  Exp. Sign Coefficient Std. Err. t-stat p-value 
intercept 
 
0.1181 *** 0.0126 9.37 0.00 
INSCOV - -0.0667 ** 0.0461 -1.97 0.05 
INSCOV2 + 1.0350 *** 0.2668 3.88 0.00 
CAPX - -0.0142 * 0.0074 -1.81 0.07 
LnMV +/- -0.0021 *** 0.0006 -3.60 0.00 
lnMB - -0.0002 
 
0.0008 -0.95 0.78 
LEV + 0.0022 * 0.0049 1.89 0.06 
CASH - -0.0106 * 0.0055 -1.94 0.05 
NSHARE + -0.0016 
 
0.0023 -0.70 0.49 
YEAR2004 +/- 0.0022 *** 0.0008 2.70 0.01 
YEAR2005 +/- 0.0045 *** 0.0013 3.48 0.00 
YEAR2006 +/- -0.0050 *** 0.0011 -4.63 0.00 
YEAR2007 +/- -0.0014 
 
0.0014 -0.98 0.33 
INDUS1 +/- -0.0021 
 
0.0039 -0.55 0.58 
INDUS2 +/- 0.0025 
 
0.0028 0.88 0.38 
INDUS3 +/- 0.0016 
 
0.0029 0.55 0.58 
INDUS4 +/- -0.0028 
 
0.0028 -0.99 0.32 
INDUS5 +/- 0.0141 *** 0.0022 6.35 0.00 
INDUS6 +/- -0.0003 
 
0.0035 -0.10 0.92 
INDUS7 +/- 0.0064 *** 0.0023 2.75 0.01 
INDUS8 +/- -0.0047 * 0.0026 -1.80 0.07 
INDUS9 +/- 0.0011 
 
0.0025 0.42 0.68 
INDUS10 +/- -0.0006 
 
0.0029 -0.19 0.85 
INDUS11 +/- 0.0091 *** 0.0029 3.09 0.00 
INDUS12 +/- 0.0004 
 
0.0026 0.16 0.87 
INDUS13 +/- -0.0049 
 
0.0037 -1.34 0.18 
INDUS14 +/- -0.0021 
 
0.0052 -0.40 0.69 
INDUS15 +/- -0.0075 * 0.0040 -1.89 0.06 
INDUS16 +/- 0.0060 
 
0.0071 0.84 0.40 
INDUS17 +/- 0.0017 
 
0.0026 0.66 0.51 
R-square        0.17        
Std. Err. adjusted for 395 clusters  
 
   No of Obs   1,156         
Inflection point ,where, INSCOV= 0.032        
 (Source: Research Data). Panel B presents the second step OLS regression of CAPX on ERP_CAPM 
(RAW BETA). The t-statistics are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
The labels ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when 
unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. Variables are 





Panel C Dependent Variable = ERP_CAPM (INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED 
BETA) 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficient  Std. Err. t-stat p-value 
intercept 
 
0.1166 *** 0.0126 9.29 0.00 
INSCOV - -0.0179 ** 0.0059 -2.14 0.03 
INSCOV2 + 0.9392 *** 0.0165 3.95 0.00 
CAPX - -0.0134 * 0.0075 -1.92 0.06 
LnMV - -0.0020 *** 0.0006 -3.48 0.00 
lnMB - -0.0003 * 0.0001 -1.88 0.06 
LEV + 0.0020 ** 0.0010 2.33 0.02 
CASH - -0.0102 * 0.0055 -1.86 0.06 
NSHARE + -0.0018 
 
0.0023 -0.80 0.43 
YEAR2004 +/- 0.0022 *** 0.0008 2.58 0.01 
YEAR2005 +/- 0.0044 *** 0.0013 3.44 0.00 
YEAR2006 +/- -0.0051 *** 0.0011 -4.69 0.00 
YEAR2007 +/- -0.0018 
 
0.0014 -1.23 0.22 
INDUS1 +/- -0.0097 
 
0.0059 -1.63 0.10 
INDUS2 +/- 0.0023 
 
0.0028 0.82 0.41 
INDUS3 +/- 0.0016 
 
0.0028 0.57 0.57 
INDUS4 +/- 0.0101 * 0.0060 1.68 0.09 
INDUS5 +/- -0.0029 
 
0.0028 -1.01 0.31 
INDUS6 +/- 0.0144 *** 0.0022 6.47 0.00 
INDUS7 +/- -0.0001 
 
0.0036 -0.03 0.98 
INDUS8 +/- 0.0062 *** 0.0023 2.68 0.01 
INDUS9 +/- -0.0049 * 0.0026 -1.87 0.06 
INDUS10 +/- 0.0011 
 
0.0025 0.44 0.66 
INDUS11 +/- -0.0004 
 
0.0029 -0.14 0.89 
INDUS12 +/- 0.0090 *** 0.0029 3.09 0.00 
INDUS13 +/- 0.0005 
 
0.0026 0.20 0.84 
INDUS14 +/- -0.0048 
 
0.0037 -1.32 0.19 
INDUS15 +/- -0.0022 
 
0.0052 -0.42 0.68 
INDUS16 +/- -0.0075 * 0.0040 -1.87 0.06 
INDUS17 +/- 0.0063 
 
0.0072 0.88 0.38 
R-square   0.47        
Std. Err. adjusted for 395 clusters  
 
   No of Obs 1,156        
Inflection point ,where, INSCOV = 0.010 
 (Source: Research Data). Panel B presents the second-step OLS regression of CAPX on ERP_CAPM 
(INDUSTRY ADJUSTED BETA). The t-statistics are based on robust standard error adjusted for clustering 
at the firm level. The labels ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-
tailed when unidirectional variables have predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. 




7.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents the empirical results obtained from a suite of multivariate 
statistical tests conducted on an unbalanced panel dataset of 631 Chinese PLCs for the 
period 2003-2007. The two primarily hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4 (section 4.3) 
are tested by regressing costs of equity, estimated using the CAPM and the MPEG 
model against the property insurance purchase choice decision and the extent of 
property insurance use, respectively. Consistent with what was hypothesized, firms 
purchasing property insurance are found to have lower costs of equity. This finding 
supports the agency theory-based argument that insurance can decrease costs of equity 
by mitigating agency problems (costs). In line with recent prior research (Zou, 2010), a 
non-linear U-shape relation between the extent of property insurance use and the cost of 
equity is also found in the Chinese corporate sector. Given that the inflection occurs 
above the 90th percentile of observed property insurance spending, property insurance 
use is likely to be beneficial to the majority of sample firms in this study. Furthermore, 
consistent with the predictions of agency theory (Subsidiary Hypothesis 3) shareholders 
appear to reduce share prices (i.e., require lower returns) when a firm insures its assets 
in order to mitigate agency incentive conflicts such as the investment crowding-out 
and/or managerial risk aversion problems. Additionally, consistent with theory and 
previous published research, costs of equity are found to be negatively related to firm 
size, price-to-book ratio and firm’s liquidity, but positively related to leverage. Finally, 
no statistically significant empirical evidence is found to suggest that agency incentive 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholder increases costs of equity in 
China. The main conclusions, implications deriving from the results of this study, some 
inherent limitations with the research design, and prospects for future research are now 











CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter of the thesis summarizes the research results and presents the main 
conclusions and implications arising from the study. Additionally, the contribution of 
the research is evaluated and the limitations of the study are highlighted. Prospective 
areas for further research are also considered in this chapter.  
8.2 Overview of the Project 
There are two generally held views on corporate risk management (insurance) in the 
academic literature. One views corporate risk management (insurance) as a mean of 
ensuring loss avoidance with little consideration of its importance in the corporate 
strategic investment and risk-taking decisions. The other sees corporate risk 
management (insurance) as an integral part of the value creation process. That is, one in 
which the concept of economic capital, when applied with prudence and judgement, 
provides companies with a financial cushion and the confidence to carry out their 
strategic plans (Doherty, 2005). A large number of studies have focused on the 
determinants of corporate hedging. (e.g Smith and Stulz,1985; Stulz, 1996, Leland, 
1998; Bessembinder, 1991;  Froot et al., 1993; Zou and Adams, 2006). Some prior 
research has focused on the relation between hedging and firm value (see e.g Allayannis 
and Weston, 2001; Granham and Rogers, 2002; and Zou, 2010). In contrast, previous 
studies that explore how hedging impacts on the cost of equity are few and only use 
financial derivatives data. For example Gay et al. (2011) examine how derivatives use 
affects the cost of equity for US listed company for 1992-1996 and 2004-2006. They 
find that firms using derivatives tend to have lower costs of equity than firms that do not 
hedge. This research study thus fills a void of the literature by examining the impact of 
property insurance use on the cost of equity for Chinese PLCs. Specifically, the study 
addresses two main research questions: 
 Does property insurance influence a firm’s cost of equity capital? 
 If it does, to what extent does property insurance impact on a firm’s cost of 
equity capital?  
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The Chinese market is a potentially powerful setting for examining the relation between 
property insurance and the cost of equity for four main reasons. First, China has become 
one of the biggest recipients of FDI in the world since the WTO Agreement of 2004. 
Moreover, there are now increasing numbers of Chinese companies seeking overseas 
listing status. Those attributes have offered international investors increased prospects 
for risk diversification (Zou and Adams, 2006).  
 
Second, property insurance is the predominant risk management technique used in 
China’s corporate sector as the market for alternative hedging techniques in China are 
generally undeveloped (Zou, 2010). Therefore, this attribute enables this study to avoid 
potentially confounding effets of (unobserved) hedging substitutes (e.g. derivatives 
use).   
 
Third, China has its unique ownership structure which could exacerbate agency 
incentive conflicts in firms. A large number of listed companies in China are State-
controlled. About two-thirds of total corporate shares are either held by government 
agencies (i.e. the State shares), or held by State-related legal entities (usually SOEs) 
such as the legal-person shares (Zou and Adams, 2008b). Both State shares and legal-
person shares are not publicly tradable, which gives rise to different voting rights 
between tradable shares and non-tradable shares. Those attributes provide a potentially 
powerful setting for testing agency theory-based argument of the relation between 
property insurance and the cost of equity.  
 
Fourth, Lee and Rui (2000) observe that a key inhibitor to the efficient operation of 
financial markets in China is the lack of knowledge held by investors (particularly those 
from overseas) as to the future growth opportunities of companies with different 
ownership and control structures (e.g., State versus private shareholdings). This 
information asymmetry problem is compounded by a relatively undeveloped market for 
credit ratings in the Chinese corporate sector compared with Western countries (Ferri et 
al., 2001) (see also Chapter 1, section 1.4, footnote 10). Therefore, this study provides 
insights as to whether investors in China price securities differently for firms purchasing 
property insurance compared with firms that do not insure or do not insure to any 
significant degree. Moreover, the research project could be of potential relevance to 
managers, policymakers, investors, and others with an economic interest in China. For 
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example, by enabling the managers of PLCs to better understand the effects of insurance 
purchases on business operations and firm value. This could also help them improve 
their risk management practices in the future. The key features of the China’s financial 
and insurance market were discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  
 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, the study critically reviewed the positive-descriptive-type 
theories reported in the financial economics literature that could be adopted to address 
the research question of this study. From the literature review, agency theory was 
identified as the most appropriate and viable framework to guide empirical testing. 
Specifically, severn agency problems that could impact on the cost of equity are 
identified. (See Table 3.2) Drawing a framework from agency theory, this study then 
puts forward two main hypotheses and one subsidiary hypothesis in Chapter 4 regarding 
the linkage between property insurance use and the cost of equity. Chapter 5 evaluates 
the cost of equity models used in prior studies and identifies the CAPM and MPEG 
model (Easton, 2004) as the two cost of equity models that best fit the current dataset of 
Chinese PLCs. 
 
Statistical analysis for panel data is employed to test empirically the three main 
hypotheses derived from agency theory in this study. Statistical tests are considered to 
have the advantages of being scientifically rigorous and generalizable. The research 
design is described in Chapter 6. The results derived from the statistical testing of panel 
data for 631 Chinese PLCs over the five years 2003-2007 are reported in Chapter 7 of 
this thesis. Overall, the analysis of the empirical evidence reported in this thesis 
suggests that agency theory is an intuitively useful framework for explaining the 
relation between property insurance use and the cost of equity in the Chinese corporate 
sector. Section 8.3 below now presents the main conclusions and implications derived 
from the data analysis performed during the course of this study.  
 
8.3 Research Conclusions and Implications 
Four main conclusions arise from the analysis of the empirical results obtained in this 




First, agency theory-based arguments appear to be appropriate to explain the relation 
between property insurance use and the cost of equity. Specifically, this study finds that 
consistent with what was hypothesized, firms purchasing property insurance are likely 
to have a lower cost of equity than those firms not purchasing property insurance. This 
could reflect that property insurance acts as an effective control that helps re-aligns the 
interests of manager and shareholders. As a result, when property insurance enables 
managers to maximize shareholder’s wealth by investing in positive NPV projects, 
shareholders are likely to seek less price-protection (require lower returns), thus 
reducing the firm’s cost of equity.  
 
Second, the study finds that there is a non-linear U-shape relation between the extent of 
property insurance use and the cost of equity for Chinese PLCs. This result accords with 
the findings of Zou (2010) that the relation between the extent of property insurance use 
and the firm value is an inverted U-shape. Given the inflection point occurs above the 
90th percentile of the sample of firms, property insurance use appears to be beneficial to 
most Chinese PLCs. In other words, this observation suggests that firms with higher 
levels of property insurance tend to have lower costs of equity compared with those 
firms with lower levels of property insurance. On one hand, property insurance could 
thus encourage investors to increase their equity stakes in well-hedged (insured) firms 
so that they fully realize their potential economic value. On the other hand, ex-post 
financing mechanisms, like property insurance, could help firms to release their 
holdings of equity capital. This indicates that property insurance might be able to help 
firms optimize their capital structure. Again, this implication is consistent with the 
predictions of the agency theory.  
 
Third, to further examine the relation between the extent of property use and cost of 
equity, the study tested whether insurance can reduce the cost of equity by mitigating 
agency incentive conflicts such as the investment crowding-out and/or managerial risk 
aversion problems. As predicted, the empirical results indicate that firms where these 
two agency problems are mitigated by property insurance are likely to reduce their costs 
of equity. Firms purchasing property insurance (lowering agency costs) are able to take 
on new value-added projects for which the NPV exceeds the transaction costs of 
insuring. This is particularly important in China, where external funding opportunities 
could be obfuscated by severe information asymmetry problems. The positive linkage 
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between a firm’s growth options and the purchase property insurance could also reflect 
the intention of managers and/or shareholders to actively manage business risks and 
mitigate agency problems in companies with high growth options. This finding further 
supports the propositions of agency theory. 
 
Fourth, consistent with prior studies and finance theory, control variables, such as firm 
size and the price-to-book ratio are negatively related to the cost of equity. This 
suggests that large firms tend to be less inherently risky than small firms (e.g., because 
of their inherently higher cash resources and ability to effectively diversify risks) and so 
such firms tend to experience relatively lower costs of capital. Moreover, firms with a 
high price-to-book ratio, in other words, less growth opportunities, are likely to be less 
risky and thus have lower costs of equity. This could highlight the importance of 
property insurance for firms with high growth opportunities. Liquidity is also found to 
be one of the key factors for investors in pricing equity. Firms with more cash or cash 
equivalents, tend to be rewarded with lower costs of equity. However, contrary to 
expectations, evidence is not found to suggest that controlling-minority shareholders 
incentive conflicts adversely impact on firms value by the increasing the costs of equity.  
However, this result could reflect the imprecise proxy for controlling-minority 
shareholders conflicts used in the study. The empirical results further suggest that, 
consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), firms with more independent directors on the 
board are likely to have low costs of equity. Therefore, more independent directors on 
the board could be perceived by shareholders to reflect ‘good’ corporate governance as 
independent directors are likely to be motivated to act independently and prudently in 
their role as risk monitors on the board.  
 
8.4 Contribution of the Research 
The research project provides new and potentially important insights regarding the use 
of property insurance and firm value in China and as such, it has at least four 
regulatory/practical implications.  
 
First, this is believed to be the first empirical study to examine the relation between 
property insurance use and the cost of equity. More importantly, this study makes an 
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important extension to the risk management literature by identifying a channel through 
which risk management (insurance) improve firm value. The findings suggest that 
property insurance is an important corporate finance issue that impacts directly on 
firms’ strategic investment and risk management decision. Indeed, investors are likely 
take account of commercial property insurance purchased in assessing firm risks and 
pricing securities. Diamond (1984) also notes that the monitoring function provided by 
financial institutions (such as insurers) helps to minimize the risk of unexpectedly 
severe asset loss and control moral hazard (carelessness) by agent-managers. This is 
also the first piece of research to provide empirical evidence that property insurance 
specifically reduces the cost of equity by mitigating agency incentive conflicts such as 
the investment crowding-out and/or managerial risk aversion problems. This is 
particularly important for firms with high growth opportunities as insurance can help 
facilitate investment in potentially positive NPV projects. The research is therefore 
likely to be of interest to insurance suppliers, brokers, managers, industry regulators, 
investors, amongst others. The U-shape relation identified between the property 
insurance use and the cost of equity further implies that over-insurance could be 
detrimental to firm value. This is particularly important to those managers in Chinese 
PLCs who lack knowledge of risk management/insurance. The study also sheds light on 
the corporate capital structure decision. For example, the contingent capital attributes of 
insurance can reduce the level of retained share capital and so maximize reported 
returns on equity. This attribute is likely to be of interest to current and prospective 
investors and the financial analyst community. 
 
Second, this study contributes insights on the relation between the cost of equity capital 
and risk management by utilizing a corporate insurance dataset, whereas most previous 
risk management studies (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Haushalter, et al., 2007; 
Géczy et al., 1997, 2007) have used financial derivatives. Compared with financial 
derivatives’ data, insurance is an indemnity contract (pure hedge) and so cannot be used 
for speculation (Zou, 2010). The current study provides a cleaner test of the research 
hypotheses than would be the case using financial derivatives data. 
 
Third, the linkage between risk management (insurance) and the cost of equity is 
particularly important in an emerging market, such as China, where the funding of 
corporate investment opportunities can be obfuscated by severe information asymmetry 
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problems and poorly developed legal and financial systems. A China-focused study also 
provides a good opportunity for testing and refining financial economics-based theories 
(such as agency theory) on the relation between cost of equity and the use of risk 
management techniques (such as insurance). The research methods and results of this 
study could thus act as a useful framework and benchmark for future insurance-based 
research in both China and other Asian countries, particularly those with a similar 
socio-economic structure and political history to China. 
 
Fourth, China’s rapidly expanding financial markets and the increasing number of 
Chinese companies seeking overseas listing status has offered international investors 
increased prospects for risk diversification (Zou and Adams, 2006). However, Lee and 
Rui (2000) observe that a key inhibitor to the efficient operation of financial markets in 
China is the lack of knowledge held by investors (particularly those from overseas) as to 
the future growth opportunities of companies. The findings of this research project 
suggest that agency problems are priced by investors and reflected in higher equity 
costs. As noted earlier, this is especially important for firms with high growth 
opportunities as insurance can enable the realization of positive NPV investment. This 
attribute has economic and political decision-making relevance for investors, financial 
analysts, policymakers and others with an interest in the Chinese corporate sector. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the Study 
Conclusions drawn from this study should, however, be tempered by recognition of 
some of the limitations associated with the research design. The following four 
limitations specific to this research project deserve attention. First, as noted in previous 
chapters, the panel data used in this study were draw from the CIE database which 
provides insurance spending of parent companies, whereas the cost of equity estimates 
are at the group level. On the other hand, most of the subsidiaries of parent companies 
in the study are engaged in the same industries and in general, they are physically 
located close to that of the parent. As such, the risk profile (and hence the cost of 
equity) at the level of the corporate group should be very similar to parent. 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that the results might be biased to some extent as a result 
of risk profile mismatches. Second, market-based proxies used for some variables (e.g. 
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a firm’s riskiness) could be “noisy”, particularly in view of the short time-series of data 
used (2003-2007) in this study and given the nascent and volatile nature of the domestic 
stock markets in China. Third, because of the relatively small number of firm/year 
observations the current study was unable to run quartile regressions and/or change 
regression analysis to check the robustness of the empirical results. Fourth, due to the 
absence of analysts forecast data, the study could not experiment with alternative 
market-based accounting valuation models to estimate the cost of equity which are often 
deemed to be more reliable than CAPM model.  
 
8.6 Areas for Future Research 
There are a few prospective areas for future research highlighted by the results of the 
present study. First, future research should attempt to employ alternative cost of equity 
estimation models (e.g., the AEG model) for testing the relation between property and 
other classes of insurance (e.g., directors and offices (D&O) insurance) and the cost of 
equity. It is also important to test the robustness of the relation between property 
insurance and different estimates of the cost of equity, as no widely-accepted approach 
for estimating the cost of equity exists in the finance literature. Second, future research 
could explore the insurance-cost of equity relation by using a ‘true’ level of insurance 
coverage with deductibles information which more precisely reflects the expected 
probability and quantum of risks to be covered. Third, new research could incorporate 
other potentially relevant variables into the analysis of property insurance use and the 
cost of equity. For example, such factors may include managers’ past risk experiences 
(or firms’ historical loss experiences), more accurate industry classification (e.g., a more 
refined breakdown of manufacturing firms), and/or firms’ production diversification 
strategy as hedging substitutes (which requires segmental reporting data). Fourth, recent 
empirical research in developed economics such as in Canada (Chen. et al. 2012b) 
reports that risk management prudence could also directly impact on future levels of 
equity financing and its cost.  However, this study was not able to examine the future 
effect of property insurance purchase on equity financing due to data unavailability. 
Future research in such areas, thus could yield interesting insights and contribute to 
improving our understanding of the effect of corporate risk management (insurance) on 
firm value, particularly in emerging economies. 
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8.7 Final Remarks 
Corporate risk management (insurance) and its link with the cost of equity is a subject 
of a considerable importance to managers, investors, regulators and other interested 
parties. A number of prior studies have examined the effect of hedging on firm value 
(e.g., see Zou 2010). However, most of studies focus on the impact of risk management 
decisions (derivatives use) on firm value through future cash flows. The current study 
makes an important extension to the risk management literature by identifying a channel 
through which risk management (insurance) improves firm value by examining the 
relation between property insurance use and the cost of equity in Chinese PLCs. The 
findings of this study support agency theory-based hypotheses that property insurance 
could reduce firm’s cost of equity by mitigating agency problems. Despite the 
limitations of the study, it is believed that this research contributes valuable insights on 
the relation between the corporate purchase of property insurance and the cost of equity. 
Accordingly, it makes a potentially important contribution the accounting, finance and 
risk management literature. It is believed that the results of this study could also provide 
important decision-making insights to managers, investors, policyholders, insurers and 
other interested parties such as credit rating agencies. Further research could extend this 
work in several directions, for example, in determining what different corporate 
stakeholders (e.g., current and prospective investors, managers, policymakers and so on) 
consider to be the economic value-added qualities of commercial insurance buying, 
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APPENDIX A: Definition and Description of Dependent, Control and 
Other variables 
Variable Name Definition 











Raw beta times the market risk premium of 
7%, where the raw beta is estimated by a 
market model regression using the previous 






Industry-adjusted beta times the market risk 
premium of 7%, where industry-adjusted 
beta is the re-levered industry median of 
unlevered raw beta estimated by a market 
model regression using the previous 60 





Implied cost of equity based on the MPEG 
model minus the risk-free rate, where the 
risk-free rate is defined as yield to maturity 






    
 
INS 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm has 





The annual (amortized) corporate spending 
on property insurance scaled by the prior 
year-end book value of tangible assets (e.g. 




The square of annual corporate spending on 
property insurance scaled by the prior year-
end book value of tangible assets 
+ 
CIE 
Control Variables      
LEV 
Long-term debt to total asset ratio, both 




Cash and cash equivalent scaled by book 
value of total assets, both measured at the 




Natural logarithm of the ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of equity. Both 




Natural logarithm of the market value of 




Systematic risk, measured by raw beta 
estimated from market model regression 
using the previous 60 months’ returns (at 
least 24 months) divided by 1 plus the ratio 





Analysts’ forecast error, defined as (Actual 





Variable Name Definition 





The proportion of non-tradable A-share to 




Idiosyncratic risk. Defined as the standard 
deviation of the residual monthly returns in 
market model regression using the previous 





Price run-up, defined as natural logarithm of 
1 plus the compounded stock returns in the 
previous 12 months. 
+/- 
Datastream 
Other Variables      
STATE_OWN 
The proportion of shares held by the State to 




The proportion of shares held by managers to 
total shares in issue. 
+/- 
WIND 
BOARDSIZE Number of board members +/- WIND 
INDBOARD 
Proportion of outside directors to total 




A dummy variable equals 1 when the CEO is 




A dummy variable for whether a ‘high risk’ 
firm belongs to the manufacturing of 
chemicals, plastics and rubber, oil and gas 
extraction/refining, coal mining, and 
metallurgical engineering industry is denoted 




A dummy variable for whether a ‘catastrophe 
risk’ firm locates in east coast and central is 




Cost of borrowing, defined as an average 
borrowing cost (interest expense charged to 





Capital expenditure to asset ratio, defined as 
annual capital expenditure/total asset both at 




New debt financing, defined as (total 
liabilities in year t+1 minus total liabilities in 




Cash flow to sales ratio defined as (earnings 





Industry median of insurance coverage 
INSCOV in the same city excluding the firm 




Insurance choice fitted by a random-effects 
probit model with instrument variables(i.e., 
high property risk firm dummy, city dummy, 






Variable Name Definition 





Insurance coverage use fitted by a random 
effects tobit model with instrument variable 
(industry median of insurance coverage) and 
other control variables. 
- 
 
INSCOV2* Squared term of INSCOV* +  
INDUS1 
A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 





A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 
agriculture, forest, animal product and or 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 
medicine or biological product industry, and 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals one when a firm is 





A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 





A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 
chemical, plastics, rubber, and oil industry, 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 
coal mining and gas extraction/refining 




A dummy variable equals 1 when a firm is in 








APPENDIX B:Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and Condition Index 
Variable         Equation [6.1] Equation [6.2] Equation [6.7] 
INS 1.07 - - 
INSCOV - 3.55 3.27 
INSCOV2 - 3.41 3.39 
LnMB 1.96 2.07 1.60 
LnMV 1.52 1.60 1.89 
LEV 1.23 1.22 1.24 
CASH 1.18 1.18 1.18 
STD_ERR - 1.28 - 
UBETA - 1.81 - 
CAPX - - 1.11 
NSHARE 1.15 1.15 1.14 
YEAR DUMMIES       
2004 1.76 1.76 1.75 
2005 1.89 2.49 2.44 
2006 1.84 1.84 1.77 
2007 2.53 2.53 2.40 
INDUS1 2.29 2.29 1.39 
INDUS2 1.64 1.65 1.95 
INDUS3 1.27 1.27 1.4 
INDUS4 2.02 2.02 2.62 
INDUS5 2.09 2.08 1.05 
INDUS6 1.10 1.10 1.14 
INDUS7 1.02 1.02 1.08 
INDUS8 2.98 2.96 1.02 
INDUS9 1.73 1.73 3.96 
INDUS10 1.55 1.57 2.03 
INDUS11 2.62 2.62 1.80 
INDUS12 1.45 1.44 3.43 
INDUS13 1.30 1.30 1.66 
INDUS14 1.10 1.10 1.32 
INDUS15 2.33 2.33 1.47 
INDUS16 1.35 1.15 1.14 
INDUS17 1.44 1.13 2.89 
Mean VIF 1.66 1.82 1.88 
The largest condition index in 
the model 5.66 5.65 5.79 
(Source: Research data). This table gives the VIFs of each independent variable and the largest condition 
index in models [6.1], [6.2], and [6.7] specified in chapter 6 section 6.4. All VIFs are less than 10 
indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in the current study (e.g., see Kennedy, 1998, 








APPENDIX C: The Extent of Property Insurance Use (demeaned 









INSCOV_DEMEAN -  -0.0655**   -0.0360** 
  
(-1.96) (-1.88) 
INSCOV2_DEMEAN +     1.0288***     1.1817** 
  
(3.85) (2.45) 
LnMV -    -0.0022***   -0.0002** 
  
(-3.69) (-2.14) 
LnMB +/-          -0.0005   -0.0014** 
  
(-1.14) (-2.56) 
LEV +   0.0008**      0.0403*** 
  
(1.89) (6.8) 
CASH -  -0.0109**    -0.0065*** 
  
(-1.99) (-3.04) 
NSHARE +          -0.0015          -0.0004 
  
(-0.67) (-1.36) 






R-Square   0.15 0.46 
No of Obs.   1,156 1,156 
Inflection point ,where, INSCOV =  0.032 0.015 
(Source: Research data). This table shows the panel regression results of the extent of property insurance 
use on the cost of equity using demeaned INSCOV and INSCOV2-see footnote 44, chapter 7, section 7.6. 
The dependent variable: risk premium is computed as industry adjusted beta times the market risk 
premium of 7%, where industry-adjusted beta is re-levered industry median of unlevered raw beta 
estimated by a market model regression using the previous 60 months returns (at least 24 months). The t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The labels ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (one-tailed when unidirectional variables have 
predicted signs and two-tailed otherwise), respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
